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ABSTRACT
Planning and preparations for the 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup are well underway and
there is little doubt that South Africa will impress sports fans and spectators with the modern stadiums
and tourist facilities. The 2010 World Cup is an opportunity to hasten social, cultural, environmental,
economic, and physical growth. South African cities should use 2010 to improve the public realm and
create new economic opportunities for South Africans.
Megaevents like the 2010 World Cup can generate economic investment and build an
international image, but South Africa can also use World Cup funding to invest in the public realm. South
Africa is economically, socially, and spatially fragmented. As South Africa struggles with issues of racism,
inequality, crime, and poverty, development for 2010 offers an opportunity to unify the fragmented
community through design. Development projects and urban investments for the 2010 World Cup can
transform the city and stimulate new development patterns. Host cities can use new stadiums,
transportation infrastructure, and tourist facilities as part of city improvement plans. Design, project sitting,
and city policies can alleviate or exacerbate urban fragmentation by enticing infill development or
wastelands. Considering the enormous public expenditures, it is imperative for cities to include substantial
city improvements in the planning repertoire.
Unfortunately, World Cup planners are not maximizing this opportunity. Planning for the WC
tends to focus on economic development and image enhancement, instead of the possibilities for city
improvements. Ideal city development often conflicts with international hosting requirements and
deadlines. Despite high expectations, infrastructure projects are too focused on the ephemeral and not on
the permanent.
This thesis will examine the possibilities for cities to use the 2010 World Cup to hasten city
development. The first chapter will detail the 2010 World Cup plan and the local stakeholders as well as
the lessons learned from previous World Cups. The next chapter will examine the obstacles South Africa
faces as it prepares for the 2010 World Cup and characteristics that make this host country different from
previous World Cup hosts. Chapter three will describe the development strategy and explain how World
Cup infrastructure can change the city. The next chapter will illustrate the World Cup conflict resulting
from these development decisions. The final chapter will explain the reasons why local organizers are
wasting this opportunity, instead exacerbating inequality and fragmentation, and conclude with
suggestions for future World Cup planners.
Thesis Supervisor: Diane E. Davis
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On earth peoples become fans;
Care not wars, care not crimes;
Carry our flags, songs, and drums;
Everyone is dancing, chanting, harmonizing;
Restarted our true engine of human life.
Soccer plays,
On the pitch of our beautiful globe;
Care not politics, care not separatisms;
Carry our joys, passions, and oneness;
Everyone is coming, watching, and sharing;
Rebuilt our perfect sphere in one wholly piece.
Soccer ends,
On the screens of common household;
Care not victory nordefeat, honor or shame;
Carry our beer, tears, hopes; a great memory;
Everywhere we walk, meet, and argue...
Rekindled our souls in her beginning and ending.
Soccer we play and live,
On the street, beach, and green pasture;
Care not hatred of past, injury of nightmares;
Carry our sweat, spirit, and a virtuous living goal;
Every moment of our game in life
Refines our goodly being thru true love of beautiful game.

PREFACE
Football is the most popular sport in South Africa and across the globe and the FIFA World Cup is
one of the largest international events. This is an exciting time for South Africa. With such a complicated
history, it is not surprising that expectations are high. High local and international expectations are almost
prohibitive; it is easy to impress when prospects look grave and it is difficult to astonish when outlooks
seem more certain and encouraging. It is even more exhilarating because this is the first instance when
the FIFA WC is hosted on African soil. For planners, such as expectations make it even harder to
impress. Some South Africans are disappointed by the lack of opportunities and continued inequality and
poverty even under the country's new idealistic constitution. A similar reaction is likely to occur after 2010
if excitement is met with disappointment.
In the summer of 2006, while visiting South Africa, I frequently engaged in conversations
discussing South Africa's involvement in the 2010 World Cup. As a planner, I was eager to evaluate the
potential for city development. I hope my findings improve 2010 the 2010 development strategy.

INTRODUCTION
THE IMPACT OF THE 2010 WORLD CUP ON SOUTH AFRICA
As a country, we are never going to close rank on politics, economic
plans, or foreign policy. But we are mad about sports, so there is no
argument about hosting the World Cup. We all want it.1
-Udesh Pillay, Executive Director of Urban, Rural and Economic
Development at the Human Sciences Research Council
Many people in the First World have a particular perception of
Africa and still expect to see rhinos and zebras, and people
wearing skins. People struggle to believe that a developed,
industrialized Africa exists, with the skill and capacity that the rest
of the world has. 2
- Tokyo Sexwale, Businessman
I Udesh Pillay, Executive Director of Urban, Rural, and Economic Development at the Human Sciences Research
Council admits that attitudes on the tournament have revealed that the public still feels it is well worth the sacrifices
necessary to prepare for the World Cup. Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).
2 Sexwale, Tokyo (July 18, 2007). Football Kept Us Alive. FIFA.com.
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WASTED OPPORTUNITIES
Planning and preparations for the 2010 South Africa (SA) F6d6ration Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) World Cup (WC) are well underway and there is little doubt that SA will impress sports
fans and spectators with the modern stadiums and tourist facilities.3 The 2010 World Cup is an
opportunity to hasten social, cultural, environmental, economic, and physical growth. South African cities
should use 2010 to improve the public realm and create new economic opportunities. Unfortunately,
World Cup planners are not maximizing this opportunity. Planning for the WC tends to focus on economic
development and image enhancement, instead of the possibilities for city improvements. Despite high
expectations, infrastructure projects are too focused on the ephemeral and not on the permanent. Instead
of leaving an eternal, enduring, encouraging, lasting legacy, the 2010 SA WC will leave linger debt and
fragmentation.
In 2010, billions of people worldwide will focus their attention on SA. From June 11 to July 11,
2010, SA will host the FIFA WC. Although, SA has regularly hosted international sporting events,
including the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC, this will be the first instance when the FIFA WC
will be hosted on African soil. The cost and scope of the project is enormous. SA will host 64 football
matches played in ten stadiums in nine cities - Johannesburg,4 Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth,
Nelspruit, Polokwane, Bloemfontein, Rustenberg, and Pretoria. Of the ten stadiums, five will be upgraded
and the other five will be newly constructed. The ten stadiums in total will seat more than 570,000 people.
In terms of the size of the television audience, the FIFA WC is bigger than the Olympics. 5
Megaevents like the 2010 WC can generate economic investment and build an international
image, but they can also change the built environment. There has been considerable research on the
financial benefits of hosting a WC and some research on the more elusive benefits of branding, but very
little studies have focused on the impact of the WC on the built environment. This is because this is the
first time when a developing country will host the FIFA WC and the WC can be used to rebuild the city.
SA's WC is expected to be one of the most commercial and politically successful WC events in
FIFA's 76 year history. International sponsorship, stadium attendance, and local and international
3 The FIFA WC is an international football, or soccer tournament held every four years since the first tournament in
1930. The tournament is organized by members of FIFA, the international agency responsible for organizing
international football leagues in conjunction with the host country. The FIFA WC differs from other international sports
events like the Olympics in that it is hosted in ten stadiums in the host country. Preparations are therefore
considerable more complicated. Host countries typically prepare elaborate bids several years before the event but
are only formally selected six years before the WC.
4 Johannesburg is the only city to have two World Cup stadiums. It is the primary host city where the opening and
closing football matches will be played.
5 It is important to understand the differences between the Olympics and the WC. The Olympics is held in a single city
while the WC is held across at least nine cities in a country. The enormous scale of the WC makes it incredibly
challenging. Even developed host countries have difficulty providing sufficient sports facilities in so many cities. It was
difficult for local organizers to demonstrate sufficient facilities in nine South African cities. Hosting in so many cities
makes it even harder to ensure a lasting legacy for the built environment. Unlike the Olympics, WC host cities do not
build elaborate athlete housing. Infrastructure tends to focus only on stadiums. This thesis will argue that WC should
facilitate city investment in all host cities closer to the scale of the Olympics. 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa.
Retrieved April 16, 2008, from SouthAfrica.info: www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm.
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excitement in anticipation of 2010 is expected to exceed previous records. Much of this enthusiasm
results from the enormous challenges SA faces as it plans for 2010; 2010 marks SA's final emergence
from apartheid and decades of international isolation, and SA will use 2010 as a chance to demonstrate
the possibilities of a democratic SA.6
Economic expectations are high. In total, between 2006 and 2010, the gross contribution to
national economy is expected to be R51.1 billion, which includes direct expenditures of R30.4 billion plus
the multiplier effect of the total indirect impact on SA.7 On the national level alone, the construction
industry is estimated to contribute R29.3 billion to the economy, not including local provincial and city
investment projects. This spending will sustain 368,250 construction jobs. The 33-day event itself is
estimated to generate R15.6 billion from foreign visitors. The tourism industry is estimated to need
196,400 permanent and temporary personnel. There are an estimated 3.2 million tickets to be sold.
Foreign visitors are expected to stay 15 days spending several considerable sums outside of the games
daily. In addition, estimates expect an additional 100,000 African non-ticket holders and 25,000 overseas
non-ticket holders to visit SA during the event and watch the games from the fan parks,8 bringing the total
number of visitors, including 36 teams with an average of 50 people per team, 11,000 media, 5,000 VIPs,
and 500 FIFA officials, sponsors, and media to 400,000 visitors during the month-long event.9
This is an important event for Africa. SA is the first black, African country to host a FIFA WC.
President Thabo Mbeki and Local Organizing Committee (LOC) 10 Chief Executive Officer, Danny Jordaan
frequently declare, "An African World Cup captures Africanness" or 2010 will contribute to an "African
Renaissance" or "Ubutu" (an authentic Africa). But nationally, the WC will be used primarily to leverage
marketing and increase annual tourism. From the initial stages of the bid process, the SA LOC has
committed to a use 2010 as a tool for growth and development within SA and throughout the continent.
Mbeki stressed to FIFA President Sepp Blatter at the 2004 WC dedication ceremony, "We want, on behalf
of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidences from Cape to Cairo - an event that
will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa.""
6 Ibid.
7 R is the symbol for the South African currency called Rand. Whenever possible, financial figures will be written in
United States Dollars. This document uses the current monetary conversion which at the time of publication 1 USD
was equivalent to 7 Rand.
8 Fan parks are public gathering places outside of the stadiums where crowds of non-ticket holders can gather and
watch the football match live on large television screens. These fan parks provide a central location for revelry for
those who could not afford tickets. Fan parks were an integral component of the South African bid and will be
discussed in detail later in this paper.
9 Van der Merwe, Justin. (2007). Political Analysis of South Africa's Hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups:
Lessons for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and Beyond. Politikon, 34(1): 67:81.
10 The Local Organizing Committee, or LOC, is the entity ultimately responsible for all matters relating to the
administration and presentation of the 2010 WC. After SA was awarded the WC in 2004, the South African Football
Association (SAFA), the agency previously responsible for all WC related matters formed the 2010 FIFA WC
Organizing Committee of South Africa with all its responsibility. The LOC is structured such that various members
represent sports, business, government, and entertainment sectors to ensure adequate preparations.
11 African Legacy. Retrieved April 24, 2008, from SA2010: www.sa2010.gov.za.
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In addition to the economic and branding benefits of hosting the 2010 WC, the event can also be
a powerful development tool. SA can use WC funding to invest in city improvements. The scars of
apartheid remain an important factor in the planning and development of the South African city. During
apartheid, governmental legislation restricted the movement of people and the development of the city.
As a result, sections of the city developed independently, and despite the more than a decade of
democracy, legacies of apartheid still linger shaping South African culture and policies. South African
cities remain economically, socially, and spatially divided. During the first decade of democracy,
government policies promising jobs, education, and equitable access have failed to materialize. New
opportunities intended to eviscerate past injustices resulted in disappointment. Meanwhile, wealthier
South Africans fled the cities into secure, gated communities, and cities fell into disrepair. Some wealthy,
White areas of cities like Johannesburg are as developed as Western Europe while nearby Black
neighborhoods remain impoverished. Ideally, the 2010 WC offers these disenfranchised areas the
opportunity to catch up to development elsewhere in the city.
Development projects and urban investments for the 2010 World Cup can transform the city and
stimulate new development patterns. Host cities can use new stadiums, transportation infrastructure, and
tourist facilities as part of city improvement plans. Design, project sitting, and city policies can alleviate or
exacerbate urban fragmentation by enticing infill development or wastelands. Considering the enormous
public expenditures, it is imperative for cities to include substantial city improvements in the planning
repertoire.
This thesis will examine the possibilities for cities to use the 2010 WC to hasten city development.
The first chapter will detail the 2010 WC plan and the local stakeholders as well as the lessons learned
from previous WCs. The next chapter will examine the obstacles SA faces as it prepares for the 2010 WC
and characteristics that make this host country different from previous WC hosts. Chapter three will
describe the development strategy and explain how WC infrastructure can change the city. The next
chapter will illustrate the WC conflict resulting from these development decisions. The final chapter will
explain the reasons why local organizers are wasting this opportunity, instead exacerbating inequality and
fragmentation, and conclude with suggestions for future WC planners.
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CHAPTER 1
SOUTH AFRICA PLAYS HOST
This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build and unify the nation.
It matters not that Bafana Bafana is unlikely to win. 1
- David Carte, Journalist
For a long time nobody spoke about African football, but the word
is coming. We have many difficulties. We have funds for football,
but not for food or medicine. Football is a good thing. When the
world watches South African football, they see us playing, not
fighting.2
- Lagahi Digbeu Sylvain, Journalist
1 The newly integrated South African team, Bafana Bafana (meaning the boys) played its first game on July 7, 1992,
and despite more than two decades of rest, the team beat Cameroon 1-0 at King's Park Stadium in Durban. Over the
next few years, the team continued to shine qualifying for the 1998 and 2002 World Cups. Bafana Bafana is currently
ranked at 53 by FIFA. About SAFA. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from SAFA Website: www.safa.net/index.php
Carte, David. (August 2006). Retrieved April 22, 2008 from CarteBlanche: www.carteblanche.co.za
2 Sylvain, Lagahi Digbeu. (June 2006). Retrieved April 22, 2008, from CarteBlanche: www.carteblanche.co.za.
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1.1 1 SOUTH AFRICA WILL HOST THE 2010 WORLD CUP
From June 11 to July 11, 2010, SA will host the 19th FIFA WC, an international football
tournament. Although, SA has regularly hosted international sporting events, including the 1995 Rugby
WC and the 2003 Cricket WC, this will be the first instance when the FIFA WC will be hosted on African
soil. In terms of the size of the television audience, the FIFA WC is bigger than the Olympics.3
The 2010 WC is expected to be one of the most commercial and politically successful WC event
in FIFA's 76 year history. FIFA's confidence in SA is crucial for South African further development.
Proponents have argued that the WC can be a powerful tool if wielded responsibly. SA can leverage the
needs to host effectively with the country's needs to improve safety and security and redevelop the
fragmented cities, all the while developing a profitable event. Opponents of the WC argue that these
enchanting benefits are easily overstated. Plans for the game do not focus on redeveloping the country or
investing in those areas most in need, instead focusing solely on the ephemeral demands of the month-
long event. Opponents claim that host countries rarely profit and considering the flagrant need for basic
services, that such frivolous investment on sports events is egregious.
1.2 I SOUTH AFRICA BIDS FOR THE FIFA WORLD CUP
Although SA was the front runner for the 2006 World Cup, in July 2000, FIFA awarded the event
to Germany, after SA lost by a single vote. The final vote was 12 votes for Germany and 11 in favor of
SA, with an abstention from New Zealand's Charles Dempsey, who was instructed by the Oceania
Football Confederation to vote for SA.4 Consequently, FIFA decided to institute a system of rotating the
privileges of hosting between continents with Africa being the selected continent for 2010.s
3 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from SouthAfrica.info:
www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm.
4 Dempsey was instructed by the Oceania Football Confederation to vote for SA. If Dempsey bid as instructed the tie
vote would have been decided by FIFA President Sepp Blatter who is a strong supporter of an African World Cup.
Dempsey claimed that the pressure of deciding was too great and he therefore abstained.
5 Baade, Robert A. and Matheson, Victor A. (2004). The Quest for the Cup: Assessing the Economic Impact of the
World Cup. Regional Studies. 38: 4, 343-354.
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SOUTH AFRICA PLAYS HOST
Image 1.1 I Mandela Hugs 2010 Trophy6
This now famous image of Former South African President Nelson Mandela smiling as he triumphantly lifts the WC
trophy at the official 2010 host country ceremony mirrors sentiments of pride rippling throughout SA and even the
world. "I feel like a young man of 50, "said 85-year-old Nelson Mandela, the former South African president, who
attended the ceremony.
On May 15, 2004, SA was awarded the 2010 WC, beating bids from Morocco and Egypt,
becoming the first African nation to host the FIFA WC. Not only was SA favored to win the event because
of its 2006 loss but its bid was significantly better than that of either Morocco or Egypt. Both Libya and
Tunisia were eliminated from the bid before the final selection. Specifically, SA's existing infrastructure
was infinitely better than the other contending countries.7 It is interesting to note that SA was the only
Black, Christian country vying for 2010 and that must have played into FIFA's decision. If FIFA was going
to bring the WC to Africa, it needed to bring it to a Black country. Likewise, the European agency was
likely uncomfortable with a Muslim WC and probably quite concerned about terrorism. 8 In comparison to
international terrorism events, which have never occurred on South African soil, SA's crime problem must
have seemed minor. SA and particularly Black Africa are a much larger market than the North African
countries. This meant that if FIFA chose SA, it would ensure decades of passionate Southern African
fans.9
6 Schmidt, Charles F. A Spatial Model of Authority-Dependency Relations in South Africa. The Journal of Modern
African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep., 1975).
7 Ibid.
8 It should be noted that this type of distinction is never made by FIFA, SA, or any other WC agency but it seems
obvious to any scrutinizing observer. This blatant omission is also a concession that FIFA and the world are still not





It is interesting to consider the state of SA when the nation lost the 2006 WC to Germany. In
2000, SA was still a humble democracy. The violent eruptions many had expected during the transition to
democracy had been averted, but international investors were still cautious. Crime was at all time highs
and economic growth still meager. By 2004, SA's economic growth was growing steadily and many
international agencies had reinvested in SA seeing it as a rapidly growing new market. Four years later,
SA was increasingly viewed as the foothold of Africa. Also importantly, by 2004, the ANC under the
leadership of President Mbeki were strongly supportive of privatization and corporatization, which may
have made international investors more comfortable with possible profits. Ironically, four years later, in
2008, economic investment and job growth has slowed, crime has not decreased as promised, and the
anticipated transition from President Mbeki's privatization efforts to presumed presidential successor,
Jacob Zuma may result in a shift away from privatization efforts.
In 2007, Brazil was the only country to bid for the 2014 FIFA WC, which according to FIFA's
rotating system, is set to be staged in South America. According to FIFA, Brazil's bid was approved
because it demonstrated capacity to host an exceptional international sporting event with its superior
facilities and rich tradition of football. It is also the only country in South America that could manage such
an enormous event. After the 2014 WC, FIFA is set to abandon its system of rotating tournaments around
the continents. When asked why FIFA stopped rotating hosting privileges between continents, FIFA
President Sepp Blatter said, "Something was missing. The competition was lacking, and football is
competition."' 10
1.3 1 SOUTH AFRICA OBSESSED WITH SPORTS
Sports have played a crucial role in SA, particularly as the country embraced the international
arena in the post-Apartheid years. These mega-events have been a mixed blessing. Hosting these events
has resulted in heavy financial losses for hosting agencies, but in more nuanced areas such as branding,
the unintended (or perhaps intended) consequences have been mostly positive.
Despite its historical role as international pariah chose to pursue a hosting opportunity in 1990 to
host the 1995 Rugby WC in 1990. After decades of blatant inequality, SA embarked on what Stephen Gill
dubbed as the "global beauty contest"."1 Based on Gill's work, Black and Van der Merwe assert that the
hosting of such international events is wrapped up in the global configurations of power, inequality, and
identity. This situation was exacerbated in the aftermath of Apartheid whereby SA has launched into a
frenzy pursuing such events in an attempt to heal its racial divide locally and its international image.
10 World Cup Will No Longer Rotate Among Continents. (October 30, 2007). The Washington Post
1 Van der Merwe, Justin. (2007). Political Analysis of South Africa's Hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups:
Lessons for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and Beyond. Politikon, 34(1): 67:81.
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Before the country's first democratic elections, the to-be new government having realized the immense
opportunities sporting events offered the country for both ephemeral image-building and permanent
institutional feats, was already vying for both the Rugby and Cricket WCs. The emerging democracy was
able to achieve almost impossible prowess by marketing Nelson Mandela's international iconic appeal
that for the most part superseded the practical constraints of hosting the 1995 Rugby Cup. Ironically, SA
welcomed in its first democratically elected government both Rugby and Cricket, the bastions of
Afrikanerdom and British Imperialism. Van der Merwe explains that hosting these events provided the
divided people of SA with a divergent focus on national identity and racial reconciliation instead of
concentrating on the pervasive poverty. That same ideal holds true of future hosting pursuits.12
The political rhetoric of the country has been represented through these three sporting events.
The 1995 Rugby WC's slogan, "one team, one nation," proved a panacea for a country still reeling from
the brink of civil war. Nelson Mandela's cornerstone phrase, the "Rainbow Nation" was built at the Rugby
WC. Hosting agencies designed the event to depict the country's racial aspirations and indeed the sport
demonstrated the power of the liberating nature of sports. The glory of the Rugby WC, when all of SA
seemed to unite as the first multi-racial Rugby team soared to victory, became a beacon that all
subsequent megaevents sought to recreate. The luster of the event remained for a number of years
representing the possibilities of a united SA. The event was also indicative of the political leadership of
Mandela who sought to unify the people first and foremost and saw international prestige and Pan-
Africanism as secondary. 13
Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, became president in 1999 just as SA was preparing to host
the 2003 Cricket WC. His leadership style and emphasis on hosting an African WC in 2003 has
permeated every aspect of the development of 2010. Namely, SA's decision to co-host 2003 with
Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrated Mbeki's vision for SA to rejuvenate the African continent socially and
economically. Mbeki's political agenda to redevelop SA through the African Renaissance and his
pandering to big business permeated the 2003 event. Van der Merwe explains that Mbeki's "African
Safari" motif was his attempt to Africanize a sport which was introduced as a means of civilizing the
British colonies. Although this choice created unnecessary political tensions, SA still successfully
dispelled the myth that it could not host technologically advanced events. Business investment was of







South Africa Hosts Itr•national Sports Events
Image 1.2 I South Africa Hosts International Sports Events' s
Since the early 1990s, SA has been vying for every opportunity to host an international sports tournament, playing
host to the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC. The overwhelming success of previous hosting opportunities
helped the country win the 2010 FIFA WC. Successful hosting has increased international prestige and provided the
country with investment.
1.4 I THE 2010 GAME PLAN: SA's 2010 WORLD CUP BID
SA utilized two prominent arguments when vying for 2010. Firstly, the development argument,
claiming that hosting the event will jumpstart necessary infrastructure projects that despite their needs are
stalled by cost. The second argument relates to the promotion of an improved image, an African Revival
of sorts for the entire continent. Both these arguments are entirely sound and are the notable reasons
why FIFA awarded the 2010 WC to SA; however, these arguments mask the overt lack of existing and/or
buildable infrastructure necessary to host such a mammoth event.
What better way to show the world a new SA than to host one of the most popular international
sporting events in the world. The bid book, written by the South African Bid Company, which was formed
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by members of South African Football Association (SAFA) 16 details the long-term and short-term
improvements such as infrastructure upgrades, new stadiums, enhanced transportation links, improved
telecommunications, safety and security, accommodations, and health care facilities. This magnanimous
event is promised to be an event t r.
Image 1.3 I Map of South Africa's World Cup stadiums'8
The games will be held in ten stadiums in nine cities in SA. Five of SA's football stadiums will undergo major
renovations to be completed in December 2008 and five new stadiums will be completed by October 2009.19
16 The South African Football Association, or SAFA, is the governing body of football in SA. SAFA was formed on
December 8, 1991 as part of the process to rid South African sports of its racial divisions and prejudice. Four
disparate football agencies Four different football agencies, the Football Association of SA, the South African Soccer
Association, the South African Soccer Federation, and the South African National Football Association formed SAFA.
Between 1976 and 1991, SA was prohibited from playing world football. SAFA's mission was therefore to remove the
racially divisive elements from the game so that SA could once again compete internationally. As a result of this
formation, in January 1992, SA was awarded observational status at international football competitions. Finally, in
June 1992, SAFA was invited to join the world government body, FIFA as SA's official local agency. Being readmitted
to FIFA was a milestone for SA, symbolizing the rebirth of a new SA. Before 2010, SAFA's major feat was to improve
the rank of the national team. About SAFA
17 Reader, please note that all bid books remain confidential. FIFA responded to my request for the 2010 bid book as
follows: "The documents sent by the member associations of FIFA are considered internal communication and, as
such, we are not in a position to provide them directly." Because I could not locate the exact wording and descriptions
of projects in the 2004 bid, much of my information describing 2010 planning efforts was drawn from various South
African government and ancillary websites. Because the plans continue to change and evolve the 2004 bid book was
long outdated. My inability to gather the information directly from the 2004 book does not hinder the authenticity of
this study.
18 This map was taken from www.sa-venues.com
19 A Guide to the 2010 Stadiums" detailing the construction work complete with maps, projected capacity, costs, and
completion dates is located at the end of this document in Appendix A.
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The games will be held in ten stadiums in nine cities. Five of SA's football stadiums will undergo
major renovations to be completed in December 2008 - Soccer City in Johannesburg, Ellis Park in
Johannesburg, Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria, Royal Bafokeng Stadium in Rustenberg, and Vodacom Park in
Bloemfontein. Five new stadiums will be completed by October 2009 - Green Point Stadium in Cape
Town, Mbombela in Nelspruit, Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth, Peter Mokaba Stadium in
Polokwane in Limpopo, and Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban. The stadiums are mostly located five or
so kilometers from the city center, along major highway.20 As of October 2007, the estimated total costs to
build these ten stadiums is R10 billion or USD 1.38 billion.21
To be selected, host cities prepared persuasive business cases demonstrating their ability to host
the event. Host cities were selected by the LOC, the Development Bank of SA, the National Treasury,
and the Ministry of Sport and Recreation. Officials from the South African construction industry were also
consulted as to the selection of host cities. As part of the business plans, host cities were responsible for
developing plans for supportive infrastructure including transportation upgrades and the development of
sufficient hospitality. Cities are also responsible for developing the lasting legacy of the event and
ensuring that all South Africans benefit from 2010.22
FIFA requires host countries to provide a number of guarantees to ensure a successful event.
These guarantees promise mostly short-term benefits with some ancillary long-term improvements to SA.
* Access to SA: The Government has promised no country will be excluded from participating in the
WC and therefore SA intends to provide extra visas to those affiliated with the WC. The Government
has also promised in legislation to fulfill all needs of visitors.
* A supportive financial environment: The Ministry of Finance has agreed to waive taxes on imports
and exports affiliated with the WC.
* Safety and security: The Ministry of Safety and Security, in affiliation with the SA Police Services
(SAPS) 23 has agreed to ensure safety and security during 2010. A written security plan is currently
being developed and implemented in conjunction with the LOC.
20 Despite planning policies advocating for urban stadiums near active areas, South African cities are developing
suburban style stadiums outside of the city center.
21 Maennig, W. and S. du Plessis. (October 2007). World Cup 2010: South African Economic Perspectives and Policy
Challenges Informed by the Experience of Germany 2006. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25(4), 578-590.
22 Ibid.
23 The SA Police Service, or SAPS, is national police force, the principle law enforcement agency in SA. SAPS was
formed as part of a national strategy to integrate and unite the fragmented law enforcement institutions in SA and the
homelands. SAPS, which is headquartered in Pretoria is organized into six divisions: Crime Combating and
Investigation Division, the Visible Policing Division, the Internal Stability Division, the Community Relations Division,
the Supporting Services Division, and the Human Resource Management Division. SAPS administers the national
crime records and is responsible for disseminating national and local crime statistics to the nation annually.
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* Telecommunications: The Ministry of Communications has guaranteed that the telecommunications
infrastructure will be more than sufficient to manage communications for 2010 across wired and
wireless national and international systems.
* Transport: The Government has guaranteed to install transportation infrastructure to accommodate
the needs of visitors and athletes for the event.
* Healthcare: The Ministry of Health has promised infrastructure that can supply comprehensive
medical and disaster-management services.
* FIFA rights: As part of the required promises, SA assured FIFA that it would be able to distribute and
sell its commercial affiliates in the stadiums. FIFA has also been guaranteed that it will not be liable in
any claims related to the events in SA or during the WC. 24
SA is using this hosting opportunity to expedite related projects such as the USD 1.2 billion
Gautrain, a high-speed rail linking Johannesburg and Pretoria, the new Mafikeng International Airport in
Durban, the Statue of Freedom dedicated to Nelson Mandela in Port Elizabeth (remained Nelson
Mandela City), and a signature-bridge in Coega.25
An efficient transportation system is an important element of an enjoyable stay and a successful
WC. The Bid Book promised that all modes of transportation will be "in perfect order."26 If visitors and
players cannot travel between and within cities efficiently, then they may be late for matches. Constant
delays, poor road infrastructure, and airport delays are all major problems in SA. This demand for
improvements to the transportation network is part of the government's plan to alleviate poverty through
the Extended Public Works Program. Additions such as the Gautrain, a train connecting Johannesburg
and Pretoria and the completion of the Mafikeng Airport are part of this program. Although the
government promised long-term benefits for all South Africans, the majority of the jobs are temporary.
"Big business will no doubt benefit significantly from the 2010 effect, but this government is challenged to
ensure that the periods preceding, during and after the Soccer World Cup, also materially impact on the
lives of the majority of this country, who are poor, unemployed, and remain loyal supporters of soccer."27
Private business will be the major profiteer from these WC projects.
24 Guarantees. Retrieved March 26, 2008, from South Africa 2010 Government Website:
www.sa2010.gov.za/government/guarantees. php.
25 Waltz, Clint. (January 25, 2005). World Cup Soccer Economic Impact. Alabama Institute for Sport and Fitness




In addition to these measureable impacts, SA will benefit from improved marketing and branding
generated by a successful event. "Leaving aside, for a moment, the direct benefits of the tournament to
our economy and the immense legacy of sporting and social infrastructure that will remain, this is the
single most important boost ever for South African tourism,"28 Marthinus van Schalkwyk, the Environment
and Tourism Affairs Minister said. The Bid Company's Tourism, Hospitality and Leisure Director, Gilliam
Saunders says; "We may be able to project the tangible benefits but it is not possible to project the huge
intangible impact that SA will experience over the next six years." Many of the expected visitors will likely
visit nearby tourist attractions such as Cape Town's Table Mountain and Robben Island, the Union
Buildings, Hector Petersen Memorial, Sun City, the Big Hole in Kimberley, the Greater St Lucia Wetlands
in KwaZulu-Natal, the Mapungubwe Ruins in Limpopo, Kruger National Park and Sodwana Caves in
Mpumalanga, and battle fields from the Anglo-Boer War, all of which are in or near the host cities.29
1.5 1 THE PLAYERS: AGENCIES AND STAKEHOLDERS
In 2001, SAFA reorganized its mission to focus on a single goal, to bring the WC to SA. Because
SAFA believed that hosting the WC would promote and facilitate the development of football through
sustainable infrastructure and training initiatives, lead to the recognition of football as a national asset,
and improve the image of SA as being stable, progressive, and innovative, it became the major agency
charged with outlining the bid book and coordinating the bid process.30 Underneath these seemingly
benevolent goals, SAFA has developed an overt mission to create a beneficial relationship between
football and the corporate world so as to enable Africa's ascendancy in the world of football.
To prepare the bid, SAFA developed the South African Bid Company to develop and compose
the bid book presented to FIFA. Once SA was selected as the site for the 2010 WC, the South African Bid
Company was dissolved and the LOC took over. In May 2005, Danny Jordaan joined five other staff to
form LOC. In June 2005, the LOC moved into its new offices in a central location in Sandton,
Johannesburg. On August 29, 2005, the LOC was formed as a nonprofit entity incorporated under
Section 21 of the Companies Act. It was charged with the responsibility for collaborating with FIFA and
the South African government. The initial investment for the WC was funded by FIFA but local investment
has since been able to supplement FIFA's contribution. After the Germany WC concluded, FIFA sent
representatives to the LOC offices in Sandton to ensure the completion of all the necessary planning.31




31 Jordaan, Danny. (May 25, 2005). Retrieved December 20, 2007, from Business Day:
www.worldcup201 Osouthafrica.com/content/view/202/92/.
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The LOC is responsible for monitoring the cities' preparations for 2010. The committee is
responsible for acquiring the necessary corporate sponsorship for the U17 team and organizing media
contracts. More than R3.3 billion from television deals is already guaranteed. Other sponsorship has been
secured from First National Bank and Sasol for the U17 team with finances being coordinated with South
African Airways, LG, Avis, and other American corporations to supplement the enormous costs of the
event.32
The LOC is composed of a nineteen member board of directors who are leaders in the fields of
sports, business, and government. 33 The board is composed of some of the most powerful individuals in
SA today, some of which have been accused and/or convicted of crimes ranging from corruption to tax
evasion. Although many of the board members may have noble goals, a great number are leaders of
major South African corporations, and are therefore likely motivated by corporate greed and international
ascendancy.
The Committee is spearheaded by the following four individuals. But are they fair, honest and
qualified to manage the planning for 2010? Or is their integrity questionable?
* Danny Jordaan is CEO of the LOC. In 1997, Danny Jordaan was elected CEO of SAFA and headed
the agency bid for both the 2006 and 2010 WC bids. He was an anti-Apartheid activist and a teacher
who then became an ANC member of Parliament. He has spent more than 10 years pursuing SA's
WC dream. His success in bringing the event to SA has made him very popular and as such as was
voted 44 th on the South African Broadcasting Company's 100 Greatest South Africans. In 2004,
Jordaan was selected to be CEO of the 2010 LOC.34
* Irvin Khoza, as Chairman of LOC and vice president of SAFA, is responsible for leading the
successful bid to win the 2010 WC. He made his fortune in a property deal and took charge of the
then bankrupt Orlando Pirates, a team his uncle managed into the ground. Khoza was named
chairman of the LOC despite being convicted twice (1979 and 1981) of insurance fraud for trying to
profit from a fictitious life policy. He was also convicted of drug dealing and tax evasion in Zambia and
forced by the South African Revenue Service to pay USD 10 million. Khoza was also convicted of
keeping money earned from trading players instead of reinvesting in the club as required by law.35
Khoza's previous corruption should make him ineligible to control billions of Rand, and yet somehow
he is organizing 2010.
* Tokyo Sexwale is one of wealthiest and most powerful businessmen and former anti-Apartheid




35 Who is Irvin Khoza? (December 10, 2004). BBC Sport.
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Govan Mbeki.36 While in prison, Sexwale completed a business degree at the University of SA. After
his release in 1991, Sexwale was very involved in politics, serving as the Premier of the Gauteng
Province until his split with the ANC in 1998. Sexwale founded Mvelaphanda Holdings, a mining
company for oil, diamonds, and gold which has made him one of the wealthiest men in SA. He is the
second-in-charge of De Beers Diamonds below Harry Oppenheimer. He also chairs other energy,
electronics, import/exporting, and banking corporations. Sexwale's recent support for Jacob Zuma
was considered a major cause of his 2007 control of the ANC presidency.37 Certainly Sexwale's
business interests conflict with his leading role in the planning and development of 2010. As a
businessman he is going to be biased when making decisions that should benefit the entire country,
instead building in areas that suit his business interests.
Selwyn Nathan is CEO of Southern African Investments Ltd., a sports investment company, which
focuses on building mass media support and sports brand ownership, while maximizing profit through
investing in delivery platforms such as sports-related media and services. Nathan was asked to join
the team because of his expertise in stadium development and his ability to gain sponsorship for
2010. As the CEO of a company that profits from building stadiums, he will profit from building
stadiums in 2010. He may be swayed to build more stadiums or increase the costs for building the
stadiums so that his company will increase its profits.38
Several government ministers are also serving on the board of the LOC. Because of the sheer
scale of the event, almost every government department is playing a part in preparing the country.
Different tiers of government have different responsibilities during this preparation period. The central
government's main role during the preparation is ensuring infrastructure projects such as hospitals, roads,
and emergency services are completed. The LOC has asked the central government to produce a
government-driven integrated economic strategy for the areas around the stadiums to ensure that they do
not become white elephants. 39 The central government's WC effort is driven by the Inter-Ministerial
Committee, chaired by Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The Inter-Ministerial Committee
comprises heads of the ministries responsible for delivering on the government's bid book guarantees.
The committee meets monthly to report to President Mbeki on their activity.40 The government has
36 Govan Mbeki is an important and popular ANC politician, and father of President Thabo Mbeki.37 Tokyo Sexwale: Football Kept Us Alive. (July 18, 2007). FIFA. Com.38 Other members of the board of the LOC include: Other members of the LOC board include: Professor Michael Katz
(business), Anastasia Tsichlas (sport), SAFA CEO Raymond Hack (sport), SAFA chairman of the referee's
appointment committee Mubarak Mohamed (sport), SAFA president Molefi Oliphant, Kenneth Lebenya (sport) ,
Kaizer Motaung (sport), Koos Bekker (business), Zwelinzima Vavi (labor).
39 Jordaan 2005
40 The Inter-Ministerial Committee is comprised of the following ministers: Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-
Nguka, who is the chairperson, Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile, who is the deputy chairperson,
Minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad, Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, Deputy Minister of Finance, Jabu
Moleketi, Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula,
Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Minister of
Trade and Industry, Mandisi Mpahlwa, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk,
Minister of Communications, Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, Minister of Transport, Jeff Radebe, Minister of Justice, Bridgette
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committed twelve departments and a number of ancillary semi-public agencies to ensuring a successful
WC. 41 President Mbeki said, "The good thing about it, is that it will be an integrated approach between
the event organizer (FIFA), the private sector, and the government working...on a solid platform already
established during the previous major events."42
New agencies like the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) is responsible for fulfilling the
government's guarantees, ensuring that the government's major investment for 2010 support its overall
priorities and that SA develops a lasting legacy for development, nation-building and African solidarity.
The TCC works closely with the LOC and its organization structure is divided into the following tasks -
infrastructure, security management, economic benefits, and social and political legacy, including
international branding.43 The 2010 Management Unit (MU) was formed to manage all 2010 projects and
affiliated agencies in an organized manner. The MU falls under the leadership of the Minster of Sports
and Recreation and is responsible for managing all elements of the government's responsibilities for
2010. Joe Phaahla is the Director-General of the MU. 44 In addition to the formal establishment of new
agencies, a 2010 office working with the National Treasury has been charged with ensuring sound
financial management of all 2010 projects.
The Host Cities Forum is a joint venture between the government and the LOC to manage all
aspects of preparations to be completed in and by the host cities. This group meets monthly. The Forum
is chaired by the Minister of Provincial and Local Government and is responsible for coordinating 2010
projects across local, provincial, and national spheres and for providing technical assistance to the host
cities.45
The LOC is responsible for all final details regarding stadium and other sports-related
infrastructure. The LOC is not the appropriate entity to be overseeing national planning efforts. The LOC
is the agency responsible for organizing the 2010 WC. Physically, the LOC is based in Johannesburg and
is not capable of managing projects nationwide. The LOC is composed of representatives of the sports,
government, and business sectors; they are not planners and are therefore not demanding that 2010
projects improve urban futures. The LOC does not know the best means for jumpstarting the local
economy in Polokwane or how to improve access to the waterfront in Port Elizabeth. Instead of hiring
staff that could plan such complicated projects, the LOC is focused on the ephemeral success of the
event in 2010. Although officially, all development projects are part of an Integrated Development Plan
Mabandla, Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi, Minister of Agriculture, Lulama
Xingwana, and Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan.41 Other government ministers serving on the LOC board include: Minister Essop Pahad, the Minister in the
Presidency, Minister Makhenkesi Stofile, the Minister of Sport and Recreation, Minister Jeff Radebe, the Minister of
Transport, Jabu Moleketi, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and Sydney Mufamadi, the Minister of Provincial and Local
Government.
42 Mokgola 2004





(IDP), the IDP does not necessarily reflect the most pressing local demands. Therefore, development
projects are scattered without a holistic or integrated approach to improve the city. The mission of the
LOC is to develop a successful WC event, not to improve urban futures. The agency is not accountable to
the public for insufficient planning.
The Premier Soccer League (PSL) began voicing displeasure with the LOC when they
announced plans to renovate existing stadiums rather than building new ones. The PSL is worried that
SA is not demonstrating a long-term commitment to football for future generations. Critics like PSL argue
that the Rugby WC was a great success because SA significantly improved Rugby stadiums throughout
SA. Johannesburg's FNB Stadium will be the largest new stadium and the only venue designated
exclusively for football. Trevor Philips, CEO of PSL, says that the bid never proposed to build enough new
stadiums to have a lasting legacy on the sport. Groups like PSL have gained support from host cities who
want complete control over infrastructure and do not want the Central Government in Pretoria determining
local needs.4
By creating the LOC, SAFA is able to distance itself from details and controversies around 2010
preparations. For 2010, SAFA is only responsible for training SA's football team by developing effective
programming that identifies future talent who will make the team competitive in 2010. Before FIFA
granted SA the WC, SAFA had considerable debt. As a result of the 2010 sponsorship, SAFA has paid off
all major debtors including the South African Revenue Service.47
1.6 J LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS WORLD CUPS
Much of the excitement around hosting 2010 results from promises that sports investments
guarantees profit. Early estimates of the 2010 WC's net economic impact on SA is measured at USD 3
billion, based on 230,000 foreign tourists arriving for the tournament and staying an average of 15 days.
This impact represents a 1.5% increase in GDP. 48 This figure does not include the estimate of the
economic benefit of expenditures by the local population on ticket sales and at-home viewing parties. The
estimated benefit is therefore greater than USD 3 billion. Other figures estimate an output of as much as
R21.3 billion into the national economy with an estimated R13.7 billion in direct spending by spectators
and an increase in infrastructure value at R8 billion. SA expects an additional R7.2 billion in tax income.49
46 Madywabe, Lungile. (October 23, 2006). Soccer's lasting legacy from 2010. Mail and Guardian Online.jJohannesburg).
Jordaan 2005
4 Maennig and du Plessis 2007
49 Kruys, B. G. G. (April 2007). Public Safety and Security during the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Institute for Strategic
Studies University of Pretoria.
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Despite the promised prosperity associated with international events, sports facilities rarely generate
substantial profit.
Cities and nations must be careful not to fall into debt when planning events lest they never
realize the positive economic benefits of hosting. Mayor Jean Drapeau famously said when planning
Montreal's 1976 Summer Olympic Games, "The Olympics can no more have a deficit than a man can
have a baby." Drapeau however could not have been further from reality. Montreal's initial estimates of
USD 310 million soared to USD 1.5 billion. More than thirty years later, the city is still struggling to pay off
the debt long after the infrastructure has become obsolete. The 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens
followed a similar trajectory. Just three years after the event, the stadiums are already falling into disrepair
since event planners have never found a post-Olympics use. Greece's national debt is above 6%,
violating the EU's stability pact, has been attributed to residual Olympic debt.50
In order to avoid these pitfalls, SA must develop its infrastructure with considerations for
immediate and long-term financial benefits. Cities must plan infrastructure projects to be long lasting.
Barcelona estimated it built fifty years worth of infrastructure in just eight years. Manchester's USD 850
million in investments for the 2002 Commonwealth Games resulted in 16,000 permanent jobs. SA must
develop varied jobs not just service and low-paying jobs.51
Tourism is of course the most immediate way to profit, injecting funds directly into the economy
before, during, and after the games. Tourism can be especially salient in smaller towns. Tourism to the
little Austrian host city, Lillehammer, soared 43% in the four years preceding and following the 1994
Winter Olympic Games. In the three years leading up to the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics, tourism
jumped 8%, then soared to 12% during the host year, and 3.25% annually for the next five years. Simple
considerations such as these and heeding the mistakes of previous host cities will help SA guarantee
tangible benefits from 2010.52
Examining the planning process and aftermaths of previous WC events is critical for projecting
the success of various aspects of the 2010 planning process and to forecasting the possibilities for 2010.
Countries like SA want to host international events because of the event's financial possibilities as well as
its ability to transform negative national perceptions. Although the long-term economic benefits of the
2010 WC on national economic growth are immeasurable, estimates can be developed by examining the
economic benefits of previous WC events such as the 2006 WC on the German economy. Lessons from
Germany provide a context for analyzing the potential costs and benefits to SA on a national level. Before
a shovel is placed in the ground, SA must be able to clearly demonstrate the long-term economic benefits
of building the necessary infrastructure in lieu of providing basic needs such as housing and sanitation.
r' Satchu, Jamil, Emmanuel Hembert, and Nicolass du Plessis. (2008). Building a Legacy. A.T. Keamey.




Considering the proliferate expenses and escalating costs, it is even more pressing that SA demonstrate
the significant economic benefits of such substantial investment.
WC events have the potential to be incredibly profitable national investments. The WC can only
be as profitable as the American and German Games if most of the infrastructure already exists. If the
country needs to invest considerably to host the WC as was the case in Asia and will be in SA, then the
country must invest considerably more in supportive infrastructure and needs to yield greater profits.
Likewise, if the stadiums do not already exist, then there is not likely a demand for such large stadiums. In
WC host countries like Japan, where the country built the stadiums just to host the WC, these stadiums
are wasteful since they will not likely be used after the event. For the most part, previous WCs were very
successful and serve as models for SA.
1.6.1 I The 1994 USA World Cup Success
From June 17 to July 17, 1994, the host cities of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles,
New York, Orlando, San Francisco, and Washington DC earned more than USD 1 billion in direct
spending during the 1994 US FIFA WC. Los Angeles, because it hosted the most games earned USD
623 million, New York was the next most profitable city earning USD 452 million, followed by San
Francisco with USD 338 million and Boston with USD 255 million.53 This economic analysis
conservatively measures the economic impact based on initial attendance estimates between 90 and
95%, although actual attendance was higher. The city of Pasadena, located in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area which hosted the finals in the Rose Bowl generated over USD 30 million in tax revenue
based on stadium rental fees, parking revenue, concessions, and souvenir sales. The Pasadena
Convention and Visitors Bureau reported an increase of USD 98.2 million in direct and indirect spending
and 1,700 increase in part-time jobs. However, the hotel industry did not experience the financial profits
as the rest of the country because visitors and businessmen who may have visited the city avoided the
area during the WC.54
Overall, the 1994 WC garnered tremendous economic, social, and political benefit. As a
prerequisite to hosting the WC, the US had to create a national football league, which went on to win
several subsequent tournaments. Likewise, the tourism and hospitality industry profited greatly. Although
spending remained mostly in host cities, since most hospitality industries are national corporations, profits
were shared and distributed throughout the country. No studies have even whispered that the US did not
benefit economically from hosting the 1994 WC. However, it is important to note that to host the WC, the
53 For comparison, the 1994 Super Bowl also hosted in Los Angeles that same year, an event which many consider
to be the largest American sports event earned just USD 182 million.
54 Waltz, Clint. (January 25, 2005). World Cup Soccer Economic Impact. Alabama Institute for Sport and Fitness
Management, Troy University.
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US did not need to invest in supportive infrastructure and as a result, preparations for the event were
relatively minor and cheap.55
1.6.2 1 The 1998 France World Cup Success
The 1998 FIFA WC was held in ten stadium in ten cities throughout France. The tournament was
widely considered a success both spiritually and financially. France won their first WC title and was the
first host country to win the tournament since Argentina in 1978. Because of France's relatively developed
infrastructure, the country built only one new stadium, the Stade de France in Saint Dennis, an inner
suburb of Paris and spent little renovating the rest of the stadiums. The France WC is widely seen as an
incredibly profitable and successful event. The country was unified by the unanimous celebration around
France's victory. As a developed country, the event took place without complication or serious unrest and
profits soared high as people from all over Europe came to France to join in the revelry.-6
1.6.3 I The 2002 Asia World Cup Success
In 2002, Japan and South Korea became the first to jointly host a WC event, splitting the 64
matches evenly between countries. More than three million spectators attended the matches with ticket
sales accounting for USD 1.2 billion. More than 35 million viewers watched the WC live, making it one of
the largest events in Asia.57
In the same manner that SA is designated an African WC, Japan was unwilling to be outdone by
its former colony, South Korea and as a result felt the stinging disillusionment about the WC. Japan spent
almost USD 5 billion building ten stadiums to match South Korea's number of stadiums. The most notable
white elephant stadium, Sapporo, cost USD 400 million complete with a retractable field that costs USD
15,000 each use. Even before the WC began, Japan announced that only two of the ten stadiums would
ever be self-supporting. Japan, like SA, assumed that building these ten stadiums would boost the
economy, adding an estimated USD 25 billion, only to realize that such enormous development projects
are short-term and leave the host country in debt.58 South Korea on the other hand, spent USD 1.7 billion
on infrastructure and built its stadiums with the intention of reusing them after the tournament for the
Korean soccer league. The South Korean stadiums have been incredibly successful. South Korea used
the new stadiums in conjunction with city development plans. Developers used innovative materials to cut
55 Ibid.
6 Dauncy, Hugh and Geoff Hare. (1999). France and the 1998 World Cup: The National Impact of a World Sporting
Event London: Routledge.
57 Parr, Rob. (April 2002). World Cup Brand Protection. Brand Strategy, 26-28.
58 Plotz, David. (May 31, 2002). Japan's World Cup Delusion. Retrieved March 31, 2008, from Slate: www.slate.com.
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construction costs and sited the stadiums so as to be easily adapted after the WC. As a result, the wiser
South Korea's economic output was USD 9 billion or 2.2% of GDP.5 9
Attendance and tourism levels were nowhere near expected and as a result profits were
considerably less. Hundreds of thousands of event tickets were never sold. Japan mistakenly projected
an estimated 330,000 visitors would attend the WC, instead Japan had only 75,000 visitors, just 20% of
the original estimates. This disappointing turnout as mirrored by a decline in the typical number of
business travelers who avoided Japan during the event.6
Japan, like SA, expected the WC to promise painless salvation from its economic problems.
Unfortunately, the 2002 WC failed to deliver the necessary "football magic" leaving the country in a worse
situation. Such an inflated and then disappointing result can easily happen in SA. On a more positive
note, significant corporate sponsorship rescued the financial depressing attendance supplementing some
of the investment costs. Despite the financial failures, South Korea benefited greatly from the new
stadiums and other supportive infrastructure; SA also needs new infrastructure and despite the financials
of the 2010 WC, SA could benefit from the new infrastructure regardless.61
1.6.4 1 The 2006 Germany World Cup Success
Less than two years have passed since Germany hosted the 2006 WC and already the economic
benefits of the WC are estimated as high as USD 10.4 billion. This figure is significantly higher than the
highest pre-2006 estimate of USD 2 billion, but with 3.3 million foreign visitors spending USD 200-265 per
day, the overall effect is likely closer to USD 12-16 billion. This higher figure was determined by adding
the USD 4.5 billon the German Hotel and Catering Association and the Postbank calculated was spent on
food and hotels. The residual USD 8 billion resulted from foreign investment, tourist spending, and local
resident spending during the month-long event.62 Germany was able to recover its expenses through
ticket sales, marketing revenue, and FIFA contributions. The LOC event made a USD 206 million profit
and was able to partially repay the FIFA investment of USD 65 million. Much of this surplus revenue
resulted from near capacity sales of match tickets for another USD 27 million in unexpected revenue.
Although at this early stage it is difficult to guess the cost-benefit structure of the 2010 WC, some
financial issues are already developing. In particular, the high cost of seats at the WC stadiums is proving
prohibitive for most South Africans. The LOC plans to sell 2.7 million tickets for a total of USD 638 million
resulting in an average price of USD 236. With high unemployment exceeding 27% and 57% of people
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USD 280, the LOC cannot rely on the near capacity seating that Germany experienced. With the current
entrance fees at SA's premier football matches at about USD 3 per seat, there are concerns about filling
the large stadiums at such high ticket prices.63 Event organizers should consider lowering the costs to be
sure that the demographics inside the stadiums represent an equitable distribution of the country.
Concerns about filling the stadiums at these high prices should be discussed before SA spends million
expanding the capacity of the existing stadiums.
Likewise, SA cannot expect to mimic Germany's low security costs of just USD 33 million. SA
expects to spend R6.8 billion (USD 1 billion) on security. Based upon the current crime conditions, SA
should expect these costs to escalate.
Unlike SA, Germany's athletic and ancillary infrastructure was relatively developed even before
the LOC began planning for the WC. Even so, Germany spent USD 1.9 billion on 12 stadiums; more than
60% of this funding was financed by the existing sports clubs and other private investors. Germany's
private investors were eager to invest in the stadiums since they would surely yield profits from the
upgrades as the stadiums continued to be used after the WC. SA's stadiums by contrast will be almost
exclusively funded by public funds since the clubs cannot afford to contribute the necessary funds.
Likewise, the private agencies are less likely to invest in the stadiums since they will not easily recover
these expenses. Germany's ancillary infrastructure was also considerably more developed than SA's
roads and communication systems. While SA projects manageable infrastructure costs, these costs are
likely to escalate as construction gets underway.
1.7 I DRAWBACKS TO HOSTING 2010
Megaevents like the 2010 WC have the power to hasten social, cultural, environmental,
economic, and physical growth. But ideal development goals that suit the needs of the city often conflict
with international hosting requirements and deadlines. Events like 2010 can move nations to the next
stages of development and help emerging countries like SA establish international legitimacy. Despite the
successes of previous WC events, there are considerable drawbacks for a developing country to host.
Firstly, the enormous cost involved with hosting the event. SA must develop almost from scratch a sports
infrastructure and related transportation, safety, and communications infrastructure to meet the demands
of 2010. SA may never use this infrastructure after 2010 and investment to meet the FIFA requirements is
excessive given SA's standards. Although the majority of South Africans are major football fans, they are
poor and it will be difficult for developers to earn a return on their investment in the stadiums considering




According to Maenning and du Plessis, who studied the 2006 German WC and its aftermath
determined that stadiums are subject to the laws of diminishing returns displaying a negative social
marginal utility. After the 2010 WC, many of these upgraded stadiums will not be regularly used. With so
many mammoth stadiums, it is not possible to utilize them fully. SA is a relatively poor country and
residents cannot afford to pay top prices for the types of events that developers hope to hold in stadiums
with capacities above 50,000.64 Although having these stadiums offers cities, especially the smaller, often
overlooked cities with the opportunity to host mega sports and entertainment events, South Africans will
not be able to pay ticket prices and therefore the stadiums will likely become white elephants on the
landscape and economic losses for investors.
WC proponents have promised that hosting will deliver strong economic growth. Unfortunately,
little of this potential prosperity will trickle from the corporations to the average South African. These years
preceding 2010 are supposed to be the most economically profitable. But recent reports have concluded
that poverty and unemployment in SA are at all time highs. Despite years of at least 6% economic growth,
unemployment has continued to rise above 25%. Despite Germany's WC prosperity, unemployment
increased in the years after the WC as the construction industry faced a post-event slump. SA will also
experience similar economic scarcity in the years after the WC. Even if workforce projects like stadium
and highway construction may alleviate some unemployment in the short-term, once these projects are
completed, there are no long-term programs to reduce unemployment.
SA is anticipating significant increased spending in the hospitality industry as the country
welcomes WC visitors. Although SA is expecting hundreds of thousands of visitors, as was the case in
the 2002 Asia WC, those expectations can fall short. Concurrently, those visitors who may have been
inclined to visit otherwise may be frightened off by the popularity of the WC. Germany, Asia, and the US,
experienced declines in business tourism and Asia in particular experienced notable declines in all forms
of tourism during the WC. In Germany, many cities not hosting WC events noticed considerable declines
in rented hotel rooms which resulted from more people visiting the city currently hosting a tournament.
Ironically, if SA does experience the projected number of visitors, those tourists will not likely return in the
near future. Short-term tourism increased may lead to noticeable declines in subsequent years.
Location and climate may deter visitors from the Northern Hemisphere who want to spent time in
a summer climate. Some statisticians attribute Germany's profits to its location in the heart of Europe
hosting events during the warm summer months. This ascribes Germany's tremendous increase in
tourism during WC to its central location and warm weather. Statisticians suggest that SA's distant
location and the fact that it is hosting during its winter months will lead to only marginal increases in
[34]
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tourism.65 By contrast, SA is relatively isolated from other wealthy, football-loving countries and therefore
visitors must spend considerable time and money just getting to SA. This may deter many visitors and
lead to economic losses.
Finally, a considerable amount of revenue at previous WCs was generated through
merchandizing. Since many SAs live in poverty, they will not be able to spend the significant amounts that
German, American, and Asian locals spent on WC memorabilia. Event organizers have promised that
hosting the event will revive beleaguered industries, in particular the textile industry. "The reason we're
backing the WC is that there should be employment and procurement opportunities for locals. It shouldn't
just benefit those who are already wealthy," says Tony Ehrenreich, Secretary General of the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU)." Ehrenreich continues explaining that while COSATU continues
to support 2010, it insists that FIFA reduce the high licensing fees that textile producers will need to pay
to sell t-shirts, caps, hats, and scarves.
Despite the enormous possibilities associated with hosting the 2010 WC, there are also possible
drawbacks. As a developing country, SA is experiencing different preparation challenges than previous
WC hosts. If successful however, the 2010 WC can help SA advance to the next stages of development.
65 While SA may experience increases with respect to its typically low tourism numbers during the winter months,
these increases will be matched by decreases in the preceding and following peak summer months since some of
those visitors may be planning to visit during the WC instead.
6 The Congress of South African Trade Unions, or COSATU is a trade union federation founded in 1985 as the voice
of all the 1.8 million trade union workers in SA. COSATU gained momentum by mobilizing the factory workers,
increasing its power towards the end of Apartheid by organizing a series of highly effective wage strikes. Although
COSATU forms the third section of the tripartite alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, it
remains appropriately critical of the ANC government remain true to its roots advocating for the rights of the factory
worker. Although COSATU is an avid supporter of SA's role as 2010 host, it remains critical of some of the





South Africa's efforts have been plagued by organizational snafus,
spiraling costs, and the general feeling that a developing nation is
not up to the task of hosting the world's biggest sporting event.1
- Cathal Kelly, Journalist at The Star, Johannesburg
There are always funds for projects like this but not for things like
employing more Metro Police or housing street children. To spend
R5-billion for a three week sporting event, but not on crucial
services like housing shows that the priorities are skewed.2
- Robin Palmer, Professor of Law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal
1 Kelly, Cathal. (October 5, 2006). South Africa Cup Full of Woes. The Star (Johannesburg).
2 Robin Palmer, a professor of law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Gerretsen, Bronwyn. (August 18, 2006). South
Africa World Cup Spending Slammed. The Mercury (Durban).
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2.1 I SOUTH AFRICA'S 2010 WORLD CUP IS UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSORS
The 2010 WC is unlike any other previous FIFA WC events. Not only is this the first instance
when a FIFA WC will be hosted on African soil, but SA is also the poorest and least developed country to
ever host the WC. SA therefore faces unique challenges as a host country. It must balance the need to
develop equitably and sustainably with the need to meet FIFA deadlines within the allotted budget.
SA is particularly challenged to meet international standards because of its relatively small
population of uneducated, impoverished people. SA is the largest, least populated country ever to host
the FIFA WC. With just 48 million people living in 1.2 million km2, SA is the most sparsely populated host
country. It is also the poorest country ever to host with a GDP of just USD283 billion. SA ranks 12 1st on
the Human Development Index below 0.5 which is considered "low development." By contrast, Germany
has 82 million living in 357,022 km2 earning USD3.3 trillion annually and the US has a population of 304
million living in 10 million km2 earning USD14 trillion annually. SA is also geographically and culturally
isolated. Previous host countries like Germany and US were considerably more capable of preparing
such a mammoth international event.
In addition to poverty, unemployment, and other demands common in developing countries, SA
also suffers from a history of distrust and anger resulting from decades of apartheid policies. Racism is an
important lingering factor. Briefly, between 1948 and 1994, SA was governed by minority White rule and a
doctrine of apartheid. Apartheid legislation classified South Africans according to racial groups and racist
national legislation limited employment opportunities, residential locations, education, and personal
movement. Under apartheid, South African Blacks were stripped of their citizenship. Apartheid was
dismantled after the legislature instituted universal suffrage in the 1994 elections. Despite the more than a
decade of democracy, legacies of apartheid still linger shaping South African culture and policies. The
scars of apartheid remain an important factor in the planning and development of 2010. In particular,
urban infrastructure is fragmented and the country straddles the line of developing and developed. Some
wealthy, White areas of cities like Johannesburg are as developed as Western Europe while nearby
neighborhoods remain impoverished. Ideally, 2010 offers these disenfranchised areas the opportunity to
catch up to development elsewhere in the city. Smaller cities which received marginal government
investment during apartheid can use 2010 to develop impressive infrastructure and transform their
relative importance nationally.
Before SA can rebuild itself, it must manage a variety of issues distinct to its particular stages of
development and the particulars of the 2010 WC bid. Several factors impact the balance of gains,
opportunities, losses, and burdens of hosting the 2010 WC.
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* SA has a complicated relationship with football. The sport evolved from a British Colonial tool for
submission to the "People's Game" with several decades of international isolation in between. This
2010 opportunity is an exceptionally expressive international vote of confidence.
* Local and international expectations are high as spectators from SA and across the globe anticipate
2010.
* Deteriorating cities demand considerable more investment than infrastructure in more developed host
counties. Different cities face different pressures which help and/or hinder their ability to impress.
Inequalities are pervasive in SA, and even more so in areas that are still struggling to overcome
development limitations remaining from apartheid. While all South African cities need to upgrade
various elements of their infrastructure, some cities have to build considerably more to meet the
current standards.
* Fragmentation and decentralization of governing bodies makes it increasingly difficult for municipal,
provincial, and central governments to work together in preparation for 2010.
* Escalating crime rates make it difficult to manage increasing tourism. Although President Mbeki has
promised to enact policies to lower crime rates, violence continues to intensify.
* WC costs are rising without adequate, long-term public financing planning. Unlike other host
countries, 2010 is funded almost entirely by public funds and it is therefore essential that
infrastructure provide lasting benefits to all South Africans.
* Despite socialist promises during this first decade of democracy, privatization has soared.
* International investment and sponsorship is expected to exceed all previous WC events. However,
SA has also promised to promote the development of local entrepreneurship as part of the legacy.
* SA, like many developing countries suffer from limited physical capacity. This is particularly
challenging as SA rushes to complete necessary infrastructure in an abbreviated time period.
These factors contribute to the challenging, complicated, and ambiguous nature of planning the 2010
WC. Recognizing these distinct differences between the characteristics of SA and other developed and
developing countries will enable local organizers to see possibilities and envision a lasting legacy for SA.
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2.2 I SOUTH AFRICA'S COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH FOOTBALL
This section chronicles the history of football in SA. Football was introduced by the British as a
tool to tame the natives. Over time, the popularity of the sport contributed to its nickname, the "People's
Game." Despite its controversial origins, today, football is the symbol of integration and a development
tool. If South Africans could integrate football, then there was still hope for developing a fully integrated
society. It is imperative to understand the popularity and distinctive role football plays in SA.
Image 2.1 I Every South African Plays Football
This image displays the universal passion South Africans display for the sport. In this impoverished area, Black and
White children play together. Age and color are of no regard. Building unity through the WC is one way of ensuring
that future generations are more united than previous generations. Udesh Pillay, Executive Director of Urban,
Rural, and Economic Development at the Human Sciences Research Council admits that attitudes on the
tournament have revealed that the public still feels it is well worth the sacrifices necessary to prepare for the WC.
"As a country we are never going to close rank on politics, economic plans or foreign policy," he says. "But we are
mad about sports, so there is no argument about hosting the World Cup. We all want it."3
3 Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).
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SA has actively sought opportunities to host international events since the country was
readmitted into the sports arena in the early 1990s. The government has used these opportunities to
demonstrate overt political overtones including racial integration and Africanism. Because of its sheer
size, this FIFA WC has greater potential to generate long-term, permanent improvement in SA and
therefore the government should focus on creating holistic benefits for all South Africans. Time after time,
leaders supporting the 1995, 2003, and now 2010 WCs have promised that these events are necessary
to accrue elusive benefits by enhancing equality and human rights; however, SA's business-like approach
to developing the events has diluted the perceived democracy in accordance with a more consumerist
global sports milieu and globalization. Historically, SA has used its role as host to escalate international
investment and corporate profit.
This opportunity to host the 2010 WC is a consequence of the country's elevated status in the
world. Although the Rugby WC and Cricket WC were both important hosting opportunities, both events
are considerably less important internationally than 2010. Rugby and cricket are considered White sports
and these early hosting opportunities can be considered a remnant of their relative worth under apartheid.
Football on the other hand is symbolic of a multicultural, multiracial, and truly democratic global sporting
event. Based solely on audience size, hosting the Rugby and Cricket WCs was like a "dress rehearsal"
for the Football WC.4
Although rugby, cricket, and football are well-embedded in SA, ironically, sports were originally
brought to SA as part of the Colonial British civilizing mission as a means for assimilating locals into a
"British way of life". Those South Africans that demonstrated an appreciation for British customs and
particularly sports were elevated socially and economically. As a result, British sports were incredibly
popular in the colony. Sports formed part of a "broader social fabric of everyday life" and therefore played
a prominent role in the formation and reinforcement of racially-divided communities. Cricket and rugby
were seen as the embodiment of British elitism and gentlemanliness, and therefore became the chosen
sport of the Afrikaans community. By contrast, football because of its working class image in England the
sport transplanted itself into the Black community. Van der Merwe explains that the White sports were
often seen as a means of creating unity amongst the Whites to maintain social distance from the rest of
the population.5
The game of football has historically followed the cultural attitudes of SA and the football leagues
were segregated accordingly. While the White team, the Football Association of SA (FASA), was formed
in 1892, leagues for Indians, Black Africans, and Coloureds, the SA Indian Football Association (SAIFA),
the SA Bantu Football Association (SABFA), and the SA Coloured Football Association (SACFA), only
4 Van der Merwe, Justin. (2007). Political Analysis of South Africa's Hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups:
Lessons for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and Beyond. Politikon, 34(1): 67:81.
s Cornelissen, Scarlett and Swart, Kamilla. (2006). The 2010 Football World Cup as a Political Construct: The
Challenge of Making Good on an African Promise. Blackwell Publishing (Malden, Massachusetts).
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formed in 1903, 1933, and 1936, respectively. Although the sport remained divided, an interracial football
board organized occasional mixed games into the mid-1940s. All mixing stopped in the 1940s with laws
banning mixed sports. In 1958, FIFA officially recognized FASA as the sole organizer of football in SA.
The following year, FASA launched the SA's first entirely professional football club league, which of
course was reserved only for Whites.6
Until the mid-1950s, the world allowed- SA's White team to play internationally. In 1957, at the first
Confederation of African Football (CAF) African Cup of Nations in Khartoum, Sudan, SA was disqualified
for failing to play with an integrated team. In August of 1960, SA was asked to desegregate its team as
required by FIFA's non-discriminatory regulations. The team failed to do so. On September 26, 1961,.
SA's membership with FIFA was formally suspended. Then President of the Football Association of
England, Sir Stanley Rous, opposed this suspension on the grounds that FIFA should not entangle itself
in political matters and he defended SA against further attempts to expel the team. In 1963, Rous
declared that if the suspension was not lifted, the team's competitive possibilities will be impeded and the
suspension was lifted. The following year, in October of 1964, representatives from the African and Asian
associations persuaded FIFA to reinstate the suspension. In 1976 as a result of continued political unrest
and racial violence, SA was formally expelled from FIFA.7
During SA's formal suspension from international football, the popularity of football among Blacks
increased while Whites increasingly supported rugby and cricket. Football remained popular amongst the
Black community, becoming symbolic of the struggle for equality. Football was dubbed the "Peoples
Game" since it united the Black community. Crowds attended tournaments in Black stadiums like the
Orlando Stadium in the Johannesburg Township, Soweto. Black football stars like Jomo Sono and Kaizer
Motaung became heroes to millions. During the apartheid years, football became an arena for those who
were forbidden to meet and discuss politics to raise issues of class, globalization, and capitalism.8 The
1987 film, Cry Freedom, depicts secret political meetings on the football field. This pervasive power of
football is expected to permeate some of the most impoverished sectors of SA in a way that previous
WCs could not. SA is hoping that the FIFA WC will bridge the racial divide and provide South Africans
with a divergent focus.
Between 1976 and 1991, SA was prohibited from playing world football. SA was readmitted into
the international football community as it began the path towards national suffrage. Four different football
agencies, the Football Association of SA, the South African Soccer Association, the South African Soccer
Federation, and the South African National Football Association, met in Johannesburg and formed the
South African Football Association (SAFA) on December 8, 1991. SAFA's mission was to remove the
6 Ibid.
7 Darby, Paul. Africa, the FIFA Presidency, and the Governance of World Football: 1974, 1998, and 2002. (2003).
Africa Today. 50.1, 3-24.
8 Comelissen and Swart 2006
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racially divisive elements from the game so that SA could once again compete internationally. In January
1992, SA was awarded observational status at international football competitions, and in June 1992,
SAFA was invited to join the world government body,9 FIFA as SA's official local agency. Being
readmitted to FIFA was a milestone for SA, symbolizing the reconciliation.10
2.3 I HIGH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
High local and international expectations are difficult to satisfy; in other words, it is easy to
impress when prospects look grave and difficult to astonish when outlooks seem more certain and
encouraging. Despite considerable challenges, national public opinion and international business
interests remain dubiously high. This being the first instance when the FIFA WC is hosted on African soil
makes 2010 even more exhilarating. For planners, such expectations make it even harder to impress.
2.3.1 I South African Expectations
Public opinion is integral to understanding the potential advantages of 2010. In 2005, the Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 1  began conducting annual surveys of public expectations for 2010.
HSRC selected 2,884 respondents from across the country, to serve as an entirely representative
sample. These responses represent a wide range of opinions on the 2010 WC opportunity.
* Results of annual surveys conducted by the HSRC concluded that many South Africans believe the
WC will bring economic prosperity in the form of job creation and work opportunities, although less
than half of respondents expect these benefits to linger much past 2010. Respondents were almost
evenly split, with 47% believing that the benefits of the event would be long-term and 44% expecting
short-term benefits.
* Between 2005 and 2007, the percentage of respondents who believed that the WC would result in
"increased business opportunities" decreased from 62% to 51%. According to Dr. Udesh Pillay,
project leader of the HSRC's 2010 Project, this is an appreciable decrease that has resulted from a
9 The newly integrated South African team, Bafana Bafana (meaning the boys) played its first game on July 7, 1992,
and despite more than two decades of rest, the team beat Cameroon 1-0 at King's Park Stadium in Durban. Over the
next few years, the team continued to shine qualifying for the 1998 and 2002 WCs. Bafana Bafana is currently ranked
at 53 by FIFA.
10 About SAFA. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from SAFA Website: www.safa.net/index.php?page=safainformation.
1 The Human Sciences Research Council or HSRC was established in 1968 to conduct large-scale, policy projects
for public sector users, NGOs, and international development agencies. Research is not specific to South Africa but
focuses only on continental development. The HSRC aligns its research activities to South Africa's national




more visible planning process, respondents
were beginning to "be more realistic and
discerning about their expectations."
Despite promises of prosperity, only 33% of
respondents expected to experience
personal benefits while the same number
did not expect to receive any personal
economic benefits. Expectations differed
between racial groups with only a quarter of
Black African respondents expecting
personal benefits, but 69% of White
respondents expecting to benefit from
2010. However, White and Indian/Asian
respondents only expected short-term
benefits while Black respondents expected
a lasting legacy. Women also expected to
benefit more from job creation than men.
* Although a majority of respondents
believed that hosting the will solidify SA's
position in the international arena, most
doubted that they would personally
experience these benefits.
* Detailed analysis of the surveys reveal that
respondents are becoming more nuanced
and critical of planning processes for 2010.
Public assessment of the government's
ability to meet the demands of hosting the
event decreased 5%. Respondents noted
their local municipality's failure to deliver
basic services means that it will not likely
be able to meet the more stringent
obligations of hosting 2010.
"Football Kept Us Alive"
"The Makana Football Association was named after
one of the great chiefs of our struggle. He was one of
the first political prisoners sent to Robben Island. The
Makana FA was based on the model of FIFA rules. We
played 90 minutes. The pitch we played on had to be
a certain shape and size and the goalposts had to be
exactly the same distance apart. The players dressed
in a certain way. Even the spectators dressed up in
the different colours of their teams," recalls Sexwale.
Given that they were regarded as the worst enemies
of the apartheid state and were banished to. an
offshore prison with no prospect of ever again
returning to the life they once knew, football
provided the political prisoners with some semblance
of normalcy.
"The game of football kept us alive. Everything was
prohibited on Robben Island, but we used to smuggle
FIFA rulebooks underground. We even had
'professional' referees and proper disciplinary
committees. The teams were divided according to
their political affiliation. There were days when if the
Pan Africanist Congress was angry, there would be no
game. But the Makana Football Association was a
vehicle that united all of us. It ran across all political
barriers. We realised it was a very important tool for
our own solidarity, unity and co-operation. I am not
surprised the United Nations has less members than
FIFA has," says Sexwale.
"Prisoners used any material they could lay their
hands on to make a football. We played with
whatever was available and the football nets were
made from real fishing nets which had washed up on
the island. We asked for permission to pick them up
from the shore. By the time I came onto Robben
Island, the Makana FA had made a number of strides.
After many protests, we were eventually allowed to
have our first proper soccer ball. It took about 15
years, but eventually Judy was allowed to bring us
proper kit, with boots with studs, footballs, proper
playing kit and even referees' whistles. Then you




* General public knowledge regarding the event has increased significantly in the last two years, but
figures are still staggeringly low. In 2005, only 16% of respondents knew that SA was awarded the
2010 WC. Although this figure now stands at 89%, people living in rural areas still display
frighteningly low knowledge of the event, with only 15-19% of respondents remaining ignorant of the
event. In 2007, between 8-10% of respondents living in urban areas revealed that they did not know
the event was occurring.
* Respondents noted that the main disadvantage of hosting would be an increase in crime, followed by
fear that consumer prices will increase. Fear that crime will rise is normal considering the enormity of
the event that produces an environment conducive to perpetuating crimes.
What is most important to realize is that when respondents were asked what areas they expected would
benefit most from hosting 2010, 61%, the majority of respondents believed that the Gauteng Province
(the economic heartland where Johannesburg and Pretoria are located) would benefit the most. Only 8%
believed that the "poor and disadvantaged" or persons living in rural areas would benefit, while 17% said
the benefits would go to the average South African urbanite. Thirty-nine percent of respondents expect
the majority of accrued benefits to go to businesses and 29% expect it to go to the wealthy.12
The fantasies about the possible creation and accumulation of wealth dominate the national
discourse about 2010. The date itself pervades everyday talk of symbolic power and imagined wealth to
be gained through hosting. Detlev Krige in his 2006 dissertation, Consuming the Imagination: Fantasies
about Wealth and 2010 Soccer World Cup in Soweto highlights the ways excitement about the WC is
reconfiguring the national discourse, especially for low-income residents of Soweto. Krige argues that
while the liberation struggle embodied a futurist unreality, contemporary visions about 2010 seem within
grasp. This has led some excited Soweto residents to buy property to provide accommodation to 2010
spectators. Through these imagined realities, residents are reconfiguring their personal relationships with
the city, the nation, and the globalizing world. 13
2.3.2 I Business Support
Business agrees with the HSRC surveys, expecting the majority of the benefits, namely economic
gains to go to businesses in Johannesburg and Cape Town, not to all South African cities as WC
proponents promise. According to the 2007 International Business Report by Grant Thornton, 75% of
12 Attitudes to the 2010 World Cup: Positive Expectations Continue, But Not Unabated. (February 7, 2007). Human
Sciences Research Council. Media Briefs 2007 (Johannesburg).13 Krige, Detlev. (September 4, 2006) Consuming the Imagination: Fantasies about Wealth and 2010 Soccer World
Cup in Contemporary Soweto.2010 and the Life of the City. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).
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South African companies believe that 2010 will benefit them financially.14 Research conducted among
200 privately held companies employing between 100 and 400 staff revealed that 47% of respondents
believed that the greatest benefit will occur during the year preceding 2010, with only 14% expecting the
benefit during the event itself. According to the survey, 60% of SA companies are diversifying their
product or service to be more relevant to 2010 to maximize the opportunity. Although overall optimism
amongst business remains high, it is lower than previous years. Grant Thornton attributes this "anomaly
of lower than usual optimism during a business boom to non-business related factors such as increased
crime and political uncertainty regarding the succession in South Africa's presidency." Leonard Brehm,
Chief Executive Officer of Grant Thornton commented, "If our country is to meet the growth targets that
have been set, all those working in South African business must be able to operate in a safe environment.
This can only be achieved through strong sustained action by government security agencies at all levels,
supported by culture of community participation in assisting with the detection and control of crime."15
It seems obvious that business would benefit the most from hosting such a major international
event. Hosting a WC event benefits the host country's construction businesses. Small business and
individuals may experience marginal economic benefits via secondary and tertiary spending, but the
increased tourism associated with the event will mostly go to major corporations through the hospitality
industry. Although there may be a temporary spike in employment during the years preceding the event,
there is much less work once the event concludes. Business therefore rightfully presumes it will profit
most during the building years between 2006 and 2010.
2.3.3 I International Expectations
2010 will be the first time FIFA has awarded the WC to the African continent. When selecting the
host country, FIFA selected SA as a means of helping the developing country expedite the distribution of
wealth services to all South African people. FIFA's mission to utilize the WC to generate development
was first announced during the 2006 WC, when FIFA announced a new slogan, "Develop the game,
Touch the world, Build a better future." According to FIFA, this slogan will serve as an anchor for host
countries to ensure that the event leaves a lasting legacy. The Football for a Better World Alliance is
responsible for creating funding through cooperation between government and nongovernmental
agencies to build a better future for developing countries. It will ensure that SA utilizes this hosting
opportunity to improve the living conditions for all South Africans. 16
14 Grant Thornton is the agency responsible for 2010 WC predictions used by the South African Bid Company to
create the original economic evaluations for 2010.
15 SA Business Upbeat on 2010. (February 1, 2007). Retrieved February 10, 2008, from SouthAfrica.info:
www.southafrica. info




SA has received the complete support of the African Union (AU).17 The AU has committed its
countries -to "full and substantive involvement in the preparation leading to the 2010 World Cup." As a
display of its strong support for SA as 2010 host country, in January 2007, the AU officially inaugurated
2007 as the International Year of African Football. The AU urged its member countries to develop national
programs and identify WC ambassadors to help implement the International Year of African Football
programming, "Sports for All". The AU is seeking to promote football as an instrument for sustainable
economic development and programming that alleviates poverty and builds solidarity within the world.18
In the last decade, it has become SA's agenda to host an international sporting event once every
five years. Hosting the 2006 Football WC was to be the crowning achievement of the emergent
democracy. The country's failure to obtain the hosting opportunity was its first setback in its pursuit of
hosting opportunities. If the Rugby WC was designed to unify the people and build a Rainbow Nation,
emphasizing the soft ephemeral benefits, and the Cricket Cup was supposed to demonstrate SA's critical
role as an emerging leader of Africa, focusing on the permanent quantifiable benefits, then the Football
Cup must refocus on a more holistic rebuilding of South African cities.
"It's (South?) Africa's Turn!"
Image 2.2 I "It's (South?) Africa's Turn!"1 9
SA has been calling the 2010 WC, the African WC, but isn't it the South African WC?
17 The African Union, or AU, is an intergovernmental organization consisting of the 53 African nations. The AU was
established on July 8, 2002 to help secure Africa's democracy, human rights, and sustainable economy by bring an
end to local conflicts, creating a single-integrated defense force, and instituting a single currency, the Afro.18 Ibid.




This is not the first instance when a country has invested its hope to demonstrate its rebirth at an
international sporting event. In April 1966, Munich, Germany was awarded the 1972 Summer Olympic
Games. Germany hoped to present a new democratic and optimistic Germany to the world. Munich's
official motto, the "Happy Games" and the emblem, the "Bright Sun" represented this intention. These
hopes were dashed when Palestinian terrorists kidnapped and murdered 11 Israeli athletes live on
international television. Instead of demonstrating a new Germany, 1972 led the German federal
government to realize the inadequacy of its post-World War II pacifist approach to safety and security.
This example demonstrates that the possibility for failure increases exponentially with expectation.20
2.4 1 DECAYING CITIES
Decrepit cities demand considerably more investment than infrastructure in more developed host
counties. While all South African cities need to upgrade various elements of their infrastructure, some
cities have to build considerably more to meet the current standards. Cities are the ultimate beneficiaries
of the investment. International sporting events like the WC can transform a city by renovating forgotten
neighborhoods or upgrading an ailing transportation system. The 2010 WC can be a powerful tool to
revitalize public facilities. But all these improvements are costly and cities are often left with lingering
debt. Few international sporting events are profitable and those tend to be in cities and countries whose
facilities require little investment. Long after the event is over and the debt is paid off, cities will be left with
infrastructure improvements as an eternal memory.
Hosting 2010 allows cities to influence patterns of development by encouraging growth around
the stadiums and linking neighborhoods via transportation projects. For example, Barcelona, Spain used
the Olympic Games to regenerate rundown areas on the urban fringes; London, England plans to build its
Olympic Park in the Lower Lea Valley, an area ripe for development; Seoul, South Korea used the event
to alleviate urban housing shortages; and Athens, Greece developed a new transportation system to
relieve its congestion. South African cities should use the event to fund infrastructure projects and build
responsibility, taking debt to build needed infrastructure that will continue to benefit the city for the next
half century.21
In comparison to previous WC events, shabby South African cities need considerable upgrades
and infrastructure investment. While other host countries had to build or upgrade stadiums, SA needs to
build and repair entire areas of many of the cities. While the larger cities need to rehabilitate large swaths
of existirg areas, especially in uninhabited downtown areas, some of the smaller South African host cities
20 Reeve, Simon. (2000). One Day in September New York: Arcade Publishing.21 Comparing the Olympic Games and the WC is difficult since the Olympics are only held in a single city and the WC
is held in ten cities throughout a country. Olympic debt and development therefore focuses on city development while
WCs tend to focus on national development.
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need to build entirely new downtowns. This means that SA must invest noticeably more financial
resources and capacity to meet 2010 requirements.
2.5 I DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITIES AND NATIONAL INEQUALITIES
Each municipality has its own distinctive problems that must be addressed in their own ways.
Differences between cities and national inequalities are severe. The number of people living on less than
USD1 per day has more than doubled. The inequalities between cities have also swelled recently making
it difficult for governments to make decisions applicable to all host cities.
Relative importance of South African Cities
Image 2.3 I Relative Importance of 2010 Host Cities22
With the most international prestige, economic power, and people, Johannesburg stands out as the most important
city in South Africa. Durban and Cape Town are also important. But other host cities such as Polokwane and
Nelspruit are less important on a national and international scale.
SA is a conglomeration of many different people, languages, and cultures creating diverse city
landscapes. Each South African city has a different style and attitude. All the cities intertwine to create a
unique country. Each host city was selected for the unique way it would intertwine its personality with the
WC responsibilities. Different South African cities are facing distinct pressures that impact the way the city
is developing WC facilities. Different cities are juggling their resources and their capacity in different ways.




Smaller cities are not managing the degree of complication as larger cities and they may therefore be
able to focus a greater percentage of their resources on WC-related activities. It is important to consider
the externalities of each city's WC preparation plans to realize how it relates to the city's unique plans.
With the most international prestige, economic power, and greatest population, Johannesburg is the
undisputed global city of SA and southern Africa. Not surprisingly, Johannesburg is hosting the opening,
semi-final, and closing WC matches. Pretoria and Rustenberg/Sun City are within an hours drive of
Johannesburg. Four of the ten stadiums will be located within or nearby Johannesburg. Durban and Cape
Town for instance, will be able to use their stunning natural resources while Johannesburg will use its
international status. Nelspruit is located at the most popular entrance to Kruger National Park and visitors
to these matches will probably also enjoy a visit to the park. Port Elizabeth, a historically marginalized
city, is using this opportunity to redevelop itself. City personalities as well as local pressures are an
important prelude to understanding the different ways each city is meeting its host responsibilities.
Hosting is therefore as much a responsibility and a burden as a means for gaining international attention,
economic investment, and infrastructure.
Pressures Facing South Africa as it Prepares for 2010
2010 WORLD CUP
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Image 2.4 1 Pressures Facing South Africa as it Prepares for 201023
In addition to the standard pressures of a developing country like poverty and inadequate infrastructure, SA must
manage to build bridges between generations of racially divided people by improving education and reducing
inequality, all while preparing to host one of the largest international events as the first African country to be
awarded this opportunity. The country must also manage escalating costs and infrastructure.
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Inequalities in South Africa
Image 2.5 1 Inequalities in South Africa24
According to the Center for Justice and Crime Prevention, the greatest overall inequality is in Gauteng and Kwazulu-
Natal. Reducing the inequality in these provinces will require increased economic opportunity and education.
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This competition occurs because no city wants to be the only city without a stadium, so every
host city wanted to spend more than all the other cities building the most expensive and superior facilities.
Such competition is not productive and has led to an enormous waste of money. The ridiculousness of
competition between sports is demonstrated well in Durban. Construction of the King Senzangakhona
Stadium will cost nearly R2 billion on the site of the old King's Park soccer ground located opposite the
Absa Rugby Stadium. When completed, there will be two 50,000-seat venues across from each other. In
an effort to initiate collaboration, the two stadiums combined parking and security infrastructure. This
means that it is impossible for both stadiums to host events simultaneously and at any one time, one of
the stadiums will stand empty. Such a situation is inappropriate considering the egregious budget paid for
by public funds. Durban could have easily spent less money redesigning the Absa Stadium to suit the
2010 WC.
Hosting 2010 will change how cities are ranked nationally. Shifts in economic opportunities,
international importance, and crime levels can influence how the cities interact amongst themselves.
Although Johannesburg has historically been the economic leader, increased economic investment
elsewhere may shift this paradigm. Immigrants tend to flock to Johannesburg where there has historically
been more work opportunities than elsewhere but with increased building opportunities throughout the
country, laborers may find that they prefer to live in Bloemfontein or Port Elizabeth instead. Population
shifts may lead to crime shifts. Opportunity begets more opportunity and people may find it easier to work
in cities other than Johannesburg. Likewise, 2010 will be amongst the first incidences when international
sponsorship has taken place outside of the four largest cities (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and
Durban) and it will provide the international audience with a glimpse of small town life in SA. This may
entice greater support, which in turn will help smaller cities repay their debt from infrastructure upgrades.
On the other hand, Johannesburg's important role is an assertion of its dominance over the other South
African cities and its declaration as a global city.25 Johannesburg is already the largest, most populous,
25 Global cities are those cities that serve as financial and cultural leaders in their regions and within the world
context. Cities like Hong Kong, New York, London, and now Johannesburg are examples of such cities. Global cities
like Johannesburg serve as gateways for their respective regions. These cities are developing metropolitan regions
that are distinctive from the rest of the country. Saskia Sassen defines global cities as those with global linkages
between their respective regions and the world. Johannesburg, although not the official capital of South Africa is
certainly the most cosmopolitan and worldly city in South Africa and suffered the most tumultuous transition to
democracy during the last decade. Even now, Johannesburg has to cope with the largest social and economic
disparities. Johannesburg is an entry point for intemational visitors and foreign direct investment; Johannesburg
Airport is the entry point for international visitors and the city's stock market welcomes foreign direct investment.
Johannesburg was a global city from its origins. The discovery of gold, its central location within SA and its proximity
to Pretoria make it a global city. In his book, The Making of Global City Regions, Klaus Segbers measured the
importance of globally active cities by examining the each city's ability to function as a hub linking its region to the
world. Segbers determined Johannesburg's percentage of linkage at 41%, with its closest competitor, Cairo at just
35%, and Cape Town at 24%. Segbers equates Johannesburg to Shanghai which received a similar ranking at 42%.(Segbers 14) With the dissolution of power from the controlling apartheid government to the more capitalist private
ventures, Johannesburg has flourished becoming not just South Africa's but Africa's most powerful global city
representative. Johannesburg's sprawling spatial organization was able to adapt after the dissolution of the
residential segregation. In the last decade, Johannesburg has fragmented considerably. New subcenters like
Rosebank, Sandton, and Fourways have challenged and complicated the issue of redevelopment. Instead of trying to
heal after the end of apartheid, Johannesburg was able to immediately build new world class suburbs on the
[52]
OBSTACLES TO 2010
and wealthiest city in SA and with the four stadiums within one-hour of the city center, Johannesburg will
receive a disproportionate -share of infrastructural and institutional investment. This increases inner-city
inequality. Smaller cities are challenged to attract tourists and residents.
The WC offers cities an opportunity to work together to achieve a common goal. Since a
successful WC will bring prosperity and notoriety to all, cities should collaborate to develop the best WC
on a national scale. Preparations should include determining the pressures each city is facing and the
best means for alleviating the strain. WC funds should be shared to meet the different demands of the
cities instead of funding unnecessary or excessive city improvements. Cities should also collectively
brainstorm to determine the best ways to improve national failings such as the transportation, housing,
and environment. The lasting legacy of 2010 will be a collaborative result in which the world will judge
each city's ability to meet its WC responsibilities as if it were the entire country.
2.6 I FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE
City governments must unify themselves in the same way that they must defragment the built city.
The 1996 Constitution created a decentralized government in which the country is divided into nine
provinces and 284 municipalities which govern both urban and rural areas. The new South African
government established a fragmented government form in which the decision-making process is
dispersed throughout the system rather than centralized in one person, place, or legislative body. This
means that SA places the responsibility for building the city and providing basic services with the local
municipalities.26 Although the three government tiers are supposed to be equal, in reality, there is an
ongoing battle between central government and municipal governments with the provincial governments
being relatively powerless.27 This system of home-rule in which municipalities retain almost complete
periphery. As a result, Johannesburg was able to capture the world's attention and consequently its investment
before other South African cities. When the world lifted its economic embargo and international business was eager
to return to South Africa, Johannesburg was able to offer appropriately accommodations. Notably, the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange, which could have moved anywhere, chose Sandton. Johannesburg's readiness has proved most
timely helping the city establish itself as the global city in the region.
26 Creators of this system opted for decentralization in opposition to the racist restrictions implemented by the central
government under apartheid and to avoid following the path of many other post-Colonial African countries by
becoming an oppressive dictatorship.27 The ANC united disconnected areas of cities into a single municipality and ensured that all areas of SA were
included in a municipality In urban areas, the municipality.was formed by'combining the city center and the townships
into a single governing organization. In rural areas, municipalities may be a single city or an agglomeration of several
small cities uniting for capacity.27 In the six largest cities (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port
Elizabeth, and East Rand), are governed by a single-tier system in which the municipality and the city are one and
the same. In fact, the nine provincial governments are so powerless that there is talk of dismantling the provincial
government since they have relatively little jurisdiction anyway.
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autonomy over actions has exacerbated differences between municipalities. Although cities were always
considerably different, this system has worsened inequalities between different areas.28
Some municipal funding comes from local utility and property tariffs; the majority of funding
comes from the central government levied from sales and incomes taxes. The central government funds
municipalities through an Equitable Share, population-based, division of revenue system. The Equitable
Share is an annual, unconditional grant given to municipalities to distribute as they please.29 Khululekile
Mase in his dissertation explains that the main problem with the Equitable Share distribution system is
that it provides equal share to all municipalities regardless of individual pressures. This means that some
municipalities do not receive adequate funding to meet demand while others are receiving too much. 30 If
Equitable Share does not provide sufficient funding, municipalities can apply for different types of
additional grants from central government. The most common type, the Municipal Infrastructure Grants
(MIGs) are conditional capital grants earmarked for building and upgrading infrastructure. Municipalities
may also apply for Capacity Building Grants (CBGs), which are grants designed to help local
governments increase citizen participation and increase overall municipal capacity.31
Cities lack the institutional and financial capacity to actualize urban transformation. National
divestment from cities has resulted in national funding decreases that make it difficult for cities to improve
themselves. Between 1991 and 1997 national funding to local governments decreased 85% and between
1997 and 2000 funding decreased another 55%.32 Reduced funding has burdened municipalities with the
exacerbating infrastructural needs. Rural areas have been especially strained by the funding cuts and as
a result rural municipalities have failed to meet infrastructure demands. Because infrastructure costs are
higher in rural areas with limited capacity, national funding cuts have exacerbated the inferiority of rural
municipalities. The 2010 WC offers cities the opportunity to receive national funding for local projects and
make considerable urban improvements.
28 Johannesburg was always the economic and international base, Pretoria is the serious national capital, Cape Town
is the European vacation resort, and Durban is the most liberal and integrated city. These city personalities remain
even in recent years.
29 The Equitable Share grants all municipalities a proportionate amount based on population, but does not account for
need.
30 Another issue Mase discusses is that some municipalities cannot spend the entire Equitable Share because they
do not have the capacity to use the funds. A municipality for example may need upgrade to its water infrastructure but
regardless of funding the municipality does not have the trained professionals to repair the ailing infrastructure.
Instead of spending it, the municipality holds the funding for later in an investment account. Because interest rates in
SA are so high, the municipality will hold the funding for later when an engineer arrives in the town. But the engineer
never arrives and the money remains unused.
31 Mase, Khululekile. (September 2003). Equitable Share? An Analysis of South Africa's System of Fiscal Transfers to
Local Government in Terms of How it Addresses Vertical and Horizontal Imbalances. England: University of
Birmingham.
32 McDonald, David A and John Pape. (2002). Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa. New




Image 2.6 I Fragmented Municipalities33
South Africa is divided into nine provinces and 284 municipalities, which govern both urban and rural areas of the
country. For the most part, the boundaries of cities and towns do not coincide with those of the municipalities. The
new South African government granted considerable autonomy to the municipal governments and provides little
oversight ensuring that these autonomous governments provide basic services.
2.7 I ESCALATING CRIME AND INCREASING TOURISM
Although annual tourism has been increasing since 1994, escalating crime continues to challenge
the tourism industry and makes it difficult to promote SA to potential tourists. Increased crime may deter
potential WC visitors. Violence at the 2010 WC will be incredibly detrimental to the tourism industry.
2.7.1 1 South Africa's Crime Problem
Escalating violent crime is destroying SA's social fabric, fragmenting the city, and hurting its
international image. South African cities have become what South African writer Ivan Vladislavic calls "a
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place of contested boundaries."34 South Africans have barricaded themselves behind high security walls;
some neighborhoods have formed alliances and closed off previously public streets hoping reduced traffic
will reduce local crime. People live in constant fear and avoid public areas like city downtowns, preferring
instead to spend time in privatized and presumable safer suburban malls. Every day the newspapers
publish horror stories reminding people that their fears are substantiated as SA has one of the highest




I am from Romania, and I want to come in South Africa in 2010. But I heard that the security is a big problem,
especially in Johannesburg ..... and the Black people don't like White people.
South African Government
That's a lot of rubbish. SA is a great country with a healthy thriving democracy. Racism is a thing of the past.
The security for 2010 will be excellent.
Image 2.7 I 2007 World Cup Blog
This excerpt from a 2007 internet blog demonstrates the feelings of the international audience and the SA
government's inappropriate response.
Rising crime is a serious WC challenge. Between 2004 and 2007, 2.5 million South Africans fell
victim to violent crimes such as murder, attempted murder, rape, and robbery. This means that more than
848,000 people fall victim to violent crime in SA every year, says Pieter Mulder, leader of the Freedom
Front Plus Party, an organization campaigning to reinstate the death penalty as a deterrent to violent
crime. Between 1994 and 2007, 272,000 people were murdered in SA and residential burglary has
increased by 8.3%. Internationally, five in every 100,000 persons is murdered per year; in SA, the figure
is 40 in every 100,000. Worse still, only 10% of criminal cases end up in court.35 The New Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD) concluded that the distinctive feature of crime in South Africa is "not its
volume but its violence." Between April 2006 and March 2007 there were 19,202 murders, 52,617
reported cases of rape, 218,030 assaults with the aim of causing grievous bodily harm, 9,367 indecent
assaults, 13,599 car hijacking, 249,665 burglaries, and 12,761 robberies at residential premises in SA.
34 Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).
35 In May 2007, the South African Broadcasting Corporation announced that the majority of criminal cases are never
even tried in court. The Broadcasting Corporation cited SAPS's failure to properly prepare cases as a major cause of
this impunity. He also cites the void of lawyers and judges to manage the overload. Kruys, B. G. G. (April 2007).




About 40% of these crimes were perpetrated by strangers.3 All these figures lead to the conclusion that
SA is experiencing a very serious crime crisis which needs to be addressed prior to 2010.37
South Africa has lost the idealism and strong leadership that led to free elections. Even Noble
Prize winner Desmond Tutu has warned South Africa that it is losing its "moral direction." Tutu declared
his horror at the high murder rates and child rape, explaining that South Africans have lost their
"reverence for life." Tutu continued,
What has happened to us? It seems as if we have perverted our
freedom, our rights into license, to being irresponsible. Rights go hand in
hand with responsibility, with dignity, with respect for oneself and for the
other. The fact of the matter is we still depressingly do not respect one
another. I have often said that Black consciousness did not finish the
work it set out to do... Perhaps we do not realize just how apartheid has
damaged us so that we seem to have lost our sense of right and wrong.
In a 2006 speech at the University of Cape Town, Tutu questioned why a respect for the law,
environment, and even life were missing in SA.38
Responses from the bi-annual Government Performance Barometer Survey conducted amongst
a nationally representative sample of 3,500 South Africans provide some insight into the public opinion on
crime at the 2010 WC. The 2007 results concluded that 60% of South Africans believe that crime has
increased over the past six months and 50% think that the police are not doing enough to combat crime.
The survey determined that 65% think crime will be a problem at the 2010 WC. Tracy Hammond at
Markinor, the agency analyzing the survey results, concluded that "62% of people earning less than
R1,199 per month think the police are doing enough to combat crime, whereas only 29% of people
earning more than R8,000 per month think the same." Sixty percent of rural dwellers think police are
doing a sufficient job, while only 47% of city residents agree. Similarly, only 9% of Whites think the
government's performance in reducing crime is good, as opposed to 40% of Blacks.39
Agencies concerned about the safety and security at 2010 warn that if SA does not strive to
reduce crime before 2010, the negative perception of the country may keep international visitors away
and ruin the entire event. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party warns that, "SA,
unfortunately, is perceived in many of the world as a crime haven" and once such a negative perception is
36.Crime in South Africa. (2007). Retrieved January 10, 2008, from South Africa 2010: www.southafrica-2010-
accomodation.com.
37 Nduru, Moyiga. (January 30, 2007). High-Profile Murder Sparks Debate on Violent Crime. Inter Press Service
News Agency (Johannesburg).
38 South Africa is Losing Its Way - Tutu. (September 27, 2006). BBC News.
39 IFP: Crime will Affect 2010 WC. (January 12, 2007). News24.
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cast, it is difficult to shift it. Buthelezi advises SA that they must reduce crime before, during, and after the
event, otherwise reduced tourism threatens the event and any economic gains may vanish.40
The tourism industry is particularly concerned that escalating fear over rising crime rates may hurt
the industry. US Ambassador Eric Bost put it bluntly saying that high incidence of crime may keep visitors
away from 2010. "Who is going to be interested in spending a significant amount of money here on
holiday, to have a good time, when you're concerned about the possibility of getting hurt?, Bost said.4 1
2.7.2 I South African Tourism
Annual tourism is rising despite simultaneous escalations in crime. The Department of Tourism
has been actively involved in the preparation and planning for 2010. The tourism industry can benefit
considerably from the WC. SA's tourism industry will benefit from the considerable excitement in the
years preceding and following 2010. More than 4.6 million visitors arrived in SA between January and
July 2006, a 15% increase over the same period in 2005. According to SA statistics, 20.3% of visitors in
2006 came from Africa and the Middle East, 11% from the Americas, 8% from Asia and Australia, and
only 3.1% from Europe.42 In 2006, more than 10% of foreign tourists come to SA to watch or participate in
a sports event with spectators accounting for 60-80% of these arrivals. Previous sports events including
the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC caused considerable tourism increases before and after
the host year and SA can expect even greater increases because of the enormity of the 2010 WC.43
SA markets its scenic beauty, sunny climate, and cultural diversity to leisure and business
travelers. The diversity of the climate, cultural, and tourist activities have contributed to its increasing
popularity as a vacation destination. International tourism has surged since the end of apartheid. In 1994,
SA had just 3.9 million foreign visitors; a decade later, tourism had more than doubled with the country
hosting 6.7 million visitors. In 2005, SA experienced a 10.3% increase, or 7.5 million visitors and in 2006,
another 13.9% increase to host a record 8.4 million visitors. Most visitors (74%) are from mainland Africa
and 26% from overseas. About 92% visited for a holiday, but only 2.3% travelled for business. The South
African Department of Tourism claims that tourism is the fastest growing industry in SA, contributing to
8.3% of the GDP, a considerable increase from previous 4.6% in 1993. In 2006, tourism constituted about
7% of employment nationally but its ability to create new jobs and contribute a greater share of the GDP
40 Ibid..
41 South Africa: Crime May be Own Goal That Bedevils SA's World Cup. (January 31, 2007). Al/Africa.com
42 Nduru, Moyiga. (January 30, 2007). High-Profile Murder Sparks Debate on Violent Crime. Inter Press Service
News Agency (Johannesburg).
43 South Africa: Crime May be Own Goal That Bedevils SA's World Cup 2007
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is a likely result of the 2010 WC. Increased international attention, updated infrastructure, and hospitality
and of course the event itself will likely contribute to an unprecedented increase in tourism.44
Image 2.8 I International Tourist Arrivals (in millions)45
SA has experienced impressive increases in international tourism since the end of apartheid in 1994. With this
tourism increase come substantial concerns. But how will tourism numbers change before, during, and after 2010?
The 2010 WC offers the tourism industry a unique opportunity to expand considerably and
quickly. If the industry plans for the event, marketing the country and demonstrating its attributes, tourism
throughout the country will blossom.
44 People come to SA for business and cultural reasons (eco-tourists, paleo-tourists, and adventurers); in the future,
because of the massive investment in sports facilities, sports tourism will also increase. Business travel to SA has
been steadily increasing from 470,000 business visitors in 2006 to 550,000 in 2007. Business travelers spent three
times the amount of the average leisure traveler and therefore SA hopes to increase the number over the next few
years. There is an increase from R2.1 million spent by business travelers in 2006 to R2.4 million in 2007. Cultural
travelers come to enjoy the diverse cultures, ranging from the warring Zulus to the Bushmen in the Karoo. Visitors
have also started visiting to see the sites of apartheid including Robben Island where Nelson Mandela was
imprisoned outside of Cape Town and the new Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg. Tours of cultural villages and
townships have also grown dramatically. The variety of fauna and flora and the allure of the "Big Five" animals are
contributing to increasing tourism. The number of national parks, including the world-famous Kruger Park, has
increased to twenty-one and the South African government is committed to increasing the number of protected areas
from 5.4% to 8%. Paleo-tourists flocks to SA to see some of the greatest architectural sites including the world's
richest concentration of hominid fossils in the Sterkfontein, Swartkrans, and Kromdraai sites in the Cradle of
Humankind. With more than 3,000 kilometers of coastline, the Drakensberg Mountains, and the desert, it is no
wonder that SA has become such a destination for adventure seekers. Department of Tourism. Retrieved March 10,
2008, from South Africa: Alive With Possibility: http://www.southafrica.info/45 Ibid.
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* Tourism Industry Benefits: The tourism industry can benefit financially from 2010 by developing
attractive tourism packages to entertain people before, after, and between WC matches. If visitors
enjoy SA during 2010, they will probably return later.
* Small Towns Benefit: Small towns in particular stand to benefit from 2010. Upgraded football
facilities in smaller towns like Bloemfontein and Polokwane may help bring tourists to these previously
overlooked cities. These cities should market their facilities to international teams during the events
as restful places to prepare away from the public's eye. Neighboring cities can become "satellite
accommodations" helping small cities during peak demand. For example, George, a neighboring city
to Bloemfontein will be running shuttle buses between the 2010 facilities and local accommodations.
These shuttles can help alleviate the hosting strain on Bloemfontein while sharing the benefits of
2010.
* Increased Capacity: The enormity of 2010 offers SA an opportunity to increase capacity and train
new hospitality staff. During 2010, demand for hospitality will be higher than usual and the country will
need to increase capacity to meet the need. According to the South African Department of Tourism,
one job of every twelve created in the next two years will be in the tourism industry. The tourism
industry must develop training programs to provide staff with a skill and increase capacity after the
event.
* Make SA Tourism-Friendly: 2010 will help SA acclimate to the importance of tourism as part of the
national economy. The rapid saturation of tourists into the country will help natives become more
comfortable with tourists, overall making the country more tourism-friendly.
* Demonstrate Improved Tourism Safety: The new safety and security plans will demonstrate before
the world audience that SA is a safe and fun place to visit.
* National Rebranding: The most significant benefit will be the improved image and identity developed
for 2010. The WC offers cities and attractions an unusual opportunity to rebrand themselves and
appeal to a larger audience. With so much attention focused on SA, people are going to be interested
in visiting and SA should expect a considerable increase in tourism for many years following 2010.46
46 Cities are using 2010 as a chance to rebrand themselves internationally. (1) Polokwane, a rural municipality with a
population of just 500,000, is using this unparalleled opportunity to market itself as a tourist destination, investment
destination, and residential destination through publicity from a tremendous marketing campaign for both itself and
the Limpopo Province. (Polokwane 2010 World Cup Presentation. (2007). Joint Meeting of Portfolio Committees on
Local Government and Sports and Recreation.) (2) Cape Town is launching a specific plan to attract business tourists
who tend to spend more than leisure visitors. Calvyn Gilfellan, Acting Chief Executive of Cape Town Routes
Unlimited, the official tourism destination marketing for Cape Town and the Western Cape describes the city's action
as follows, "While we have the world's eyes on us and we are preparing to receive thousands of soccer enthusiasts,
we must use this opportunity to position our destination in such a way that those who will be visiting South Africa in
2010, do visit the Western Cape, and that they return soon for more, bringing with them their friends and family."
Gilfellan concluded saying, "We believe that having conferences and events run parallel to the soccer tournament will
help us to achieve this." (2010 Conference Fever Runs High in Cape Town and Western Cape. (October 29, 2007).
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Sports and tourism industries have become intertwined in recent years as countries and cities
have intensified hosting venues and events. Scarlett Cornelissen describes in her 2005 article, Sports,
Events, and Tourism Development that the expansive growth of the international events and tourism
sectors in conjunction with hosting, organizing, and publicizing the event, in turn feeds the development of
local and national tourism. Comelissen asserts that the changing nature of tourism economies and SA's
development goals are transforming patterns of tourism investment such that broadcasting hosting
activities and infrastructure upgrades are actually tourism tools that rebrand hosting countries and cities.
In this way, there are close synergies between sports and tourism. Different types of sport elicit different
types of tourism consumption. Active, event, and nostalgia are three different types of sports tourism and
each attract a unique visitors. According to Cornelissen, the main impact of 2010 is not its immediate
effect on visitors attracted to the event itself but its reinforcement of the local and national image for future
tourism. Since cities are the key anchors for both production and consumption, they seek to benefit the
most from increased tourism.47
2.7.3 I The 2010 Safety and Security Plan
Concerns that this mammoth event will lead to increases in national crime rates before, during,
and after the event are mounting. The HSRC's annual survey concludes crime-weary South Africans list
crime as the greatest disadvantage to hosting the WC. Between 2005 and 2006, concerns about crime as
the major disadvantage rose 13%.48 Despite the differences between respondents, concerns over crime
are the one uniting force in SA. Udesh Pillay, Director of the HSRC said, "People see this [WC] as a
Destination Marketing Organization Cape Town Routes Unlimited. Press Release.) (3) Port Elizabeth has been called
"The Liverpool of the Cape," "The Northampton of South Africa," "The Detroit of the Union," but its most impressive
rebranding is its recent official name change to Nelson Mandela Bay. All these rebranding are trying to tempt
prospective investors and visitors to notice Port Elizabeth as more than the windiest city in South Africa. With its
picturesque location along the Garden Route from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth is boasting its increasing number of
annual water sports competitions in scuba diving, game fishing, surfing, and windsurfing in an effort to outdo rival city
Cape Town. Physical changes such as airport upgrading and new conference centers will transform the way people
visit SA and help bring needed economic revenue to many previously overlooked South African cities. Port Elizabeth
has historically been known as the water sports capital of SA. But it wants to be known for its premier football
leagues. The problem however is that before 2010, Port Elizabeth will not have any football leagues, and definitely
not a premier league. Gary Baines in his article, Scoring an Own Goal? Branding Port Elizabeth for the 2010 Soccer
World Cup, considers Port Elizabeth's rebranding pointless unless infrastructure upgrades are accomplished to
impress visitors when they arrive. He has his reservations regarding the prioritization and scope of the WC upgrades
however considering the relative unimportance and size of the city in SA. Baines asserts that hosting the WC should
be integrated into the city's development plan to ensure that investments leave long-term benefits. Overall, the city
must be mindful that it does not spend so much rebranding itself without accompanying it with actualized physical
changes. (Baines, Gary. (2006). Sidelining Development Goals? Re-imagining Port Elizabeth for the 2010 Soccer
World Cup. Rhodes University.)
47 Cornelissen, Scarlett. (2006). Sports, Events, and Tourism Development: Exploring the patterns, possibilities and
constraints of 2010 for urban tourism economies in South Africa. University of Stellenbosch.
48.The HSRC survey concluded that fears about crime increased from 19.1 percent to 28.3 percent in women, from
18.8 percent to 20.6 percent in men, from 15.2 percent to 28.2 percent for rural dwellers, from 18.9 percent to 25.3




feeding ground that will enhance crime because there is so much up for grabs."49 During major
international events such as the FIFA WC, criminals are able to sneak into the country via relaxed
immigration practices and engage in criminal activities such as drug smuggling. Barry Gilder, Chairman of
the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC), calls this one of the major challenges of
reducing crime in SA in anticipation for 2010. Although SA has composed a plan to protect its borders,
some criminals will surely sneak through.5 0
With so much police attention on the stadiums and the WC, criminals in other cities and other
areas of event cities will be able to act freely. The South Africa Police Services (SAPS) has determined
that most of the crime is occurring on the fringe areas. Therefore, SAPS concludes that crime will not be a
problem at 2010 since it is mostly concentrated away from the stadiums. But with so many visitors coming
to SA and so much international attention on the WC venues, SAPS must instead concentrate on
protecting the international visitors. As a result, crime will surely increase in areas with decreased police
presence. So while SA may be able to control crime temporarily while in the public limelight, these actions
will not lead to decreased crime permanently.51
The 2010 Safety and Security Plan details the procedures and actions the SAPS will take to
ensure the safety and success of 2010. The following plan will be implemented before 2010 in order to
ensure its efficiency. FIFA strongly supports SA's safety plan.
* The plan calls for greater border security at land, sea, and air ports of entry to ensure that only those
legally permitted to enter the country pass through.
* Police will patrol routes commonly taken by attendees such as the route from the Johannesburg
airport to the stadiums and from the stadium to local hotels. Increased police patrols will focus on
sections of the city where FIFA events are taking place including FIFA headquarters, hotels,
stadiums, fan parks, restaurants, and other tourist venues.
* Dedicated teams will work closely with businessmen using mobile communications before and during
the event.
49 Mannak, Miriam. (February 7, 2007). Crime, South Africa and the 2010 World Cup. World Press (Cape Town).
50 Government and private agencies are collaborating to reduce such crime. Nine government agencies have teamed
up to combat crime for 2010, forming the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC), to "create a channel
for the disposition of information across government." The Ministry of Safety and Security has been working with the
South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) to prevent cash-in-transit heists and other organized
crimes. SABRIC has been supplying the Ministry with "information that relates to intelligence regarding people who
might want to mount armed robberies against financial institutions in the country." Business Against Crime has also
been collaborating offering CCTV systems for use during the event. Musanda Satellite Campus in Pretoria is offering
additional training courses for intelligence officers to help train the many new recruits. Also the Electronic
Communications Security Company is expected to open its new security operations center at the beginning of 2008,
which will protect critical information and communication infrastructure from unauthorized access and attack. As for
international terrorism, Barry Gilder, the chairman of NICOC, said that South Africa would be facing similar
challenges with respect to terrorism and other international crime elements as previous FIFA hosts. Benton, S.(August 30, 2007). SA Intelligence Services Gear Up to Thwart Criminality During World Cup." BuaNews Online
tCape Town).
Alexander, Adam. Can Football Save South Africa from its Biggest Threat? (August 22, 2006). The Raw Story.
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* In addition to command vehicles, a fleet of 40 helicopters will patrol the tournament areas with
cameras providing live feed to operation headquarters in Pretoria. This will act as a force multiplier
with senior police officers monitoring the cameras and communicating to ground patrol if they notice
something is amiss.52
* Since 2005, SAPS has been actively recruiting resulting in a total police force of 192,000 by 2010,
with 31,000 police dedicated exclusively to monitoring WC activities.53
* Special courts will be available 24-hours a day throughout the tournament so that criminals can be
processed quickly and efficiently."
Simultaneous increases in crime and tourism is not sustainable and many fear the potentially
devastating violence that may erupt during the WC. Such an incident would destroy the tourism industry
for decades and hurt SA's international image, and therefore must be avoided at all costs.
2.8 I SPIRALING COSTS AND LIMITED PUBLIC FUNDING
The 2010 WC is funded almost entirely by public funds. This makes it increasingly challenging for
central and municipal governments to meet the demands of spiraling costs. Likewise, the government
must justify these proliferate costs to a public demanding basic infrastructure.
52 Appel 2007
53 Between July 2002 and July 2007, SAPS has grown from 109,000 to 164,000 and the force is expected to increase
to 192,000 by 2010. Between April 2006 and March 2007, 35,000 new recruits joined the reserve units and SAPS
hopes to supplement permanent police units with an additional 100,000 reservists by 2009. 53 With 31,000 officers
dedicated specifically to the WC, event organizers are not concerned about crime. But some evidence suggests that
extra policing does not necessary result in a simultaneous or proportionate reduction in crime. Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani's success in reducing crime in New York City is largely attributed to improving the neighborhood by focusing
police activities on specific target areas such as drug abuse and petty crime consequently leading to a decline in
other criminal activities (a practice often known as the Broken Window Syndrome). Such actions may yield better
results than simply increasing the numbers of police officers.
5 Other permanent improvements to SAPS include an improved communication system. By 2010, SAPS will institute
a computerized performance management system to assess and evaluate police performance. In October 2007,
Gauteng launched a new radio communications network featuring an automated vehicle tracking system that will
indicate in real time the number and location of police vehicles. Improved tracking systems will help call center
operators send the nearest available police vehicles via the fastest routes to the emergency. Likewise, the system will
ensure that police officers are patrolling in their designated areas at all times. The Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal
are expected to develop similar systems by 2010. Elaborate crime prevention command and control units and
helicopters may meet the needs of the WC but are not practical for everyday crime fighting. Hiring additional police is
the only long-lasting element of this plan. However, hiring additional police is insufficient if the additional police do not
have reliable vehicles to get to crime areas quickly. Most importantly, the plan does not call for a national realignment
to reduce the causes of crime as well as ways to improve reduction policies. The Crime Statistics: Are We Our Own
Worse Enemy? (July 16, 2007). Markinor News (Johannesburg).
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2.8.1 1 Funding 2010
2010 costs are rising without adequate, long-term public financing planning. Unlike previous WC
events, 2010 is funded almost entirely by public funds. As of October 2007, WC expenditures are
estimated to cost USD2.4 billion (R17.4 billion), of which USD1.4 (R10 billion) is set aside for stadium
infrastructure and the residual will pay for general infrastructure upgrades to transportation (roads,
airports, public transportation system), communications (new international digital telecommunication
system), and security (funding additional police and related technology). Host cities are expected to
spend an additional USD400 million (R2.6 billion) on local improvements.55 Deputy Finance Minister Jabu
Moleketi said that costs could escalate to more than USD2.9 billion (R20.8 billion). He said that cost
escalation is a key challenge. As central government coffers shrink, city rivalry will intensify.5 Costs are
also expected to increase as the value of the South African Rand continues to fall and labor costs
increase. To place the high cost of the 2010 WC, despite Germany's highly developed sports facilities,
the 2006 Germany WC cost USD1.9 billion in stadiums with another USD2.7 billion on WC-related
infrastructure.57
Stadiums are the most significant cost. FIFA requires all stadiums comply with its international
standards for size and quality. As a result, costs for stadium construction has escalated sharply from
R818 million or USD113.7 million originally estimated in the Bid Book. Individual city budgets are high
since every city wants the most modern stadium and most efficient public transportation system. Cape
Town has set aside USD772 million for construction and upgrades;5 8 Durban has allocated USD860
million (R6 billion) for 2010.59 As rivalry between Cape Town and Durban intensifies, infrastructure
spending will increase.
55 Campbell, Malene. (2008). The Impact of Major Sporting Events on the Economy and the People of a Developing
Region: the Case of South Africa. Bloemfontein: University of Free State.
56 Mokgola, T. (May 20, 2004). SA Looks Ahead to 2010. BuaNews: Government Communication and Information
S7 ystem (Cape Town).Maennig, W. and S. du Plessis. (October 2007). World Cup 2010: South African Economic Perspectives and Policy
Challenges Informed by the Experience of Germany 2006. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25(4),pg. 581.
58 Cape Town's budget is allocated as follows: USD386 million has been invested in the Green Point Stadium, a
modern, all-weather, multi-purpose, environmentally sustainable and technologically advanced stadium; USD24.3
million in the Western Cape's public transportation system for an integrated rail, bus, minibus, taxi transportation
system, developing route monitoring systems, fleet upgrades, and an integrated fare management system. Major
investments like this are only possible because the WC expedites the development process and allows cities to
implement changes quickly; USD186 million in improvements to Cape Town International Airports; USD21 million in
improvements to the Foreshore Switching Station to guarantee electricity transmission; USD3 million in high-tech
security equipment for efficiency and safety; USD1.4 million for tourism marketing; USD772 Million Plus in 2010
Opportunities in Cape Town. (April 2007). US Commercial Services. Issue 4.
59 The budget includes a new football stadium, international airport, trade port, tram system, harbor upgrades, roads,
railways, and beaches. Durban hopes that its warm, sunny weather will be most attractive to visitors in 2010. Funds
have been allocated as follows: USD285 million (R2 billion) to build a 3.7 kilometer runway and terminal with capacity
to handle 6 million passengers a year; USD285 million (R2 billion) for design and management of new Durban King
Senzangakhona Stadium with the total construction costs still to be determined. Infrastructure Projects Create
Opportunities for US Businesses in Durban. (January 2007). US Commercial Service. Issue 2.
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CITY COST (USD millions) CITY POPULATION (2004) CAPACITY
New Stadiums
Cape Town 403.1 2,984,885 70,000
Durban 278 3,129,298 80,000
Nelspruit 118.8 484,245 45,000
Polokwane 111.2 532,673 45,000
Port Elizabeth 159.9 1,054,359 40,000
Upgraded Stadiums
Bloemfontein 34.1 655,332 48,000
Johannesburg: Ellis Park 29.2 65,000
Johannesburg: Soccer City 208.5 3,225,407 104,000
Pretoria 25.7 1,531,954 55,000
Rustenberg 20.7 405,554 45,000
Total 1,388.9 574,200
Image 2.9 I South Africa's Stadium Investment for 2010 World Cup 60
New stadiums will be being built in Cape Town, Durban, Nelspruit, Polokwane, and Port Elizabeth. These smaller
cities lack adequate sporting facilities and costs are expected to exceed USD214 million on stadium construction.
Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Rustenberg are spending about USD60 million to upgrade stadiums.
Total spending is estimated to exceed USD1.4 billion.
2.8.2 I Build the Stadium, Create the Jobs61
Escalating costs have caused considerably uproar. The building costs were grossly
underestimated in the Bid Book. The original costs of building all the stadiums were estimated to be less
than R2 billion for both the construction of the new stadiums and the upgrading of existing stadiums.62
Cape Town's Mayor, Helen Zille, and the Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU) are
questioning where financial resources will come from to finance the construction of new stadiums. They
oppose taking funding from more pressing needs like housing and sanitation to fund WC related
infrastructure.63 Zille and COSATU are asking questions like, who is really benefiting from hosting the
WC? Is there a more appropriate way to spend this money? Should the government be investing in new
housing instead of stadiums? Although the government has promised that WC investment will benefit all
South Africans, in reality, big business serves to profit from increased international prestige and
investment. Zille has answered this question by using 2010 to distribute the benefits of expedited projects
60 Maennig, W. and S. du Plessis. (October 2007). World Cup 2010: South African Economic Perspectives and Policy
Challenges Informed by the Experience of Germany 2006. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25(4),pg. 581.61 This is a slogan from the San Francisco '49ers' campaign to try to get the city to build the team a new sports
facility. It demonstrates the city's willingness to subsidize sports facilities hoping for economic retums.62 But according to the LOC, the Bid Book cost R15 million alone to produce, so clearly the LOC did not estimate the
construction costs correctly. In response to such criticism, the LOC blames escalating costs on FIFA requirements





throughout the region. Developing an integrated public transportation system for example will leave a
lasting legacy throughout the region.
These costs are proliferate considering the overwhelming need for better water and sanitation,
health care facilities, adequate housing, and access to electricity as well as improved education and
public transportation. The National Urban Reconstruction Housing Agency (NURHY) reports that more
than 250,000 new homes could be built instead of the R9 billion being spent on the Johannesburg
stadiums. The SA Government Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) claims that houses cost
R35,000 per building and only citizens who earn less than R3,500 per month qualify. Instead of building
stadiums for the WC, NURHY believes that SA should be spending money building as many as two
million new housing units.64 Steve Friedman of the Institute for a Democratic SA (IDASA) says that
juxtaposing stadium expenditures against housing problems is an incorrect comparison. "The question is
how many houses you can build, but whether you can show that money on stadiums won't help towards
the creation of a better society where people can make their own choices. You might as well suggest that
you don't hold elections because they cost a lot of money. Parliament costs money," Friedman says.
Friedman argues that if the WC is profitable and delivers sufficient economic returns, then this was a wise
investment but if only the wealthiest of the wealthy profit from the event, then the government has made a
mistake.65
Proponents of sports stadiums claim that sports facilities improve the local economy by creating
construction jobs and generating new spending in the local community. Advocates argue that new
stadiums spur economic growth and that that they are self-financing. WC proponents have promised that
new economic investment will generate long-term economic investment in cities. Andrew Zimbalist, an
economist from Smith College and an expert on the impact of sports stadiums on city economies,
explains that these arguments are filled with incorrect economic reasoning that overstate the benefits of
stadiums. In Zimbalist's book, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes, he argues that stadiums are only advantageous if
they spur significant imports into the region. He argues that economic growth occurs when a community's
resources (i.e. people, capital investments, and land) become more productive via "economically
beneficial specialization by the community for the purposes of trading with other regions or from local
value added that is higher than other uses of local workers, land, and investments." Building a stadium is
good for the local economy only if the stadium is the most productive use of capital investments and
workers.66




66 Noll, Roger G. and Andrew S. Zimbalist. (1997). Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams
and Stadiums. Brookings Institution Press (Washington D.C.).
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* Oriole Park in Baltimore, Maryland is the most successful American sports stadiums because it
attracts about a third of baseball spectators from outside the Baltimore area. 67 South Africans are not
likely to travel between regions to go to a football match because it is not part of the culture. For SA,
this means that stadiums must attract considerable crowds for games after 2010. This is a huge
problem; at the opening of the WC in 2010, there will be more stadiums than local leagues and South
Africans will not be able to afford the ticket prices needed to generate a return on the investment.6
" The Denver Broncos is an example of an overestimated annual economic impact study and the
failure of stadium to return profits. Early estimates promised nearly USD120 million, increasing to
USD245 million in future estimates. Such promotional studies overestimated the impact of the facility
because experts confused gross and net economic effects. Local spending on events in the stadium
is a substitute for recreational spending elsewhere such as movie theatres and restaurants. Stadium
profits are a substitute for revenue generated from other activities, which means that excess spending
is shifted from one activity to another without increasing. This means that the overall economic benefit
simply shifts from other investments and overall cities do not profit.69
* Renovations to Chicago's Soldier Field failed to generate promised economic investment. The
USD660 million stadium renovation to Soldier Field, of which USD432 million was paid by Chicago
taxpayers, failed to generate the projected revenue. Chicago Park District Officials expected the
renovated Soldier Field to generate USD10 million annually for park district programs; unfortunately,
the stadium failed to live up to expected economic returns and taxpayers continue to bear the
financial burden.70
So, why do cities subsidize the cost of new sports facilities? Zimbalist explains that cities
rationalize the considerable expense because stadiums generate more local consumer satisfaction than
alternative investments. Sports captures public attention and helps the city develop a national and
international image. Cities say that these societal benefits far outweigh the costs. Even if fans do not
actually attend the games or buy sports-related products, broadcast and print media sell the stadiums. As
long as there are sufficient fans, then South African WC host cities will generate continued interest in their
stadiums. Stadiums can therefore be considered a public good or an externality benefitting all sports
consumers regardless of future economic returns. Sports fans are therefore likely to support the building
of a new stadium regardless of the city's ability to fund the project. Residents will support the stadium
investment even if they themselves will never be able to attend a game because the pride of having a
local stadium is enormous.71 There is therefore almost always political and local support for construction
67 Although this is different sport and context, it remains relevant.68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Stanek, Steve. (February 1, 2005). Chicago Stadiums Fail to Deliver Promised Benefits. The Heartland Institute:
Budget & Tax News.
7' Noll and Zimbalist 1997
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of new sports facilities and for this reason, most WC cities are able to fund stadium budgets that far
outweigh its means.
2.9 1 PRIVATIZATION
Privatization of the landscape has virtually captured the South African city and threatens to derail
the long-term legacy of 2010. If private entities control the design and development of public infrastructure
for 2010, then these private interests may not develop equitably but profitably.
A variety of factors have been driving the increasing private sector involvement in South African
development since 1994. Namely, the neoliberal policies of the ANC, rampant bureaucratic corruption,
lack of alternatives, and lack of capacity. Because private entities could disassociate themselves from the
apartheid government, in many ways, privatization has offered SA new opportunities. The neoliberal
policies of the ANC have been the driving force behind the institutional support for privatization.
Privatization is a growing cause of conflict. Trevor Ngwane of the Anti-Privatization Forum explains that
the ANC is ruling in favor of class politics. Ngwane says, "The ANC is doing what the old National Party
could not do because it can hide behind its struggle credentials and the peoples' trust of Nelson Mandela
to get away with theft and murder." The ANC began in 1912 as "an organization of educated Africans and
enlightened chiefs who wanted equal rights for themselves because they were civilized unlike the rest of
the natives," Ngwane concludes. After apartheid, many South Africans assumed that the ANC would
retain its radical rhetoric of the 1960s (i.e. to turn to the masses and develop infrastructure that served all
South Africans). David McDonald, the director of development studies at Queen's University explains that
when ANC leaders came to power, they failed to apply the socialist remedies to the problems as many
South Africans had expected. Instead, they decided to correct the injustices of apartheid through free
market capitalism. Nelson Mandela demonstrated this dramatic shift in the ANC when he said
"Privatization is the fundamental policy of our government. Call me a Thatcherite if you will." Mandela's
successor and current president, Thabo Mbeki famously said at succession, "I am a Thatcherite."72
Ngwane explains that "there are very few viable political parties that do not support capitalism - even the
South African Communist Party stands in support of the ANC." 73
72 Carty, B. (February 9, 2003. Whose Hand on the Tap? Water Privatization in South Africa. CBC Radio (Cape
Town).
73 Jay, D. O. (2007). Privatization in South Africa: Starting Over. The Dominion (Johannesburg).
This is especially evident in the development of new corporate malls in Soweto. In October 2007, the Maponya Mall
opened in Soweto. Developer Landmark Real Estate announced that this mall would be no different from any other
modern mall in either its design or its retailers. The 55,000 square meter development is destined to become the
"heartbeat" of Soweto. Fifty-five percent of the R55 million shopping mall is owned by Nedbank and the Masingita
Group, with the remaining 45% owned by the developer. Ken Reynolds, Divisional Director for the Gauteng division of
Nedbank Corporate Property Finance called the mall a "realization of a long-term goal for us to be instrumental in the
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Privatization in South Africa
Image 2.10 1 Construction Privatization in South Africa74
The new South African government has failed to deliver the promises of apartheid. Instead of providing basic
services as promised in the 1996 Constitution, South African leaders have privatized many amenities, putting the
responsibility for building the new South Africa in the hands of the private market. Is the WCjust another invitation
asking private entities to build what the government cannot?
2.10 I INTERNATIONAL SPONSORSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
2010 proponents promise that the WC will provide opportunities for the development of local
entrepreneurship. Paradoxically, the 2010 WC could not be built without international sponsorship funds
being used to build infrastructure projects. There is an inherent conflict between relying on international
support which limits the possibilities for local industries and promising to advance local-owned
businesses.
2.10.1 I World Cup Sponsorship
Global reach during the WC is incredible and therefore sponsors pay considerably to penetrate
the world market. Without corporate sponsorship, SA could not afford to build the stadiums, roads, and
hospitality venues necessary for 2010. 2010 sponsorship is valued at R7.8 billion, a 40% increase since
Germany in 2006. FIFA has already signed the six global sponsors for the 2010 WC, Visa, (paid between
development of this dynamic suburb." Of the 46 stores, 65% are national tenants, 7.5% are franchises and 27.5% are
independent retailers. Soweto, which has prided itself as being the heart of the resistance to apartheid has welcomed
this class oppression. Ster-Kinekor wins Maponya Mall bid in Soweto. (2005). Retrieved February 3, 2008, from
Primedia Newsroom: www.primedia.co.za.
74 Graphic created by author.
[69]
WASTED OPPORTUNITIES
USD150 million and USD200 million), Adidas (paid USD350 million), Sony (paid USD305 million),
Emirates (paid USD195 million), Coca-Cola (paid USD500 million), and Hyundai-Motor (paid undisclosed
sum). In addition to these billions in investment, there are also another fifteen official partners and local
sponsors such as McDonald's and Anheuser-Busch.75 In exchange for their generous support,




Image 2.11 I Who Will Benefit From the World Cup? 76
According to FIFA, 2010 sponsorship is valued at R7.8 billion, a 40 percent increase since 2006. FIFA has signed the
six global sponsors for the 2010 WC: Visa, Adidas, Sony, Emirates, Coca-Cola, and Hyundai-Motor.
Advertising exposure during the WC has become incredible valuable, with SA receiving the
highest demand from sponsors in FIFA WC history. Global sponsorship value has increased from USD2
75 Viscusi, Gregory. (June 19, 2006). The High Price of World Cup Exposure. Business Report.








billion in 1984 to USD16.6 billion in 1996 and approximately USD43 billion in 2006.77 According to William
Fenton, the editor of The World Sponsorship Monitor, in 2006 alone, football attracted USD2.3 billion in
new sponsorship. By contrast, the Olympics received USD776 million.78 Clint Waltz at the Alabama
Institute for Sport and Fitness Management at Troy University, asserts that the main investment category
for sponsorship is sport with 65% of the 1994 US WC, 63% of the 2006 Germany WC, and 80% of
201 0.79
The potential to lose financially is equally incredible at such mammoth events. The 2002 Asia WC
took place immediately after a global advertising slump and never produced the profits many had
predicted. 2001 was a difficult year for the market with the economic downtown of the US terrorist attacks
permeating the event.80
2.10.2 1 The Development of Unofficial Enterprises
Proponents of 2010 promised that it would expand opportunities for economic development and
help alleviate poverty. Faced with the opportunity to enter the hospitality or construction industries, some
South Africans are instead developing their own microenterprises. According to a 2008 audit by the
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the WC has already generated 80,000 job
opportunities in local tourism, hospitality, and construction. By 2010, the tourism industry is going to
comprise 12% of the country's GDP. 8'
Although the majority of the events will benefit wealthy corporate investors, some South Africans
are finding ways to unofficially profit. In previous WC events, FIFA has strictly forbid unofficial vendors
from selling trademarked merchandise, but in 2010 FIFA is permitting the informal sector to sell exclusive
2010 WC merchandise. This will create jobs and encourage formation of local businesses. FIFA has also
been kind to local artists developing new art projects in preparation of 2010. Artists are building replica
stadiums, 2010 stadium paintings, 2010 themed safety helmets out of mining hats, 2010 handmade bead
jewelry, and 2010 t-shirts, and selling the goods at informal markets around the country. Other artists are
making more niche collectables including 2010-themed papier-mach6 decorated stones. Some of these
artists have teamed up with corporations in more formal marketing campaigns. One artist is working with
a major shoe retailer to display 2010-themed artwork in stores around the country. FIFA's relaxed attitude
77 Waltz 2005
78 Ibid.
79Robinson, James. (April 9, 2006). FIFA World Cup to Net $1 Billion in Advertising Revenue. ZenithOptimedia.
80 Robinson 200681 Hamlyn, Michael. (January 16, 2008). 2010 A Chance for the Poor. BuaNews (Cape Town).
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towards these vendors has helped develop considerable excitement in anticipation for the event while
also allowing informal sectors to generate funds.82
2.11 I LIMITED CAPACITY
South Africa, like most developing countries suffers from a lack of innovation, skills, and
experience needed to plan and develop 2010. This creates a challenge as SA struggles to design and
build the necessary infrastructure.
The incredible demand for construction laborers and contractors will help cities develop critical
skills in the workforce. As an unintended consequence of the delays, many enormous construction
projects are occurring simultaneously throughout the country. Improving the skills of the local workforce is
a major beneficiary of mega event planning. Skill development programs should develop skills beyond
just hospitality and tourism sectors in areas such as project management, engineering, security,
marketing, and construction. When Atlanta hosted the 1996 Summer Olympics, the city offered college
students broadcasting internships and women were offered construction apprenticeships. 83 It is important
that SA be mindful of hiring local laborers and training them with new skills instead of importing skilled
workers. Cities should ensure that a certain percentage of workers are local residents and not new
immigrants or imported laborers. This unparalleled demand has caused the need for new laborers to
increase substantially. In essence, these building projects are serving as major workforce training projects
demanding laborers learn the skills on the job. Likewise, various sectors that do not typically work
together must collaborate to complete the project in a timely manner. This increased capacity will enable
laborers to build other smaller projects throughout the country after 2010.
2.12 I DEFEATING THE OBSTACLES
SA is confronted by enormous challenges as planners develop the 2010 WC. 2010 is unlike
previous or future WC events; the challenges confronting SA as it plans for 2010 are distinctive and
preparations for the event must acknowledge for these complexities and use them to organize and
improve SA for 2010 and beyond. Planners must be persistent and anticipate the success of the WC by
planning proactively instead of just expecting positive results. Local organizers should use the
tremendous energy and excitement around 2010 as the fuel to overcome these inherent paradoxes. The
82 Hamlyn 2008
83 Satchu, Hembert, and du Plessis 2008
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2010 WC must be used as the catalyst for change and not just a deviation from reality. Planners must
anticipate, design, prepare, and arrange changes to the physical and institutional landscape. These
changes must be appropriate to the city needs and carefully weighed against needs in neighboring cities.
Careful consideration of urban issues may cause planners to weigh the egregious costs of stadiums
versus the needs for housing and water infrastructure. Instead of asking these questions, in many cases,
planners are disassociating themselves from the planning process allowing the local 2010 organizers to
make most of the decisions. In essence, planners are expecting these major changes to just happen.
There needs to be critical analysis to describe and explain the ways SA needs to change and a clear
methodology to accomplish these changes within the 2010 redevelopment plan. Recognizing that SA's
2010 event is faced with hurdles and inconsistencies, planners must acknowledge these challenges and
envision creative solutions to these impossible possibilities. These challenges are met with opportunities





We have to focus very closely on all elements that concern the
preparations for the World Cup, stadiums, transport,
communications, security - all of these elements...We can't replicate
Germany, but I am sure that what will be done will be sufficient.
We need both [jobs and housing]. You can't say stop this one and
then we'll do another one tomorrow. Sure, we absolutely need
houses, we need to work steadily to end informal settlements. That's
very crucial. We can do both, we will do both.1
- Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa
The question is not how many houses you can build but whether you
can show that the money on stadiums will help towards the creation
of a better society where people can make their own choices.2
- Steve Friendman, Director of the Institute for a Democratic South Africa
President Thabo Mbeki told an independent newspaper in an interview at the South African Embassy in Berlin in
July 9, 2006.
2 Steve Friedman of the Institute for a Democratic SA (IDASA) calls South African democracy into question asking if
stadiums are the best appropriation of public finances. Madywabe, Lungile. (October 23, 2006). Soccer's lasting
legacy from 2010. Mail and Guardian Online. (Johannesburg).
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3.1 I SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES
The scars of apartheid remain an important factor in the planning and development of the South
African city. During apartheid, governmental legislation restricted the movement of people and the
development of the city. As a result, sections of the city developed independently, despite the more than
a decade of democracy, legacies of apartheid still linger shaping South African culture and policies. South
African cities are fragmented with large undeveloped sections separating the wealthy areas from the
former townships. South African cities remain economically, socially, and spatially divided. The 2010 WC
is an opportunity to unify the fragmented city.
The 2010 WC can also be a powerful development tool. SA can use WC funding to invest in city
improvements. Development projects and urban investments for the 2010 WC can transform the city and
stimulate new development patterns. Host cities need to build new stadiums, transportation infrastructure,
tourist amenities, and facilities. Design, project sitting, and city policies can alleviate or exacerbate urban
fragmentation by enticing infill development or wastelands. Considering the enormous public
expenditures, it is imperative for cities to include substantial city improvements in the planning repertoire.
Cities should use 2010 to improve the public realm and create new economic opportunities for South
Africans. As SA struggles with issues of racism, inequality, poverty, and now climate change,
development for 2010 offers an opportunity to unify the community through design.
Considering SA's scarce financial resources and the growing demand for adequate housing,
water, and power, many deem such WC infrastructure egregious. WC supporters promise that developing
WC infrastructure will leave a lasting positive impact on each South African. If however, South African city
planners can utilize the WC to revive the inner-city and bridge the gaps between communities, then WC
investment is money well spent.
This chapter will discuss the future of South African cities and the revitalization possibilities for
2010 host cities. SA was awarded 2010 as part of FIFA's efforts to aid progress in developing countries.
Host cities must therefore make noticeable infrastructure improvements that transform the city. Cities
must be mindful of stadium designs and ensure that stadiums are fully integrated into city improvement
plans. Stadiums are an integral redevelopment design tool. Football infrastructure can reshape the city
through integrated development programs, public participation, and good design. Stadiums must be
surrounded by supportive entertainment development such as restaurants and retail and provide sports
spectators with a place to revel before and after the game. Perhaps the most significant change to the city
is the creation of new parks. Cities are also building fan parks as new public spaces for spectators to
partake in WC revelry. These public spaces are particularly important in SA where there are limited parks
because safety in public spaces cannot be guaranteed. These fan parks have the potential to transform
the way South Africans use the city and may leave the deepest impressions after 2010. The WC
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development can change the city landscape inscribing it with a football legacy and unifying the spatial
divide.
3.2 I THE DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENT WINS THE CUP
SA developed a groundswell of support when vying for the opportunity to host the 2010 WC
based on compelling arguments made by the bid committee using three main contentions:
* The Development Argument: 2010 has deadlines and it is an opportunity to hasten necessary city
improvements;
* It's Africa's Turn: SA would be the first African country to host a WC event; and
* South Africans Love Football: SA has one of the largest populations of football supporters.
The WC was awarded based on the pervasive and salient reasoning arguing for the need to accelerate
development programs in anticipation for 2010 as well as FIFA's mission to bring the WC to Africa.
The development argument was suggested as a means of repairing the country from the spatial
scars of apartheid, in which development patterns separated residential development according to race.
As a result, SA developed the fragmented city. This legacy continued even after the post-apartheid
transition and instead of the promised improvements, fragmentation, crime, poverty, unemployment, and
atrocious living conditions have worsened in the last decade. The Bid Company promised that this
hosting opportunity will provide SA with a chance to repair these apartheid scars and improve living
conditions. Despite promises, the plans reveal no such preparations. Event organizers are primarily
concerned with constructing the necessary stadium and related infrastructure for the event and have
given little consideration for the city after 2010.
Part of the limitations stem from FIFA's restrictive policies regarding stadium requirements. For
example, FIFA requires the host country to provide at least eight, preferably ten stadiums with seating
capacity of between 40,000 and 60,000. For SA, this may be too many stadiums, leaving many stadiums
barely used. FIFA also has considerable safety and technological requirements, which have increased
the cost of the construction and are not necessary after 2010. FIFA asks that designers create stadiums
that can remain relevant to local communities after the WC. However, FIFA's requirements do not
necessarily meet the needs of SA's football community after 2010. As a result, many of the stadiums are
well over budget and unnecessarily large, leading many to wonder if the stadiums will be fully used after
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2010.3 Despite these considerations, SA and the LOC are committed to developing the 2010 facilities to
meet these requirements.
Building the 2010 World Cup
Image 3.1 I Building the 2010 World Cup4
SA lacks sufficient infrastructure to host the 2010 WC. What little infrastructure exists is mostly decaying.
Therefore, considerable investment and construction will be necessary to host the 2010 WC.
Generations of South Africans have grown up in isolation and despite more than a decade of
democracy, that legacy continues. During apartheid, interaction between residents of townships, inner
cities, and suburbs was limited; not surprisingly, social, economic, and physical fragmentation resulted.
The one uniting force is sports, namely football; people with nothing else in common find commonality in
this sport. The 2010 WC can be a catalyst for change, forcing government and private industries to work
together, to follow guidelines, to meet deadlines, and to actualize a meaningful transformation of the city.
City planners have placed a halo around the 2010 WC expecting it to be a panacea solving city
struggles. "It will take a lot more than the World Cup to bridge the wealth gap" in SA where it remains
amongst the most unequal in the world, writes Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
Provincial Secretary Tony Ehrenreich. WC opposition is concerned that with so much focus on 2010,
there may be considerable disappointment when years of aspiration leave little lasting legacy. Cities do
not exist for singular celebratory events. Therefore, there is concern that 2010 may create merely the
illusion of progress which will collapse after the event. To remedy this, planners must help cities use the
WC to make meaningful changes on the city landscape, namely uniting and redeveloping the city. Njabulo
3 There is also growing concern that if SA cannot demonstrate that stadium and related infrastructure will be
completed before 2010, FIFA will take the hosting opportunity away and ask a more prepared country to step up as
host. FIFA's President Sepp Blatter denies any such plans or suggestions that threaten to take the event away from
SA.
4 Graphic created by author.
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Ndebele of University of Cape Town writes, "Holding major world events can be seen as a demonstration
of what our new democracy is capable of...we [must] rather turn our enormous energy towards what truly
makes us world class: ourselves, and how our towns and cities truly express who we wish to be."5
3.3 I THE FRAGMENTED CITY
The spatial landscape has been shaped by fear, poverty, inequality, violence, and
disappointment. SA suffers a daily average of 50 murders, 700 grievous assaults, and 356 aggravated
assaults.6 Increased violence and subsequent fear has hijacked the socialist promises and turned the
post-apartheid city into the fragmented city. Public space is all but nonexistent and remaining parks have
become a proxy for the inequality in the city. Despite increased opportunities, economic investment
meant to eviscerate past injustices has led to increased poverty and inequality.
Urban segregation in SA predates apartheid and developed around an elitist discourse on public
health and community safety. Fear, self-righteousness, and the assumption of White superiority were
ingrained into the urban fabric of the South African city. Economic and political power was the heart of the
segregation; keeping people separate ensured complete control for the ruling powers who continued to
profit from the inequality. Segregated townships were engineered to highlight racially-based inequality.
During apartheid, white communities were generally located in the most fertile, desirable locations,
enjoying one of the highest standards of living in the world, while Blacks tended to be forced onto the
least desirable areas, typically a great distance from the city center.






Image 3.2 I Graphic Model of the Apartheid City of South Africa
This model, developed by K.S.O. Beavon in his article "The Post-Apartheid City: Hopes, Possibilities, and Harsh
Realities" in the book The Apartheid City and Beyond edited by David Marshall Smith, demonstrates the spatial
stratification that developed in the apartheid city.
SA is socially and spatially fragmented. Many expected that integration would follow the formal
end of the 1950 Group Areas Act in the early 1990s. But economic disadvantage replaced laws and few
Blacks were economically or politically mobilized. New opportunities intended to eviscerate past injustices
resulted in disappointment. Many were confused with their new free status, which promised prosperity on
paper but only brought disappointment. Meanwhile, wealthier South Africans fled the cities into secure,
gated communities, and cities fell into disrepair. Development has occurred in the form of gated suburban
malls and private parks. These development patterns stigmatize the disadvantaged as the "unproductive
underclass" blaming them for increased violence. ANC promises of job creation, improved education, and
access to basic necessities such as shelter, water, and electricity failed to materialize, instead creating
the fragmented city. Thus, racism has changed from vulgar biological forms into class-based choices in




Black majority is still trapped in the townships, but economic inequalities have replaced legislative
restrictions.7
















Organic (1900) Apartheid (1950) Post-Apartheid (2000)
Image 3.3 I Development in South Africa 1900-20008
Prior to government intervention, development in SA was organic, relying on the market to draw people from place
to place. Johannesburg for example developed after the discovery of abundant gold resources. The Group Areas Act
of 1950formally restricted the movement of people and separated residential dwellings according to race. Even
after the dissolution of these restrictions, most people remained in their current location, in many cases fortifying
themselves in their original areas, creating an even more fragmented city.
For the last several decades, SA has been growing without developing. John Friedmann, urban
planner, explains the differences between development and growth. Development is defined as "the
unfolding of creative possibilities inherent in society," while growth is "an expansion of the system in one
or more dimensions without change in its structure." 9 This WC provides SA and its cities with the
opportunity to develop, revive, and unify instead of just growing haphazardly.
7 Less than 2% of land in South Africa has been redistributed since the end of apartheid. Instead the government has
left it up to the market to redistribute the land to the "Black Diamonds," the rising Black middle class. While the
government has hoped that this rising middle class will take care of their brethren, in fact, as soon as those with
means are able to leave the townships, they flee forgetting their neighbors quickly. Despite marginal improvements,
physical and economic mobility has been limited.
Graphic created by author.
9 Friedmann, John. "A General Theory of Polarized Development", in Niles M. Hansen (ed.), Growth Centers in
Regional Economic Development (New York, 1972) pg. 84
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Image 3.4 1 State of the South African Cities Analytical Framework
The 2004 State of the South African Cities Report Describes the challenges South African cities face such as
unprecedented urbanization and a population growth. The Report explains that despite changing political
environments, democracy is giving rise to independent, self-governing state with poverty alleviation programs and
economic opportunities like the 2010 WC.
John Friedmann's general theory of polarized development provides an applicable conceptual
model to analyze the South African city. In A General Theory of Polarized Development, Friedmann
states that a spatial system is comprised of a core and a periphery, and exists "where a core can be
shown to dominate some of the vital decisions of populations in areas external to itself." In this traditional
city model, the periphery is dominated by the core and maintains this periphery through the market
system. Conflict and disparity exist between competing groups in the core and the periphery; spatial
integration is achieved by increasing economic, social, and political unification.10 To achieve
development, SA must seek to spatially integrate the deeply divided core-periphery areas during the WC-
related development. If organizers can use the WC to increase opportunity and form community cohesion
within the city, disparity and ultimately conflict and violence will be reduced.
10 Friedmann 1972 pg. 84 and Schmidt, Charles F. A Spatial Model of Authority-Dependency Relations in South


















Friedmann's theories demonstrate that political change alone cannot transform the decades of
fragmentation. Physical changes are necessary and with the WC, possible. Without the provision of
permanent housing, social cohesion is impossible. Homelessness is an epidemic is SA, limiting the
development of strong, unified cities and communities. In Cape Town there is a housing demand backlog
of 350,000 homes, increasing by 25,000 per year, but Cape Town can only build 13,000 homes per year.
This presents a growing crisis with people expected to be on the waiting list for twenty years."1 The WC
provides an opportunity for SA to expedite housing development.
3.4 1 WHAT IS A WORLD CUP CITY?
In the years surrounding an event as incredible as the FIFA WC, the city becomes myopic
focusing entirely on the necessary actions. A WC city is developed exclusively and in preparation for a
WC sporting event. In anticipation for 2010, the urban fabric of city has become littered with football-
related highway billboards, lamppost flags, and advertisements. The 2010 WC literally becomes
physically entwined within the city. South Africans are consuming football; school children play football in
the streets. However, cities must meet the requirements of hosting without becoming exclusively
dedicated to sports. Cities do not exist for a singular festival like the WC and therefore development must
meet the needs of the population not the visitors. The city must continue to exist outside of the stadium.
3.4.1 I Technology Changes the Nature of the Stadium
Technology has made the boundaries between the stadium's inside and the outside more porous.
The way we define the "stadium" and its "spectators" is changing in the new millennium. Giant screens in
open air parks, advanced telecommunications, and the very nature of the city is transformed by crowds
watching the football game. Clapperton Mavhunga, in his article What is the Stadium?, sees the stadium
as the heart of the event but not the sole area of revelry. The broadcasted game carries excitement and
turns homes, parks,,sports bars, bus and railway stations, cars, and bicycles, into stadiums away from the
stadium. Although typically fragmented, all of SA is united under this digital signal. "One place (the
stadium) becomes present in many spaces; different people in different places enter the stadium through
their TV screens, radio commentary, and internet and become one crowd in many places." 12 Such a
cerebral image of the stadium makes it difficult to plan for it. The WC and technology enables people
within SA to connect to each other and the world, but will the development schemes help people retain
this connection after the event concludes?
1 Ehrenreich, Tony. (May 2, 2007). The Ugly Reality of Our Beautiful City. Cape Argus (Cape Town).
12 Mavhunga, Clapperton. (2006). What is the Stadium? University of Michigan (Ann Arbor).
[83]
WASTED OPPORTUNITIES
3.4.2 I Masculinity in the World Cup City
Margot Rubin argues that cities must be mindful not to build excessive masculinity during this
transformative period. Since the bulk of WC fans are men, Rubin examines how the city will manifest the
masculine features associated with 2010. Rubin contends that cities become the conceptualization of
masculinity and in a sense the physical manifestation of the male fantasy as cities become "men's
playgrounds."13 What is the role of women in a city transformed in anticipation of a male-oriented event?
For the last decade, the country has sought to redress the inequalities of apartheid by providing special
opportunities to women. If the redevelopment of SA occurs in conjunction with the development of these
highly traditional notions of masculinity and femininity, then it will be difficult to abolish the concept of
sexism from the city.
3.5 I CASE STUDIES: WORLD CUP STADIUMS AS NEW CITY CENTERS
3.5.1 I Can Stadiums Revitalize Cities?
In the United States, cities commonly build sports facilities as a revitalization tool. Policies
assume that attracting large crowds to a downtown area will underscore its vitality, centrality, and
potential for additional economic activity and development. Large crowds will encourage private
investment in entertainment facilities such as restaurants, bars, and retail. For this reason, cities often
build shopping malls near new stadiums. Increased recreational and retail activity will attract additional
private investment to expand downtown office complexes. New residential development will follow this
influx of activity and a new downtown will be born. In the same way that tremendous skyscraper buildings
like New York's Empire State Building or Chicago's Sears Tower were expected to serve as city
landmarks, drawing centrality and activity to the city center, virtually every American city has rebuilt its
baseball stadium. Cities rationalize tremendous investments in sports stadiums using this rational that a
single asset will have an investment domino effect.14
The long-term impact of stadiums on downtown redevelopment is still debated. Experts contend
that stadiums alone do not provide a sufficient economic or social impact to justify the tremendous
expenditures. Sport facilities are worth the expense if they anchor the city and provide spectators with a
reason to come downtown. Integrating sports facilities into the existing urban fabric has been responsible
for influencing development patterns in some cities, especially when restaurants, office complexes, and
other recreational facilities are within walking distance of the stadium. Aesthetically pleasing and
architectural distinguishable stadiums have also had a greater impact on their neighborhoods. Oriole Park
13 Rubin, Margot. (2006). Women's Bodies in Masculinized Spaces: FIFA World Cup and the Women in their Cities.
2010 and the Life of the City. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).
14 Zimbalist, Andrew. 180-181
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at Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland and the Skydome in Toronto, Canada have attracted thousands
of visitors who simply want to tour the facilities.15
Noll and Zimbalist, two prominent American economists who study impact of new stadiums on
downtown revitalization, conclude that stadiums can be a source of local economic and community
growth. Stadium success is determined by the magnitude of the government subsidies enticing nearby
investment.16 Noll and Zimbalist fail to recognize the societal unity that develops between city residents
who support the same professional sports team. The importance of the stadium therefore supersedes the
physicality of the stadium to impact the very nature of the city. SA should not develop stadiums solely for
economic purposes, but should build them to anchor the social revitalization of the city. Cities cannot rely
on private investors to compliment city investment strategies. Development must be coupled with greater
city development strategies that aim to defragment the city. SA should place the stadiums as new focal
points in the city. The city can create value in the surrounding landscape by inviting developers to build
commercial, cultural, entertainment, and civic facilities around the WC stadiums. This will attract future
development around the stadiums and make these expensive investments into new city centers.
3.5.2 I Stuttgart and its Center of Competence
Stuttgart, Germany used its role as host city to strengthen business and tourist attractions before,
during, and after the WC. Professor Gunter Sabow of Stuttgart University explained in his article, Stuttgart
and its Center of Competence, the ways that the city used the 2006 WC hosting opportunity to redevelop
itself. Sabow argues that cities must build interesting, high-capacity, high-tech places that combine
business and entertainment without constraining the important role of hosting. Stuttgart built the
Kompetenssentrum Telematik, Mobile Computing Customer Care Center (KTMC) which served as center
for spectators in 2006. The KTMC now hosts 30 international companies including Daimler-Chrysler,
Siemens, and Hewlett-Packard. This site distinguished and strengthened the position of business
development in the city.17
3.5.3 I Seoul Digital Media City
Seoul Digital Media City (SDMC) is becoming the centerpiece of South Korea. SDMC was built by
the government on the site of a former landfill as part of South Korea's 2002 WC development plans to
attract domestic and foreign investment to support its growing high-tech businesses. The Korean
15 Noll, Roger G. and Andrew S. Zimbalist. (1997). Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams
and Stadiums. Brookings Institution Press (Washington D.C.).




government built SDMC as part of its larger master plan to develop a future-oriented incubation site for
technology venture firms. The Mayor of Seoul, Goh Kun, said that that SDMC was selected because of its
close proximity to the Seoul WC Stadium which attracted great media coverage in 2002. The
development will take advantage of the 2002 development of the WC Park (a park of similar size to
Central Park in New York City) and the 7,000 unit residential development. Land values increased in the
aftermath of the 2002 WC as a result of the stadium and subsequent development projects.18
3.5.4 1 Reviving a Declining Chester, Pennsylvania
Football proponents argue that investment in local leagues and supportive infrastructure can
revive declining downtowns. The establishment of a football team in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area
will generate much-needed economic investment for the city of Chester. This investment comes more
than a decade after Philadelphia was overlooked as a host city for the 1994 USA WC because of its
insufficient stadium facilities. The lack of stadium availability has limited the city's involvement in football
and hurt the city's national and international status. In February 2008, US Major League Soccer (MLS)
announced that its first new team since 1996 will be located in the Philadelphia suburb of Chester. This
USD30 million project will serve as the centerpiece of the city's waterfront renewal project. MLS will build
a 20,000 seat stadium for an estimated USD115 million and develop a convention center along with
commercial, residential, and retail infrastructure surrounding the stadium for an additional USD414
million. The project is expected to revitalize a declining area, southwest of Philadelphia, and generate
substantial improvement throughout the region. Funding will come from a variety of public and private
sources with USD30 million commitment from the City of Chester, USD10 million from the Delaware Port
Authority, and USD47 million from the Pennsylvania state government. "We believe it is a good economic
deal and we can demonstrate direct economic development that will return a lot to taxpayers," said Ed
Rendell, Governor of Pennsylvania. "If this sports stadium serves as the catalyst to revitalize the City of
Chester, you won't be able to put that in an economic analysis. It won't be in a balance sheet." Chief
Executive Officer of Chester, Nick Sakiewicz, explains that this investment project is more focused on
investing in the local community and Chester than developing the sports league. Sakiewicz said, "It will be
the people's team with a world-class stadium." The stadium is expected to showcase the determination of
the City to revive itself.19
18 Yang, Sung-Jin. (June 20, 2002). Seoul Digital Media City Envisions Super-Efficient Tech Hub. Korea HeraldJSeoul).




3.5.5 1 Fan Parks Connect Denver, Colorado
Denver, Colorado built a downtown stadium to jumpstart its inner city revival. Just a decade ago,
Denver was a devastated economic wasteland. Denver's impressive regeneration began with the hosting
of the 1976 Winter Olympic Games and continued for decades, transforming the city into a prosperous
place for living and working. South African cities can learn a great deal from Denver's development of
parks and public spaces. The city integrated the downtown through the largest system of parks and
bicycle paths in US. Denver's convention center, baseball stadium, libraries, and businesses are
connected through a network of paths. Denver cleverly built just 15,000 parking spaces for the 50,000
seat Coors Field Baseball Stadium, clearly too few spaces for a stadium with so many seats. As a result,
spectators must park in convenient downtown parking areas scattered around the downtown and walk
past entertainment and commercial facilities. This encourages spectators to frequent these city amenities
either before or after a game, or even when they are not attending a game. Since the stadium opened in
1995, this experiment has generated USD200 million a year for the local economy. These impressive
results were part of a well-planned scheme to revive the city, increase greenery, and redevelop local
downtown businesses. South African cities can utilize this model as a means for defragmenting the city
landscape and ensuring economic investment trickles into the city during and after 2010.20
3.5.6 I Cities Need to Develop Local Business around Stadiums
Chicago's U.S. Cellular Field, home to the Chicago White Sox Baseball team was built in 2001 for
USD125 million, but the 2003 renovations cost an additional USD200 million in public money.21 The
project was supposed to revive the historically marginalized south-side of Chicago by providing the area
with a local entertainment center. Despite renovations, recent attendance figures are well below
expectations. Studies argue that the stadium failed to unify the area because the city never developed
shopping or restaurants in the immediate area. As a result, spectators come to the games, spend money
inside the stadium and then leave. The stadium stands as a white elephant providing the local community
with little more than traffic. By contrast, Chicago's north-side baseball stadium, home to the Chicago
Cubs, is one of the most vibrant areas of the city because of its plethora of local shopping, restaurants,
and bars. Cubs fan come to the area early, spend money locally, and stay in the area after games
conclude to partake in the revelry with fellow fans. Longer stays means that fans are spending money at
local businesses and investing in the city's economy. South African stadiums will only generate
meaningful, long lasting city improvements if the city encourages development surrounding the stadium.
20 Cuff, Martin. (2006). Inner City Success: The Denver Example. The Property Magazine (Western Cape).21 Stanek, Steve. (February 1, 2005). Chicago Stadiums Fail to Deliver Promised Benefits. The Heartland Institute:
Budget & Tax News.
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3.6 I REVIVING THE INNER CITY BY DEVELOPING THE SURROUNDING TOWNSHIPS
The WC development projects should be used to revive the inner city by supporting development
in surrounding communities and former townships. Injecting funding into these decaying and forgotten
areas will add vigor and creativity throughout the city.
Historically, inner cities have held wealth and opportunity. Living closer to the inner city therefore
meant being closer to opportunity. For disenfranchised South Africans, the city was reserved for the
White population, while they were relegated to space outside of town or the townships. Many still fear the
impermanency of living in the city. The memory of the planned demolition of vibrant Black areas of the
city such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg22 and District Six in Cape Town23 remain deeply inscribed in
the collective memory. As a result nearly two decades since the repeal of the legislation restricting
residential locations of Black Africans, many remain in the townships. This physical and physiological
segregation is still a dominant feature of the South African city. According to Sharon Lafraniere
redevelopment requires changing the perception of the space. Lafraniere explains that "space is directly
lived through its associated images and symbols" and hence the space communicates nonverbally.
Meaning can change over time.24 For example, Tiananmen Square in Beijing was built as a symbol for
socialist China. After the 1989 protests, Tiananmen Square became associated with the brutality of the
same communist government. The reverse can occur in SA. Inner cities that have become synonymous
with violence can become places of unity, where people can remember SA's football team scoring a goal.
Through these collective memories, the place can reflect the development of a new intricate relationship
between place and time. To redevelop the inner city, planners must rebrand new and existing
development with consideration for the inscribed memories of hosting the 2010 WC.
22 Sophiatown was one of the four freehold townships outside of the City of Johannesburg and one of the few places
where Black Africans could own land. During the 1940s and 1950s, Sophiatown became the symbolic center of Black
culture, arts, politics, religion, and entertainment around Johannesburg. Sophiatown was a diverse area where
Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians could assemble. According to the 1950 Group Areas Act, interracial interactions bred
conflict and necessitated separation of the races. Because of this diversity, in 1953, the National Party decided to
raze the town. Nelson Mandela and other ANC activists rallied to try to protect Sophiatown, but failed, and on
February 9, 1955, residents were forced from their homes and relocated to an empty field in Meadowlands (now part
of Soweto). The area was rebuilt as a white only suburb named Triomf (Afrikaans for triumph). In February 2006, the
area was renamed Sophiatown but the vibrancy and culture remains only a memory.
23 District Six is named for its location as the Sixth Municipal District of Cape Town. By the beginning of the 20th
century, it was a flourishing, diverse area near downtown Cape Town, comprising nearly a tenth of the city's
population. According to the 1950 Group Areas Act, interracial interactions bred conflict and necessitated separation
of the races. District Six was deemed a slum and unfit for habitation because of its diversity. The government
portrayed the area as crime-ridden and dangerous, but most residents believed that the government cleared the land
because of its ideal location, sandwiched between Table Mountain and downtown Cape Town. On February 11,
1966, the government declared District Six a white-only area and removals started in 1968. Considerable opposition
from individuals as well as international agencies delayed the removals, which continued until 1982. Continued
conflict over ownership of the land has left it undeveloped. Today, the government recognizes the claims of former
residents and has pledged to support rebuilding.




SA's White population has also fled the inner cities. Extreme business divestment from the inner
city occurred as crime escalated. Businesses and people fled to suburban privatized cities like Sandton,
near Johannesburg, leaving inner cities to decay.25 South African cities are dilapidated and dangerous.
People are afraid for their safety and equally concerned that purchasing property downtown is a bad
investment. Without considerable government and private investment to rehabilitate inner cities, it is not
surprising that the inner-city remain abandoned. If SA put WC activities downtown, this would offer future
opportunities to return and contribute to the beginning of spatial integration, fulfilling what Lafraniere calls
the "transformation of spatial representations."26
Both Black and White people must be encouraged to repopulate the city with increasing
residential dwellers as the primary objective of urban development policy. Significant development of the
inner city cannot occur without support from thriving communities surrounding it. In order to revive South
African cities, the government must develop new urban growth centers in and around the townships,
while also continuing to invest in downtown redevelopment projects. Redevelopment projects are
contagious. Blossoming redevelopment in one area can revive neighboring areas. Increased security,
commercial activity, cultural expression, and connectedness are intertwined. Improved downtown spaces
will increase activity, which will spur economic development and cultural expression. In reverse, increased
cultural expression will increase connectivity and decrease crime which results from decreased inequality.
To alleviate the feelings of impermanency and encourage community development, the city could also
develop incentives for people to buy rather than rent. Special policies must be created to encourage
increased residential development downtown, encouraging mixed-income and mixed-race developments.
This will reduce the inherent ambiguities in the new SA, inviting all races to reunite in the inner city.
Policies must encourage inner city redevelopment while also enhancing the quality of life in the
townships and increasing the connectivity between the townships. The disparity between the townships
and the city cannot be exacerbated lest people continue to feel isolated. The economic base of the
townships must be developed and strengthened to create interconnectivity between the city and the
townships. Opportunities in the township and the city should be mutually exclusive to unify these
fragments of the city. Including townships in the redevelopment of the inner city will make them a vital part
25 Sandton is a 156km2 city in the northern part of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Area. In 1969, the municipality was
established as extension of the city as Johannesburg began expanding north of its downtown. Although it started as a
residential community, it quickly became one of the wealthiest towns in the area. In the last fifteen years, the financial
center of Johannesburg shifted from the downtown to Sandton. As Sandton developed, building a considerable
amount of the city's A-grade office space, the downtown lost important businesses like Nedbank, one of SA's largest
banks. Today, Sandton has become Johannesburg's new city center appealing to the international visitors and
businessmen as well as middle and upper-class South Africans. The Sandton Convention Center is one of the largest
convention centers on the African continent and the primary site for important events like the 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development. Sandton also has a number of 5-star hotels and major tourist attractions including Sandton
City and Nelson Mandela Square, two of the largest shopping centers in the Southem Hemisphere. Across the N1
ring road from Sandton is Alexandra, which although only 8 km2, has about the same population as Sandton and is




of the city as a whole. The notion of marginal, satellite, or fringe communities must be replaced with a
shared vision of inter-connected communities.27
World Cup Potential to Increase Physical and Social Mobility
Image 3.5 I World Cup Potential to Increase Physical and Social Mobility28
WC-related infrastructure can connect the fragmented city by building pathways between communities. These
pathways can be either physical as in improved road access or community participation. Reducing crime will also
open the pathways. Situating WC venues on the outskirts of Soweto and downtown Johannesburg may encourage
mobility unifying the people of the city.
Parks and open spaces are integral for congregating. SA needs abstract space - unlimited or
undefined spaces, organically developed, divorced from reality and human experience - which could
provide an uncorrupted place for South Africans to congregate without the constructed fear of daily life.
This space needs to incorporate a social and mental unification in addition to good physical form. The
production of common space where people can freely interact on a regular basis is the best means of
27 Townships must be linked not just to the inner city but also to each other. A Malaysian investor, Newcyc, pledged
to build a 27-mile, USD1.7 billion monorail connecting the central business district of Johannesburg with Soweto. Built
entirely with private money, the light-rail system is expected to be completed by 2009. It is expected to ferry 1.5
million people on a daily basis, between 39 stations for 10 Rand per ride. The monorail is expected to reduce
commute times from over an hour to fifteen minutes. This is a step in the right direction but additional such projects
must be developed. Ndelebe 2007
28 Graphic created by author.
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linking the social and economic fragmentation. Increased cohesion and comfort can only occur through
close, personal associations within the perceived space by establishing common routes and networks
which link people and places to a daily urban reality (i.e. establishing regular commuting habits).
3.7 I BUILDING THE STADIUMS
SA's original winning bid proposed 13 stadiums, three of which were rugby stadiums upgraded for
the previous WCs. 29 Three of the stadiums were cancelled and the current plan calls for five new
stadiums and five refurbished stadiums. When the final ten stadiums were selected, two of the three
rugby stadiums had been dropped from the list and Cape Town and Durban were building new stadiums.
The 64 football matches of 2010 will be played in ten stadiums in nine cities - Bloemfontein, Cape Town,
Durban, Johannesburg, Nelspruit, Polokwane, Port Elizabeth, Rustenberg, and Pretoria.30 Stadiums are
designed as versatile, multipurpose facilities intended to serve the needs of 2010 as well as future
entertainment and community events. The ten stadiums in total will seat more than 570,000 people during
the 2010 WC. This new plan promised SA more seats per game than any host country since the United
States in 1994. The decision to build five stadiums has been divisive. Construction of all major stadiums
and WC-related infrastructure began by February 2007.
To be selected, host cities prepared persuasive business cases demonstrating their ability to host
the event. Host cities were selected by the LOC, the Development Bank of SA, the National Treasury, the
Ministry of Sport and Recreation, and representatives from other South African cities. Officials from the
South African construction industry were also consulted as to the selection of host cities. As part of the
business plans, host cities were responsible for developing plans for supportive infrastructure. Cities are
also responsible for developing the lasting legacy of the event.
29 Ellis Park in Johannesburg, Newlands in Cape Town, and Kings Park in Durban, all rugby stadiums, were three of
the thirteen stadiums already upgraded to meet FIFA's eligibility requirements.




STU CT T 0 CS C
Cape Town 2,984,885 403.1 70,000 October 2009
Durban 3,129,298 278 70,000 August 2009
Nelspruit 484,245 118.8 46,000 April 2009
Polokwane 532,673 111.2 46,000 April 2009
Port Elizabeth 1,054,359 159.9 50,000 March 2009
Bloemfontein 655,332 34.1 48,000 October 2008
Johannesburg: 3,225,407 29.2 65,000 July 2008
Ellis Park
Johannesburg: 3,225,407 208.5 95,000 April 2009
Soccer City
Pretoria 1,531,954 25.7 50,000 December 2008
Rustenberg 405,554 20.7 42,000 December 2008
Total 1,388.9 574,200
Image 3.6 1 Table of Stadiums
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South African cities were selected based on the strength of their football clubs. After that, cities
are ranked according to the plans for their stadium, infrastructure, and global context. Johannesburg
naturally became the national host, holding opening and final matches, and the only city to have two WC
stadiums. Durban and Cape Town are the other major host cities. Both cities have vibrant football clubs,
although both cities needed new stadiums. Smaller cities like Nelspruit and Port Elizabeth were selected
because of local development needs. Ancillary development in the smaller towns will provide them with
much needed improvements as the lasting legacy. Hosting the event in a variety of cities scattered
throughout the country ensures that all South Africans have access to the WC with the possibility of
viewing matches at nearby stadiums.
Image 3.7 1 Construction of Johannesburg's Ellis Park31
Construction workers continue their efforts during the February 2007 inspection of WC stadiums.
For the most part, stadiums are being built with public funds and will remain in the public domain.
The National Treasury allocated R8.4 billion for the building and upgrading of WC stadiums. 32 Host cities
are responsible for supplementing the residual financing necessary for construction of stadiums and
supportive infrastructure. Ideally costs are kept to a minimum and stadiums are built in the most cost-
effective manner. The five new stadiums will be built, owned, operated, and maintained by the host city
municipality. Some host cities hope to offload the cost and responsibility for the new stadium into private
hands after the event concludes. Soccer City, the largest and most expensive WC stadium which was
31 Photo taken by author.
32 The R8.4 billion is broken down as follows: R7.62 for stadium construction and upgrading, R580 million for the
supply of utilities and services to the stadium, and R200 million for overlay items at each stadium. The funding is
spread over four years starting in fiscal year 2006-7 with R600 million, with R1.26 billion, R3.6 billion, and R2.939
billion in subsequent years.
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originally owned by SAFA was returned to the municipality in honor of 2010 and will henceforth be
managed by the City of Johannesburg.
Image 3.8 I Newspaper Clipping of World Cup Construction
3.8 I STADIUM DESIGN AND URBAN FUTURES
The design and layout of the stadium as well as the city policies towards private development in
the area are an important aspect of the stadium's impact on the city.
* A more attractive design will bring spectators who may not have visited the stadium otherwise.
The local community also benefits from having an aesthetically pleasing stadium. A single
improvement can create a domino effect enhancing the overall beauty of the area.
* The design of the stadium serves an economic purpose as well. Many new stadiums are built to
include additional luxury seating so that owners can charge higher prices for seats.
* The precise location of the stadium may indicate its impact on the local community. Those




The way the stadium is situated on the lot and the entrance and egress may entice or exclude
spectators. The sitting may also charm private investors to develop the immediate or surrounding
vicinity.
The proclivity of the stadium towards lucrative ventures is necessary to attract future development. If
designed with these considerations in mind, a stadium can rejuvenate a forgotten downtown; if the
stadium is design and situated poorly, however, then it may never be used and become a scar on the city.
There are two stadium typologies - the suburban and the urban stadium. In the Unites States,
urban, downtown stadiums tend to be more lucrative for developers and businesses in the immediate
vicinity. Urban stadiums typically have a stronger impression on the cityscape and cultivate community.
Suburban stadiums are usually located in picturesque settings and surrounded by greenery. Security
concerns in and around stadiums is an important aspect in stadium design in SA. Suburban stadiums,
because of the considerable open space adjoining the facility, tend to be easier to safeguard.
3.8.1 I Johannesburg's Soccer City vs. Ellis Park
Johannesburg, population 3.3 million, is going to be home to two internationally-recognized sports
facilities: Soccer City and Ellis Park. These two stadiums demonstrate the opposite ends of the spectrum;
while Soccer City is the prototypical suburban stadium, Ellis Park is in the city center. Examining the
impact of these two stadiums on the city provides insight into the ways 2010 interventions may impact
other South African cities.
Little but tall grass existed in Johannesburg before the richest Witwatersrand (Afrikaans for white
gold reef) was discovered in 1886 by an Australian named George Harrison on a farm about five miles
west of the city's downtown. Within weeks, thousands of prospectors had set up tents in the area.
Oppression, greed, and corruption followed as the government essentially enslaved the native population
to extract the gold. Today, Johannesburg is SA's premier metropolis, with the majority of international
investment, the main international airport, and all the disparity typical of SA.
Downtown Johannesburg is best described as featureless, with sprawl and traffic reminiscent of
many American cities, complete with decaying office towers and blatant poverty. The Newtown Cultural
District is the city's best attempt at a cultural district, complete with a historic brick making area, a new
science museum, and the Johannesburg Art Gallery as well as centers for theatre, dance, and music.
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Johannesburg - Population Centers
Image 3.9 I Johannesburg - Population Centers33
This concept map illustrates division between the population centers in Johannesburg. Johannesburg remains an
unjust city with a large proportion of the population living in Soweto, southwest of the city's main ring road but a
majority of city landmarks, commercial, transportation, and natural amenities, north of Johannesburg's CBD.
Development typically occurs north of the city center around wealthy neighborhoods and private shopping centers.
New malls, such as Fourways, are developing north of the ring road, about as far as one can live from Soweto. This
style of development has led to a social and physicalfragmentation in the city.




Image 3.10 1 Johannesburg- Economic Centers34
This image depicts the relative economic importance of areas like Sandton and Randburg over the city's main
central business district. Malls are also key financial and social centers. Soweto and Alexandra remain separated
from these economic centers as well as wealthy residential areas. The paradox between where people live and
where the economic power is centered is key to the integrated divisions within cities like Johannesburg.
The N1 ring road encompasses great disparity. In the 1980s, as apartheid crumbled, residents
and businesses fled north. Today, the city's fanciest hotels and restaurants lay in ubiquitous suburban
nodes surrounding by security walls. Places like Montecasino, an ersatz Tuscan villa housing a hotel,
casino, mall, and an aviary; Melrose Arch, a gated community of condos, galleries, spas, and high-end
restaurants; and Houghton embody the wealth of northern Johannesburg. Sandton has become the
unofficial new downtown, housing most businesses, international hotels, and even the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange. To the south lie the Black neighborhoods spawned from government location
restrictions. Soweto, which stands for South West Townships, has a population of more than one million.
Although formerly fairly impoverished, today it is a middle-class suburb. Neighborhoods like Orlando West
34 Graphic created by author using 2006 South Africa census figures and Google maps.
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are havens for the Black Diamonds (nickname for wealthy Blacks), who built the first malls in Soweto in
2007. White tourists, who would have never entered Soweto, now tour the residences of Nelson and
Winnie Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and Hector Pieterson. The only township north of the inner
city is the Alexandra Township. The disparity between the races is most apparent in Alexandra, which sits
on the doorsteps of wealthy Sandton. Unlike Soweto, Alexandra remains a compact, largely impoverished
township. Despite its opportune location, Alexandra remains one of the most disenfranchised areas of
Johannesburg.
Soccer City is located at the confluence of two major highways, the N12 and N1, situated at the
southwest border of the city and Soweto. Hosting the opening and final match on the border of such a
famous township demonstrates the city and the nation's commitment to increase equality. The stadium
was originally built in 1987 with a capacity of 94,700. For 2010, the upper tiers will be extended to
increase seating capacity and lighting will be installed. Soccer City is built in a suburban style with a great
deal of greenery surrounding the stadium and a large parking lot to facilitate convenience. Unlike urban
stadiums that typically have businesses surrounding the stadium, Soccer City is an island. People are not
going to want walk from home to the stadium and there will be little business activity before or after the
matches. The open design of Soccer City makes it easier to safeguard than a stadium located in a denser
area. This may entice spectators who may avoid a game in the denser area of Ellis Park.




Image 3.12 1 Soccer City Map
Stadium development should be connected with the city's redevelopment plan. Specifically, the
city must redevelop the surrounding area to entice private developments in the vicinity. The area is
already ripe for development. Although historically marginalized, Soweto's increased spending capacity
has attracted private development. In October 2007, the first private mall, the Maponya Mall, opened in
Soweto. Developer Landmark Real Estate announced that this mall would be no different from any other
modern mall in either its design or its retailers. The 55,000 square meter development is the "heartbeat of
Soweto."35 Malls such as the Maponya Mall are located a distance from Soccer City and the two entities
will not be able to work together to entice shoppers and spectators. The city should create development
initiatives to lure development closer to Soccer City to ensure that the area remains vibrant even after
2010. Additional entertainment and business around the stadium and in Soweto would entice people to
come to these previously avoided areas. Without greater integrated development planning, the 2010 WC
will not facilitate increased unity.
Unlike Soccer City, Ellis Park is located just east of Johannesburg's central business district in a
relatively dense location. Ellis Park was built in 1982 as a modern, multipurpose sport facility intended to
revitalize Johannesburg's downtown. For 2010, the city is expanding capacity by 10,149 seats to hold a
35 Fifty-five percent of the R55 million shopping mall is owned by Nedbank and the Masingita Group, with the
remaining 45% owned by the developer. Ken Reynolds, Divisional Director for the Gauteng division of Nedbank
Corporate Property Finance called the mall a "realization of a long-term goal for us to be instrumental in the
development of this dynamic suburb." Of the 46 stores, 65% are national tenants, 7.5% are franchises and 27.5% are
independent retailers. (Ster-Kinekor wins Maponya Mall bid in Soweto 2005)
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total of 60,000 spectators. Ellis Park will host one quarterfinal match. Ellis Park is just a 15 minute walk
from the city center. Ellis Park is already connected to the downtown via a series of parks including
Joubert Park, Johannesburg's main park. This offers the city an unparalleled opportunity to bring
thousands of people to the downtown, many for the first time in many years. Many people do not feel safe
or comfortable downtown and therefore, the city needs to upgrade and rebrand the city center.
Johannesburg needs to encourage local businesses to cater to the. 2010 crowds and to provide
spectators with the very best experiences. If people enjoy themselves and see that there is a reason to
come downtown, then they may return in the future.
Image 3.13 I Ellis Park
Image 3.14 1 Ellis Park Map
[100]
FRAGMENTING THE CITY
SA is wasting this opportunity to unify the urban landscape. This is especially so in Johannesburg
where local organizers are spending billions on two stadiums and related transit and tourist infrastructure,
but spending little to elevate the standard of living for the poor. Instead of unifying the built landscape,
2010 is exacerbating inequality and fragmentation in SA.
Despite promises that 2010 will leave a lasting legacy on the city, the stadium locations are not
sited well and policies in the surrounding areas fail to entice new development patterns. Image 3.15
suggests an alternative future if stadiums were to be used more constructively. In this idealistic future,
stadium locations are situated to. invite new development in and around the central business district. In
this case, development that typically occurred north of the downtown will be attracted to the higher land
values around the new stadiums in the south. Johannesburg planners should develop mixed-use/mixed-
income development to fill the land between Sandton and Soweto. This will begin to bridge the residual
fragmentation between the people.
Johannesburg Future








36 Graphic created by author.
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Building stadiums downtown can provide the ideal economic stimulus to the inner city. The billion-
Rand Soccer City located across the road from Soweto demonstrates an obvious change from the
apartheid days, which restricted Blacks to Soweto. Such investment will transform the southern portion of
the city inviting new development to bridge the gap between Soweto and the downtown. Just east of the
inner city, the revitalized Ellis Park will also contribute to the defragmentation of the city. It will serve as a
bridge between the downtown and the fancy northern suburbs. These stadiums built in conjunction with
attractive development incentives can revive and unify Johannesburg.
3.8.2 I Nelspruit's Mbombela Stadium
In rural communities, people need to see the benefits of the stadium immediately. Stadiums need
to be more than just entertainment or business centers but city centers. Stadiums must be located in a
central and convenient location and be designed to serve as a downtown anchor. The stadium should be
located near the city center and must be carefully integrated into the city's development plans. The 2010
WC will put these smaller, lesser-known cities on the map, and therefore, their stadiums must be the focal
point of the city.
Nelspruit, population 221,474, is the capital of Mpumalanga and the main gateway to Kruger
National Park. It is the trading center for the smaller towns in Mpumalanga. Nelspruit is located 330
kilometers east of Johannesburg and 100 kilometers west of the Mozambique border. The city is a major
stopover for visitors travelling to Kruger Park and serves as the major economic stimulator for the
province. The 46,000 seat, R920 million, Mbombela Stadium is located six kilometers west of the city
center. The roof supports are designed to resemble a giraffe, an apt symbol given the stadium's close
proximity to Kruger. Visitors to Nelspruit will be able to watch a 2010 match on their way to Kruger. The
precinct is designed to stimulate the development of a resort development to attract more visitors to the
city for sports games and Kruger. The stadium is key to the development of a sports district with rugby
and football fields. The stadium will also serve a dual role as a conference center. It is designed to
stimulate job growth and encourage leisure and business tourism. "This venue will create the platform for
people from all over SA and other parts of the world, to make the trip to Mbombela to share in a common
passion in the form of sport and entertainment," said Mpumalanga Premier, Thabang Makwetla. With
limited entertainment and business facilities, the new stadium will not only produce short-term
construction jobs but encourage local economic growth.37
37 Mbombela Sports Stadium Information. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from Mbombela Stadium:




Image 3.16 I Nelspruit Map
Image 3.17 I Mbombela Stadium




The Mbombela Stadium will become the focal point of the city. In anticipation for 2010, the
Nelspruit city government built its new government headquarters on the outskirts of town near the new
stadium as well as the Riverside mall, casino, hotel, and commercial complex. 2010 offered Nelspruit an
opportunity to reinvest downtown and create a cohesive urban community; instead, the city is continuing
its practice of abandoning the inner city and constructing a new civic center away from the unpleasant
crime and grit downtown. -
3.9 I BUILDING COMMUNITY SPACES THROUGH FAN PARKS
Fan parks are integral to the success of 2010. SA will build fan parks in all host cities. Originally
started in Germany in 2006, cities, independent of the LOC, organized fan parks or fan festivals to
provide a place for fans to gather and celebrate while watching the game. These fan parks were so
successful that FIFA insisted that SA commit to the idea. Fans who do not have tickets to games can still
revel in the excitement watching all the action on a high definition big screen television in secure outdoor
parks. Entrance is free to the parks. Six times as many people were in the fan parks at the 2006 WC as
inside the stadiums. 39 Before 2006, host countries would discourage visitors from coming to the country if
they did not have tickets. SA expects more than a million people to watch the matches in fan parks in
each host city.40 The fan parks also encourage people to stay longer even if they do not have tickets to
many games. It elevates the spirit in the host country during the month-long event, providing a public
space for everyone to party during the games. SA currently suffers from a significant lack of public space.
If the parks are designed and developed with consideration for a lasting legacy, the additional public
space can transform the city.
3.9.1 I Germany's Fan Parks
In 2006, fan parks were scattered throughout public spaces in Berlin's city center. Berlin has
experienced considerable and contentious redevelopment in the last decade, as the formerly divided city
has tried to unify itself. Berlin, determined to use its hosting of the 2006 WC to boost civic consciousness
and unity, developed a series of public urban spaces to revitalize the city and mobilize citizens and
visitors. Events took place at more than twenty public spaces, which included streets, plazas, parks, and
semi-public locations. In the aftermath of the event, Berlin used these parks to reduce divisions between
city occupants. These spaces have been successful in both a social and economic revitalization of many
forgotten areas of the city. Factors such as location, accessibility, and linkages with the urban fabric as
well as the specific programming and media forms contributed to the widespread laudability of the parks.
38 Mabin, Alan. (2005). Suburbs on the Veld, Modem and Postmodern. Witwatersrand University (Johannesburg).
39 Appel, M. (December 4, 2007). Fan Parks Fuel Local Business. BuaNews (Cape Town).
40 Nevin, Tom. (October 2007). Fan Parks Will Attract One Million Visitors. African Business.
[104]
FRAGMENTING THE CITY
These parks facilitated a transformation in the public and private spaces during the WC and continue to
have an impact on the social harmony of the city. Marie Selter and Theresa Golka in their article,
Learning from Berlin-The Soccer World Cup 2006 and its Impact on Public Space, describe this
transformation of public space for the 2006 WC. Since reunification, Berlin has been struggling to develop
new public spaces and build unity between East- and West-Berliners. Selter and Golka explain that the
parade of fan parks throughout Berlin created holistic unity between the stadium and different
neighborhoods in the city. Berlin built a place where everyone could come together in support of the
German team. This boosted civic consciousness and changed the way people interact with public space
and with each other in public spaces.1
Image 3.18 I 2006 German World Cup Fan Park
This 35,000m2 fan park accommodated 10,000 fans between the hours of 2:30pm and midnight everyday of the
event. Designers of the park tried to develop an equitable, cluster-free space. The park was also void of advertising.
The success of fan parks in Germany, serving as the eleventh stadium made them popular with 2010 organizers.
3.9.2 I South Africa Builds Fan Parks
Fan parks are particularly important and controversial in SA. High ticket prices have made
entrance to the WC events prohibitive, pricing out most locals. The government and the LOC are mindful
of creating an exclusive event while still acknowledging the need to demand high prices to repay the
expenses. Although, fan parks generally are supposed to quell concerns that an elitist government is
41 Selter, Marie and Theresa Golka. (2006). Learning from Berlin-The Soccer World Cup 2006 and its Impact onPublic Space. 2010 and the Life of the City. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).
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developing an elitist event, placing those without financial means to purchase seats outside the stadiums
is reminiscent of previous apartheid practices. In essence, the government is welcoming everyone to the
event, but formally separating spectators according to purchasing power. It is therefore imperative the fan
parks leave a lasting legacy after the event, improving the community cohesion and general health and
welfare.
Although there is consensus on the need and importance of fan parks, their location has been
particularly controversial. Fan parks should be built in the townships to ensure that those with the least
access are not excluded from the events. Fan parks will add greenery to dense townships. From a safety
perspective, the density and informal networks may make it difficult to secure parks in the townships.
There has been some concern regarding security in the fan parks. High crime rates in SA and in
general during international sporting events makes it difficult to guarantee the safety of people in the
crowded, intoxicated parks. SA is therefore dispatching extra police to the fan parks to ensure that people
are reveling safely. However, those cities that cannot afford additional police may have to cut back on the
number of fan parks. Cape Town recently announced that tight budget constraints may result in fewer or
smaller fan parks. Despite expanded police forces, there is still credible reason for cities to be concerned
about protecting spectators in the fan parks.42
The construction of fan parks also poses a new challenge for city planners. Public space is all but
nonexistent in SA, so each city must develop entirely new public spaces; if these parks are designed to
be flexible and accommodating, they may change the way South Africans interact with the urban
environment. Fan park designs should be useable after 2010. The typical design is a large open space
just outside the stadium. But such spaces are hard to secure during the event and often remain vacant
after the event. Some cities are also proposing smaller parks in the townships and scattered throughout
the city and linking to a main fan park just outside the stadium. Cape Town for example is developing a
number of smaller parks along a "Parade Route" from the hotel area through the downtown to the Green
Point Stadium. These smaller parks are easier to secure during the WC and easier to adapt afterwards.
Cape Town's plan weaves the fan parks through the city so as to be easily used by locals after 2010. The
plan also integrates the fan parks into local business areas to encourage fans to spend locally.43 Smaller
cities like Polokwane are building fan parks that are much too large to be used by the local population
after the event. Polokwane should consider developing its fan parks in a smaller, integrated manner,
similar to Cape Town. Large, more sprawling cities like Johannesburg are having trouble determining
where to place the fan parks and how best to weave them together. Designing parks in separate areas of
the Johannesburg, placing one in Soweto and another in Sandton will homogenize the parks and reduce
the possibilities for social integration. Cities should use the Cape Town plan as a model and develop fan




parks in a similar style. Reintroducing public space can provide a common ground needed to finally
bridge the decades of divide and may ultimately leave the deepest impression of all the WC-related
improvements on the city.
Image 3.19 I Concept of Cape Town Fan Parks"
This concept drawing suggests an alternative to city planner's fan park designs. Cities are not developing complex
fan parks systems to leave as a lasting legacy on city development. The brown parks are existing parks and the new
suggested parks are marked in green. Public spaces can reunite the city and reintroduce green spaces.
[107]
44 Graphic created by author.
WASTED OPPORTUNITIES
3.10 I THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES
WC development can transform and unify South African cities, which have remained divided
despite more than a decade of democracy. Although the apartheid policy restricting development
patterns ended in 1994, planners have not yet unified the city. The same poor planning that limited
the efficacy of previous development plans continues to fail in 2010 plans. Because of the scale and
cost of stadium projects, they should have a lasting impact on the future of South African cities.
Throughout the world, stadium projects have transformed neighborhoods and helped cities
rejuvenate. Planning and urban design should be integrated into current WC stadium plans so as to
maximize the possibilities for development. Time is running out; planners can still make minor
changes to the sports developments that can have resonate throughout the city. If WC organizers
do not actively use these stadium projects to unify the city, then these projects will not share the




The flames of racism, ignited by a minority at soccer matches
cannot and must not be allowed to divide the family of football.1
- Tokyo Sexwale, Businessman
Everybody in the country should see themselves as participants, as
contributors to this effort, to ensure we do indeed host a successful
World Cup. All of us - business, trade unions, and everybody else
should as a nation, treat it as a common project, a very important
project.2
- Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa
1 Sexwale, Tokyo (July 18, 2007). Football Kept Us Alive. Retrieved February 1, 2008, from FIFA: www.fifa.com.




4.1 I CHALLENGES AHEAD
Poor planning has ignored public opinion and as a result conflict has arisen. Strict hosting
deadlines make it difficult for government to listen to the needs of the people. This intense pressure has
exacerbated conflict between city residents and city officials as well as between competing urban
localities. Expensive and long-lasting stadium decisions must be made overnight and there is no time to
carefully research the implications of these hasty decisions. The presence of squatters conflicts with the
government's need to present a clean and organized city. The WC allows the central government to take
a leading role in municipal and individual decisions. Such situations will inevitably cause conflict.
Policymakers and social analysts must study and examine the way SA manages the event to determine
the true efficacy of its democratic decisions. In this way, the WC is the first measure of South African
democracy. This chapter will examine the ongoing conflicts between municipal and central governments
and between cities and their people. By the conclusion, the reader will understand the inherent
challenges of hasty development that test this budding democracy.
4.2 I EGREGIOUS EXPENSES
There is continued debate concerning the value of expensive infrastructure and the need to
reduce expenses. Reducing the number of host cities may reduce costs but will keep the profits in fewer
South African cities. As costs escalated, the LOC tried to reduce the number of host cities, but faced
insurmountable opposition. No South African city wanted to give up the opportunity to host a WC match.
Cities are eager to utilize the WC to gain national and international notoriety. New and improved
infrastructure is an important lasting legacy of the event. It is also a way to disperse improvements
throughout SA. The 2010 WC is almost entirely funded through public funds. In a country demanding
improved health facilities, clean water, and electricity, public expenditures on five new stadiums seems
profligate. The stadiums must therefore leave a lasting and meaningful legacy.
Football is the most popular sport in the country, but the decades of international isolation from
sports left the industry without an opportunity to build proper stadiums. The LOC explains that a legacy of
the event is the advancement of the sport. Investing in the development of football infrastructure is
necessary, the LOC argues, to redress past imbalances. Danny Jordaan, Chief Executive Officer of the
LOC, explains that the legacy of 2010 is more than just superior football facilities, but the emerging
understanding that those facilities will be available to all South Africans.3




Attendance at football matches is declining in SA. Stadium construction therefore seems like a
waste of public funds. Labeling a stadium for a specific sport instead of sharing venues makes it even
more difficult to fill the stadium. Originally, the LOC was planning to renovate existing rugby stadiums.
LOC Chairperson Irvin Khoza explains that although other sports made their grounds available, the
playing surfaces at most of these stadiums were not suitable for football. The issue becomes that it is
difficult to keep the stadium from becoming a white elephant without developing some means of
integrating the sports between stadiums.
Although most South Africans are excited for 2010, there is some mounting criticism of features
of the stadiums projects. From a sports perspective, it is important for SA to have modern stadiums, but
questions are mounting as to how the stadiums will be used after the event. Jacques Schippers of
TotalGaz, who is coordinating energy procedures for the WC, said that "to increase or build new stadiums
is not the way to go...for the month we host the World Cup they will be packed but when it's over,
turnouts will drop again." The biggest problem he sees is that the South African football leagues are not
"of the highest quality and the public would much rather sit at home and watch the English league on the
pay channel than go out and watch their local sides play."4 On average, the three major football clubs
attract only a few hundred fans to each match. Although the sports clubs claim new stadiums will help the
sport develop, given these attendance figures, it seems unlikely that the local clubs will fill these
tremendous stadiums.s
Agencies bringing the WC to SA promise that despite enormous expenditures, the WC will bring
economic benefits and prosperity to all South Africans. But actions taken in preparation for the WC
suggest that this promised prosperity will not likely be felt by the majority of South Africans; instead, it will
come to corporate investors and the tourism industry. The LOC has cited the 2006 German WC as well
as previous WCs as the source for this expectation. However, financial gains are rarely experienced by
developing countries that need to invest considerably in WC stadiums and related infrastructure. The
profitability of this event and its impact on all socioeconomic levels in SA is therefore doubtful and
considerable challenges lay ahead.
4.3 I DETERMINING STADIUM LOCATIONS
4.3.1 I Cape Town
Contention between cities, their football leagues, and FIFA developed during the final stadium
decisions. Football stadiums are central to the redevelopment of the city and can shape the direction of
4 1 interviewed Jacques Schippers of TotalGaz in January 2008. She explained her perspective as an energy provider




the city. To minimize costs, some cities are trying to modernize and repair existing stadiums, while other
cities are building without concern for costs. The desire to curb escalating costs is mirrored by the desire
to aid redevelopment strategies by placing stadiums in transitioning communities. FIFA requires host
cities to demonstrate only "pleasant appearances" during the event which means that when selecting
stadium locations, cities need to consider the skyline view of the city that will be filmed for the television
audience. Internationally televised events cannot depict slums. FIFA has instructed SA that the locations
of the stadiums must have picturesque settings.6 Naturally, this has led to mounting tensions in the cities,
particularly in Cape Town.7
The extensive debate in Cape Town during stadium selection illustrates the inherent contention in
the planning process. The location of the stadium is the nucleus of Cape Town's redevelopment strategy.
The stadium is the principally televised aspect of the city and therefore becomes the city's image. An
attractive stadium will become the international image of Cape Town.
According to the Bid Book, the Newlands Stadium was to be the competition venue and Athlone
Stadium was an additional practice venue.8 Development opportunities were linked with Cape Town's
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) which called for major development projects linked to the Athlone
Nodal Plan, including the Klipfontein Corridor rapid transport system, completion of the Swartklip regional
sports complex, the establishment of the Barcelona Green Belt, and the N2 Gateway Project with its
integrated human settlement development. Cape Town preferred to host the 2010 matches in the Athlone
Stadium, which would allow the city to fund stadium upgrades.9 Having two internationally competitive
stadiums would have boosted Cape Town's reputation as a sports city. But the Cape Town Football
League suggested hosting 2010 at the Blue Downs Stadium, a 68,000-seat venue. Blue Downs is located
in the Cape Flats Townships where football participation is more prevalent. The league considered this to
be a more appropriate location given the extreme popularity of football within the townships, and
assumed that having the stadium in the townships would ensure continued dedication to the sport. The
league rejected the Athlone Stadium claiming that it was too difficult to expand the stadium to the needed
size. FIFA rejected both the Blue Downs and the Athlone Stadiums as being located in an "unattractive
location." FIFA also rejected the city's originally suggested Newlands Stadium arguing that it is too difficult
to upgrade. Rebuilding the Green Point Stadium quickly became the only option. It was chosen for its
6 FIFA explicitly forbids cities from broadcasting cranes or other building sites in the city's skyline during the WC.
Cities must rush to finish all the necessary construction before the event begins in 2010. SA agreed to these
requirements before being awarded the event. Both FIFA and SA want to present footage of an impressive country.
7 Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).
8 Newland Stadium is located in an up-scale suburb of Cape Town, located at the foot of Table Mountain, where it
could beautifully display the picturesque mountain for international television. The Newlands Stadium is a famous
rugby and football venue recently upgraded for the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC.
9 Athlone, built in 1971, has a capacity of 30,000, but was expected to be upgraded to seat 50,000. Renovations were
expected to cost just R297 million for upgrades and the installation of modern communications technology. But its
location along the football-loving Cape Flats made that impossible.
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prime downtown location, its scenic surroundings, its ability to link with transportation infrastructure, and
its capacity to seat 68,000 spectators.10
Image 4.1 I Cape Town's Stadium Options
From right to left and top to bottom row: Athlone, Newlands, Green Point, and Blue Downs Stadium.
Plans were made to demolish and rebuild the old Green Point Stadium instead of renovating the Ath/one Stadium.
This decision was made primarily based on location and the stadium's international image. Television viewers
would see the poverty dominating South Africa when broadcasters panned out of the Athlone Stadium. Instead,
television viewers will witness the picturesque Table Mountain and the natural splendors of Cape Town.
FIFA pressured Cape Town to choose the Green Point Stadium citing the explicit rule forbidding
cities from broadcasting informal housing and poverty. The Athlone Stadium, the Newlands Stadium, and
10 Swart, Kamilla and Bob Urmilla. (2006). Soccer Stadium Venue Selection, City Selection City Legacies and the




Blue Downs Stadium would have displayed the Cape Town Townships in the background. Instead, the
city chose to demolish and rebuild the Green Point Stadium located in a predominately white, wealthy
area near the downtown that conveniently displays Table Mountain in the background. The Johannesburg.
based, Mail & Guardian newspaper reported that a FIFA delegate said that Athlone, which is surrounded
by low-cost and informal housing was not an appropriate site to host a billion dollar event. "A billion
television viewers don't want to see shacks and poverty on this scale," he said. The Mail & Guardian
explained that it was not just merely aesthetic motivations that led them to pursue the Green Point
Stadium but its 20,000 extra seats will add millions of Rand in ticket revenue."1
Kamilla Swart and Bob Urmilla argue in their article, Soccer Stadium Selection, City Selection,
City Legacies and the 2010 FIFA World Cup: A Case Study of Cape Town that perhaps Cape Town was
too hasty in its decision to move the hosting from Newlands to Green Point calling it "short-sighted."
Although Cape Town is facing increasing competition from other provinces for its tourists, the city still
maintains dominance as the main tourist city with more than 80% of visitors coming to Cape Town. Swart
and Urmilla argue that 2010's main impact is not the city's immediate economic gains due to 2010, but
the reinforcement of the city as a place for future visitation.12
Who held the power in the Cape Town stadium debate? The conflict between the city and the
league was ultimately dominated by FIFA who maintains taut control over all final decisions. FIFA retains
strict regulations on the capacity and quality of all stadiums regardless of the long-term development
goals associated with the city. In Cape Town, the city's Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is no longer
congruent with the location of the stadium because FIFA determined the Athlone Stadium to be
inadequate. FIFA's intervention may have lasting negative repercussions. With so much contention
between the city and FIFA, there was no place for public input. Long after 2010, these stadiums will
remain in the city as lasting memory of the event and therefore they should meet the long-term needs of
the city and the IDP. Swart and Urmilla recommend that in the future host authorities and FIFA work
together with central government agencies to avoid such complications. Decisions regarding
infrastructural investment should ultimately be the decision of the city that will bear the consequences
long after the event.13
4.4 I TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND THE CITY: SQUATTERS MAKE WAY FOR 2010
As the country prepares for the 2010 WC, many thousands of SA's poorest people face eviction
from inner city suburbs and informal settlements. In order to fulfill the FIFA requirement to present only
pleasantries, the government has proposed programming to clear all the informal settlements from the
11 Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).




cities by 2010. In its place, the government is promising to provide proper, permanent housing as a major
legacy of 2010. Municipalities have developed comprehensive housing and city development strategies to
eliminate the informal structures from cities.
Since the end of the restrictive housing policies in the 1990s, tension between the market forces
and the constitutional rights of the poor has been growing. According to SA's 1996 constitution, all people
are guaranteed the right to basic housing. Despite conflict, municipalities have continued to renovate their
cities relying on the pervasiveness of the market. Market demand and growing privatization of the housing
market has created conflict between the municipality and the people. Squatters, contesting their right to
reside in informal settlements which they call home, have been ignored and marginalized in the courts. As
a result, squatters are typically evicted to achieve a greater good like the 2010 WC.
4.4.1 I Cape Flats Redevelopment
Work began in February 2005 in the Langa Township outside of Cape Town. Early grievances
were quieted with promises of progress. The government claims that the multi-million rand N2 Gateway
Project will benefit more than 100,000 squatters along the highway leading from Cape Town's
International Airport into the city. A major bonus of hosting an event like WC is that municipalities are able
to jettison infrastructure projects, bypassing the extensive bureaucracy typically associated with such a
plan. However, there is insufficient time to gather public input. Nomaindia Mfeketo, Executive Mayor of
Cape Town, supported the project saying that it will "bring quality housing to the poor of our City on a
scale which has not been on the agenda before." Mark Julies of the Sobambisana Consortium, contractor
on the project, explained the despite the expected 150-units per hectare density, the plan is create an
urban environment consisting of open space, green space, semi-private space, and rainwater collection
points. Lindiwe Sisulu, Minister of Housing, described the project as a "win-win for everyone in Cape
Town," saying that inevitably in a project of this magnitude there will be dissent, but it is important to
consider the greater good. 14
14 Van der Linde, Fidelia. (February 15, 2005). Housing Takes the High Road. BuaNews (Cape Town).
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Image 4.2 I Informal Settlements in Cape Town's Townships15
Image 4.3 I New Buildings in Cape Town's Langa Townships
These nearly finished hostel-like residential buildings pictured above were built to replace the informal settlements
in Image 4.2. Although at first glance these buildings seem like a considerable improvement, many residents are
opposed to moving. These buildings are reminiscent of the hostels where men were housed when they originally
came to the city to work. These hostels make people uneasy. The government built it thinking that this typology
was familiar, but did not realize the negative connotation.
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Despite government promises, interviews with residents in the Langa area in June 2006 revealed
a growing cynicism. 17 The lack of public participation in the planning process has led to doubts about the
long-term benefits of the project. Residents are distrustful of government policies in general and would
prefer to live without government intervention. Field visits revealed an obvious need for improved service
delivery, but residents seem to have acclimated and formed community ties. The government promised
not to separate families or force them to move far from their current location. A laborer explained that he
would not live in a house built by somebody else. Squatter settlements have developed in this area for
many years without government intervention and many residents why the government is intervening now.
Although they remain excited for 2010, they think the country is embarrassed and want to hide them. In
order to leave a lasting legacy, municipalities must gain the trust of the residents; otherwise, constant
tension will blur the benefit of the redevelopment programs.
4.4.2 I Johannesburg - Inner City Redevelopment
Slum clearance is also occurring in Johannesburg. In 2001, Johannesburg launched its urban
renewal plan to refurbish 235 "bad buildings" (namely apartment buildings and hotels) downtown. Since
2001, Johannesburg has evicted thousands of the poorest people from the downtown. Despite legal
opposition from squatters, SA's Supreme Court of Appeals allowed Johannesburg to evict 300 squatters
from inner city buildings because the municipality classified them as unsafe. According to Johannesburg's
Inner City Regeneration Strategy, the elimination of such socioeconomic "sinkholes" is essential to
increasing property values, raising private-sector investment, reducing crime, and the overall
transformation of Johannesburg into an "African World Class City." In accordance with this strategy, the
council also introduced the Better Buildings Program which allows developers to take buildings that have
extensive utility bills in exchange for rate rebates. The City claims it is trying to protect the needs of the
city's poor with the help of the Metro Evangelical Services and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless.
Together, the once dilapidated Europa Hotel has been transformed into a low-cost, communal housing
project.
In anticipation for the 2010 WC, the poor are being marginalized by the City and denied an
adequate hearing before eviction. Underneath the rationale for the Court's ruling is the realization that in
order for SA to demonstrate pleasantries, the city must be free of squatters. Stuart Wilson of the Center
for Applied Legal Studies in Johannesburg's Witwatersrand University claims that the judge did not
protect the squatters, instead exhibiting an arbitrary exercise of power. The squatters claim that because
there is no clear strategy to provide them with adequate alternative accommodations, they cannot be
evicted. Judge Louis Harms ruled that "the obligation of the occupiers to comply with that order is not
17 In June and July 2006, I informally met with and interviewed residents of the Cape Town Townships. Upgrades
were already apparent and it became the subject of many conversations. Although some residents were optimistic
the cynicism and mistrust of government intervention was apparent.
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dependent upon their being provided with alternative accommodation, even if the effect of complying with
the order will be that they are left without access to adequate housing." The Supreme Court of Appeal
ordered the city to offer those evicted housing in a temporary settlement area. This ruling sets a
precedence allowing other WC cities to clear the cities to make way for upgrades.
The Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) estimates that most of the 26,000
squatters living in the downtown area are not living in unsafe conditions. Jean du Plessis, Director of
COHRE, called these practices a human rights violation.
These poor people choose to live in urban centers because they are
located close to formal job opportunities or points of entry into the
informal economy. They are themselves very often the victims of crime,
unprotected by an under-resourced police force, rather than the criminals
they are often made out to be. In the name of clearing these depressed
areas, they are being forcibly evicted without any credible alternative
housing or tenure options.
Many South Africans agree with COHRE's response, claiming that the only way to make any money is to
squat in the center city and save money on transportation. Nelson Khethani, a street vendor squatting
downtown said, "To forcibly remove us from our homes and send us out of the city is like the racial
segregation the apartheid regime used against us. We are not criminals-you can walk in here at 12
midnight and nothing will happen to you," he said emphatically. "We have a building committee that
controls who moves in and out, and we clean the building from top to bottom every Sunday ourselves."
Squatters like Khethani are asking the municipality to provide them with basic housing alternatives.18
18 Poor Squatters Make Way for 2010 World Cup. (April
Networks.
16, 2007). United Nations: Integrated Regional Information
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Image 4.4 1 Squatters in Johannesburg Downtown Building' 9
This downtown building is officially vacant and long since abandoned but there is clearly evidence of squatting.
Notice the curtain sheets covering the fenestration of the building to hide the number of people living in the
building. FIFA and the South African government want images like this erased before 2010.
4.4.3 I Johannesburg - Ellis Park/Bertrams Redevelopment
Bertrams is a poor, decaying suburb just outside of the inner city, adjacent to the Ellis Park
Stadium. 20 Bertrams currently houses plenty of unemployed squatters and illegal immigrants in dozens of
dilapidated buildings. The neighborhood is essentially a no-go zone at night. Ismail Farouk, an artist and
social development consultant, describes Bertrams as a poor neighborhood with considerable social
problems including high unemployment, substance abuse, and xenophobia. "Rapid urbanization and
transnational migration are both significant contributors to the ever increasing resident population who
arrive in search of new economic opportunities. Yet, Bertrams seems to have little to offer global
economies and has become a place of poverty. Bertrams has a history of displacement which dates back
80 years," says Farouk.21
The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) has identified Bertrams as part of the R2 million
greater Ellis Park Precinct Upgrades in anticipation for 2010. The JDA intends to transform abandoned
19 Photo taken by author June 30, 2006
20 Bertrams is named after Robertson Fuller Bertram, a property developer who bought the area and developed into
Johannesburg's oldest suburb in 1889.21 Gedye, Lloyd. (October 5, 2006). What World Cup? Cape Town: Mail and Guardian.
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office buildings into affordable housing and develop viable retail, commercial, and entertainment venues.
Lael Bethlehem, Chief Executive Officer of the JDA, says that the agency has been .considering improving
Bertrams for quite a while. The area has great potential for middle to low income housing because of its
location near the downtown. Bethlehem says the 2010 WC is just the catalyst needed to get things
moving. "2010 is a key moment and Bertrams must be ready by then. We don't want the area to look like
it does now," says Bethlehem. "We would like to see quite an ambitious redevelopment of Bertrams." The
JDA is offering tax breaks to investors that purchase property in Bertrams under the Urban Development
Tax Incentive. Developers who construct new buildings in these areas will receive a 2% tax write-off in
the first year, followed by a 5% annual write-off over 16 years. However, not all real estate agents are
convinced that there will be a property boom in Bertrams. Safura Dangor of Dangor Property Services
predicts that after the 2010 WC, things will go back to normal in Bertrams.22
Landlords have been returning to the buildings they previously abandoned and shamelessly
evicting squatters so that they can profit from the anticipated increase in property values. Ismail Farouk
accuses the JDA of not considering the needs of squatters in the buildings and just trying to profit from an
increased tax base. Farouk warns that randomly evicting people is just pushing the issues "under the
carpet." The JDA is "only interested in attracting new investment and have no interest in looking after the
existing residents," says Farouk.23
These planning efforts seek to regenerate the city by ignoring the predominately poor population
and the realities of the inner city. Claire Benit-Gbaffou raises the question, "The city, for whom?" in her
writing, In the Shadow of 2010, in which she describes the redevelopment of the Ellis Park/Bertrams area.
Benit-Gbaffou explains that while gentrification is necessary to stop urban decay, forced diversification
targets the poor as undesirable residents. The City Councilor of the Ellis Park neighborhood said, "We
need to remove these people, allocate them somewhere else. In the city we only need people who are
able to pay. When we develop the city we'll make it expensive. There is no other way...You cannot stay in
the city if you are not working." Benit-Gbaffou blames the JDA for not exerting its dominance over private
investors and protecting the rights of low-income residents. The danger of fast tracking redevelopment
projects of this nature is the temptation for the city to assert an authoritarian control over the powerless
low-income community by ignoring public needs. She cautions the city not to take the easiest route to
transform the city, but to try to develop a sustainable vision for the city by carefully consulting all the
relevant stakeholders. Overall, the city's redevelopment strategy lacks a clear and coordinate vision. The
Court's verdict upholding the City's and ultimately the 2010 redevelopment plan demonstrates the overt
exclusion of current residents from the city's 2010 planning.24
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Benit-Gbaffou, Claire. (2006). The City for Whom? The World Cup, Decision-Making Processes and the Poor in
Inner City Johannesburg. Johannesburg: Urban, Rural, and Economic Development, Human Sciences Research
Council, University of Witwatersrand.
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Ismail Farouk explains that these neighborhood regeneration programs need to highlight
community-based, social and cultural programs instead of working against them. In order for the
redevelopment to be successful, the city needs to upgrade the existing social infrastructure and develop
new community facilities. There are very few social and recreational facilities. This limits the development
of community and prevents the ostracized residents from having a voice. Businesses need to be
community-led enterprises based in the Bertrams neighborhood, employing Bertrams residents. This will
deliver local investment most directly. Farouk advocates that urban management interventions such as
business-improvement districts will have the most potential to boost the local economy.25
Conflict is escalating as SA enters the global arena in 2010. SA's competitiveness in the global
market is jeopardized by the informal housing. Ignoring constitutionality, South African cities have agreed
to free the city of informal settlements by 2010 in order to welcome sports fans. Marie Huchzermeyer,
professor at the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg,
writes in The Struggle for In Situ Upgrading of Informal Settlements that despite SA's desire to impress
the world market in 2010, it must still be sensitive to the needs of its people. This global competition must
be subordinate to the demands of dwellers. Rather, 2010 should be seen as a long overdue call for
increased sensitivity to the needs of the informal settlers and the failures of the market policies. 2010 calls
for extensive reform to the urban planning policies shaping the city and served as a tool with which to
revive South African cities.26
Tensions are mounting because of conflicts with SA's interpretation of squatting. People settle
informally on opportune, undeveloped land located near employment centers. Although, these informal
settlements lack adequate amenities, South African cities have ignored them, violating the squatters'
constitutional right to these basic services. Issues are only mounting now because the international
audiences will pass the settlements in 2010 and see the failures of the new democracy. Rather than
understanding the rationale for the informal settlement, cities are simply removing the settlements.27 Such
harsh controls resonate more with the old Afrikaaner government than with the socialistic ANC. Instead of
just clearing the settlements, the government should recognize the informality as a process that can
positively shape the city.
25 Farouk, Ismail. (September 4, 2006). Bertrams Neighborhood: Challenges for Development. 2010 and the Life of
the City.
University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).
26 Huchzermeyer, Marie. (October 9, 2006). The Struggle for In Situ Upgrading of Informal Settlements: Case studies




4.4.4 1 Kwazulu-Natal Redevelopment
Similar housing development is also occurring in the Kwazulu-Natal. In Kwazulu-Natal, the
government is planning to spend R1.4 billion eradicating slums in the townships where football training
camps are expected to be held. 28 Kwazi Mbanjwa, Director General of Kwazulu-Natal, announced that
more than half of the funding for slum improvements will go towards demolition.29 Monica Mjuqu, a shack
dweller at KwaMyandu, rationalized the government's actions saying that the government did not want
visiting tourists to see that millions were being spent on a single event while the majority of the country
still lived in poverty. "They are just ashamed of us and want us out of the way so that visitors coming to
the country won't see the conditions we live under," said Mjuqu. Although the government explains that
the timely upgrades were planned for a while but funding was only recently allocated. The government
argues that plans for 2010 include billions in investment to upgrade many different aspects of South
African cities including slum clearance. "The issue of slums being removed was there, even before it was
announced that SA would host 2010. The 2010 WC will not happen in isolation, it will go hand in hand
with service delivery," said Mandla Msomi, Kwazulu-Natal's provincial government spokesperson. "The
issue of providing housing to those living in slums has always been there, but we have had to prioritize
certain areas due to the World Cup." Nomfundo Mcetywa describes the government's actions as an
attempt to "hide the shame of poverty."30
4.5 1 TRANSPORTATION UPGRADES
Upgrades to public transportation are causing conflict because transportation infrastructure is
costly and its location contentious. Cities lack a formal mass transit system, relying on the informal
minibus taxis to transport people to and fro daily. South African cities are inwardly radial with all roads
leading to the inner city. Minibuses must therefore take passengers into the inner city where they typically
transfer to another minibus to travel onward. This system makes it difficult for riders to travel between
townships. Likewise, there are virtually no taxis after 7pm thus confining the poor who typically do not
own personal vehicles, to the dilapidated townships in the evenings. An efficient, reliable, and flexible
transportation system can mobilize the country facilitating movement between townships even after dark.
28 Mahlangu, L. (September 4, 2007). Tshwane Uses 2010 to Fuel Township Development. Retrieved January 15,
2008, from 2010 World Cup Homepage: www.sa2010.gov.za/news/070904tshwane.php.29 Of the R1.4 billion, R121 million will be used to clear the shacks with only R112 going to rebuild housing
development, and the remaining R1.2 billion spent upgrading the substandard hostels around Durban. The unequal
distribution of funding contributes to growing tensions.
30 Mcetywa, N. (November 11, 2007). Hiding the Shame of Poverty for 2010. The Sunday Tribune (Johannesburg).
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4.5.1 1 Building the Gautrain
The Gautrain is an 80-kilometer, rapid transit railway system that will link Johannesburg, Pretoria,
the Johannesburg International Airport, and Sandton. It will alleviate traffic on the congested roads in
Johannesburg and Pretoria, and offer a public transportation option. It is the most expensive non-stadium
project being built in anticipation for 2010 and one of the largest public-private partnerships in Africa. The
train is expected to directly and indirectly expected to create 93,000 new jobs during construction with
another 3,000 expected for operation of the train. Investors are already building new office blocks,
shopping malls, entertainment, and residential developments along the train line. By the time the WC
opens, the airport, Sandton, and Midrand stations are expected to be complete. By 2010, the Gautrain is
expected to carry 135,000 passenger trips per day at a cost of R40 per ride, reducing the number of cars
on the N1 highway, the major highway connecting Johannesburg and Pretoria by 20%. By 2011, the
system will connect Sandton to Soweto.31
Much of the criticism around the Gautrain is concern about cost. COSATU has branded the
Gautrain a "train for the rich." When it was first proposed in 2002, the anticipated cost was between R3.5
and R4 billion. A year later, after the completion of the Environmental Impact Assessment, the costs were
increased to R7 billion. In 2005 when the construction company was finally selected, it was expected to
cost R24 billion, with at least R7.1 billion coming from the central government. The Gautrain is the largest
and most expensive transportation project ever proposed monopolizing central government funding
typically shared amongst the provinces and municipalities. The Gautrain was never publicly debated and
as a result, there is constant debate over the viability and practicality of the train.32
Critics also point out that ridership levels may have been inflated. Existing public transportation
systems are underfunded and relatively underutilized, leading skeptics to doubt the Gautrain will be any
more popular. High crime rates in the area and limited connections at train stations will certainly deter
riders.33 Tickets prices at R40 per ride are also prohibitive for low-income South Africans who may pay
just R5 for a ride in a minibus taxi. Critics suggested a bus rapid transit system which can achieve similar
levels of service at a fraction of the cost.
31 Celean, Jacobson. (November 27, 2005). No Reversing Gautrain. Sunday Times (Johannesburg).
32 Cox, Anna. (November 1, 2005). Shilowa's R20bn Silence. The Star (Johannesburg).
33 Interviews with residents of Johannesburg and Pretoria confirm this assumption that high crime rates will deter
riders. For twenty years, trains have been a place for violence with people randomly setting trains on fire or holding
the entire train at gunpoint. As a result, people in Gauteng are afraid and are not likely to use the train.
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Image 4.5 I Gautrain Route Map
Ten stations have been identified already. Most of these stations are located in wealthy areas of the city confirming
the assumption that the train is for the rich. It also confirms the doubts regarding ridership since wealthier people
are not likely to use the Gautrain.
4.5.2 I Reforming the Minibuses
There is also controversy and conflict over the increased regulation of the minibus taxi industry.
The minibus taxis were an entrepreneurial venture developed by enterprising Black South Africans in
resistance to apartheid. Essentially trapped in distant townships, many Black workers travel tremendous
distances to work daily. The taxis provided people with a more direct, cheaper alternative to the national
bus transportation system. Today it is a multi-billion Rand industry carrying more than 60% of daily
commuters.3 The 15-seat minibuses are dangerous and not roadworthy. Minibus drivers are known for
having disregard for the rules of road and overloading the vehicles with passengers to increase revenue.
Since the national deregulation in 1987, the industry has become incredibly corrupt and dangerous.
Drivers have formed mafia-like associations which engage in anything from price-fixing to lucrative routes
to gang warfare. It is common for taxi drivers to carry guns to shoot rival drivers and their passengers.35
Sekhonyane, Makubetse and Jackie Dugard. (December 2004). A Violent Legacy: The Taxi Industry and
Government at Loggerheads. SA Crime Quarterly. 10: 13-18.
35 Dugard, Jackie. (May 2001). From Low Intensity War to Mafia War: Taxi Violence in South Africa (1987-2000).















In 2000, the central government passed the National Land Transport Transition Act to formalize
and regulate the taxi industry. This legislation has hit years of roadblocks and eight years later, very little
regulation has actualized. With 2010 just around the corner, the government must act to guarantee the
safety and efficiency of the transportation system. The Act calls to replace the 15-seat minibuses with 18-
and 35-seat buses. The government has heard little from the taxi drivers themselves who have been
unable to form a cohesive association to speak on their behalf. As a result, there has been disagreement
as to the nature of regulation. Unemployment is a particular concern; drivers are concerned that larger
buses mean fewer buses and fewer drivers. Researchers have tried to study prospective job loses, but
threatened with violence, the team abandoned the research. The central government has set a goal to
repair or replace 80% of the 1400 vehicle fleet by 2010. Given the considerable unrest, possibility for
violence, and lack of public input or professional, reliable research, this goal is largely unachieved and
dangerous.36
4.6 I GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES
Despite egregious costs and continued conflict, 2010 still fails to deliver basic services to South
Africans. For the most part this results because SA's government lacks coordinating mechanisms within
the management structure to organize national, provincial, and local institutions.
4.6.1 I Power Failures
In January 2008, South Africans experienced massive, widespread rolling blackouts, as supply
fell behind demand, which threatened to destabilize the national grid. President Thabo Mbeki admitted
that the privatization efforts were a mistake that was now adversely affecting the South African
economy.37 The Department of Public Enterprises declared these blackouts a national emergency when
the mines could no longer function. Rolling blackouts are creating conflict between the national agenda
and the country's WC responsibilities. The government admitted that the energy crisis would threaten the
2010 WC. Electricity generation continues to be limited because SA overstretched its resources
promising to build so many new stadiums. 38
36 Taxi Recapitalization Program, South Africa. (March 19, 2007). Engineering News.
37 Economists predict that the energy crisis has downgraded the GDP growth from the expected 6% to 4%. Global
platinum prices hit record highs as mines were shut down during the power crisis. Mining companies estimate that the
reduced mining capacity has severely downgraded the South African currency.
38 Power Outages Roil South Africa: The Country's Gold Mining Industry Struggles with Insufficient Power Supply.(January 29, 2008). Retrieved April 28, 2008 from CNN Money: www.cnnmoney.com.
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This energy crisis is not new but the government's continued insufficient response has slowed
needed infrastructure upgrades. In the late 1990s, the South African government attempted to privatize
the national power company, Eskom. When those attempts failed, the government denied Eskom's
budget request. The Sunday Times based in Johannesburg reported that, "electricity supplies remain
erratic, especially during the winter months of June and July, while visitors to Johannesburg's
international airport can find themselves stuck for over an hour to have their passports stamped on entry."
In response, Eskom tried to curb energy demand by initiated a series of rolling blackouts in
Johannesburg. But despite efforts, the Department of Public Enterprise revealed that usage increased
4.3% in 2007. The power outages challenge the nation's ability to meet its targeted 6% growth rate in the
years preceding 2010. Econometrix, a South African company that provides economic analysis, said that
job creation will be slowed because of outages and "the ability to reduce inequality between rich and poor
will take longer to achieve."39
4.6.2 1 Insufficient Provision of Water
According to the South African constitution every person has the right to clean water. Still,
surveys show that municipalities are failing to deliver the promised water and about 50 percent of South
Africans live without the basic amount of free water. In SA, basic water is defined as 25 liters per person
per day accessible within 200 meters of the home. Although SA is not water rich, it has not yet reached
first order water scarcities; rather SA suffers from second order water scarcity, i.e., while there is sufficient
water for everyone in SA, it is not allocated equitably. The delivery of water has been insufficient. Poor
people suffer from what they consider to be high costs for what should be free. The system in which the
municipality offers to relieve individual's water debt is not sufficient. People are outraged by government's
continued failure to provide basic water as is required by the Constitution. Crowds have mobilized in
various forms of protest including demanding that politicians halt privatization efforts. Frustrated crowds
have been known to disconnect power and water from politician's homes.40
The privatization of water has been an incredibly contentious policy. The government has allowed
private companies to deliver water for a fee, selling this basic human need, just like any other commodity
sold on the free market. Water delivery companies promised to bring fresh domestic water to all
households but now all households would need to pay a fee for the company to recover the costs of
installing pipes. Those utilities that remained public were forced to reduce subsidies and operate like
private businesses. Some cities simply turned their water utilities over to large water corporations in
France and Germany. This system of "Water for Profit" is new. Most people had never considered the
39 Ibid.




concept of paying for water and when the water bills showed up, people ignored them. Most could not
afford to pay for services that had once been free. To remedy this situation, the water utilities forced
people to pay before they got the water. This has caused immeasurably sickness and death. Many
people could not afford to pay and therefore live without access to fresh water. In 2000, thousands of
people could not afford the newly raised water tariffs and as a result turned to other sources of water.
Since most of SA's surface water is not suitable for consumption, SA experienced one of the largest
cholera outbreaks in recent history.41
4.7 1 WHO HOLDS THE POWER?
Poor planning has caused conflict: local versus national governments, city versus city, rich versus
poor, all versus some, FIFA versus host country, White versus Black, and WC spending versus basic
needs. These conflicts have manifested as budgetary, bureaucracy, redevelopment, housing, utilities, and
transport. Public participation is sorely lacking. In his article, A Spatial Model of Authority-Dependency
Relations in South Africa, Charles Schmidt writes that only through cooperation can spatial integration be
achieved. Building upon Schmidt's ideas, Njabulo Ndebele, Vice-Chancellor at the University of Cape
Town, writes, "We have to develop a clearer vision of the type of communities we want before the next
world event holds any emergent vision hostage to its glitter. Otherwise, it will come and go, abandoning
us to our nightmares..." 42 SA needs to develop a strategy for ensuring sustainable dialogue between all
sectors of the city bringing all the stakeholders together to develop and support a strategy for unifying the
city. Strong commitment from politicians and business leaders to integrate community input into city
planning is essential. 2010 calls the democratic process into question by demonstrating the apparent
controversies and unrest evident in SA. It forces cities to ask themselves what is the best development
scheme. Cities see 2010 as a chance to jettison infrastructure projects and transform the city by procuring
funding from the central government. By contrast, the central government sees the WC as a chance to
attract international investment and tourism. The people stand in the way of government action
demanding beneficial development projects.
41 During the apartheid era, the ANC told the people living in the townships not to pay for their utilities because this
will fund the White government. This culture of non-payment has contributed to this thirsty situation in many
townships. When the ANC government started allowing private companies to charge for the water, they needed to
explain to the township residents that now you have to pay for the utilities. Rationalizing the privation in this manner is
not entirely accurate. Yves Picaud, the managing director of Vivendi Water in SA explains that people in the
townships stop paying for water when the cost exceeds five percent of their income. In SA, the average township
resident pays more than 20% of his income for water. It is just viable for the people to pay for privatization. (Carty
2003)





This is not a dream. It is a practical policy...the successful hosting of
the FIFA World Cup in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible
momentum to [the] African renaissance...We want to ensure that
one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a
moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on
centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa's
time has come.'
- Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa
1 President Thabo Mbeki speaking to Sepp Blatter at
April 24, 2008, from SA2010: www.sa2010.gov.za.
the 2004 WC dedication ceremony. African Legacy. Retrieved
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5.1 I LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Megaevents like the 2010 WC can generate economic investment, enhance international
branding, and improve the built environment. Unfortunately, FIFA, the LOC, and South African planners
missed this opportunity to redevelop and unify the city. Event organizers failed to recognize the
possibilities for 2010 and as a result this is a wasted opportunity. The 2010 SA WC will probably be
financially and promotionally successful. But because of poor planning, strict FIFA guidelines, SA's
unique challenges, and resulting community conflict, World Cup development is not likely to create new
spatial patterns; instead of repairing the divisions within the city, 2010 development is augmenting wealth
in certain areas of the city through expensive sports stadiums without upgrading other neighborhoods.
Instead of unifying the city, stadiums are increasing the social, economic, and spatial divide. Even so,
hosting a WC is unprecedented opportunity for SA to improve its international image and elevate the
football sport.
South Africans planners should develop an integrated 2010 legacy that highlights the advantages
of the 2010 WC. The lasting legacy for cities varies depending on each city's investment to meet its
distinct challenges. A good 2010 WC legacy can be any number of things, ranging from a commitment
between government officials and the community to work collaboratively on WC projects and future
development projects to a set of strategic actions that will unify the fragmented city. But the most
successful 2010 legacy must be holistic and include changes to aspects of SA's infrastructure (stadiums
and transportation), economic (international investment and job growth), environmental (city beautification
and environmental remediation), sports (competitive sports teams and improved commercialization), and
social (community revitalization and national pride) sectors. Nationalism has been used as the rhetoric for
a lasting legacy since improvements in any of the five sectors would develop national pride. Eliminating
any of these areas limits the efficacy of 2010's legacy projects.2
2 It is important to understand the differences between the Olympics and the WC. The Olympics is held in a single city
while the WC is held across at least nine cities in a country. The enormous scale of the WC makes it incredibly
challenging. Even developed host countries have difficulty providing sufficient sports facilities in so many cities.
Unlike the Olympics, WC host cities do not build elaborate athlete housing. Infrastructure tends to focus only on






ork, 0 Utfic itoný!ý:j .......................  ..........
Image 5.1 I Lasting Legacy of 2010 World Cup 3
Discussions over the lasting legacy tend to focus on the physical transformation of the city, but
the lasting legacy can also be a change in the development dialogue. The lasting legacy of the 2010 WC
can be more than just upgraded stadiums and new road connections; it should create an entirely new way
of thinking about the city, municipal government, and the possibilities for SA.
Despite these criticisms of 2010 WC planning, there is also considerable success. The very fact
that SA will host the 2010 WC will impress the world and demonstrates incredible achievement. By 2010,
SA will have more stadium seats than any other country in Africa. SA will have upgraded five stadiums
and built five new stadiums. Infrastructure across the country and in nine cities will be improved. SA is
using the 2010 WC to experiment with new security procedures and expand its police force. A renewed
attention to public parks can bridge the social divide. Cities will have new train networks and housing as
well as an enhanced national and international status. International sponsorship is estimated to exceed all
previous WC events; such substantial investment demonstrates international support for the South
African government and its policies, and will likely continue years after the WC. Annual tourism is
increasing in the years leading up to 2010 demonstrating a renewed interest in SA globally; this interest
will continue to increase after the WC as well. South Africans are very excited to be hosting the WC. They
are developing local entrepreneurship and merchandise. Hosting the 2010 WC will elevate the status of
South African football as well. All this enthusiasm is important as SA tackles development hurdles.
3 Image designed and developed by author.
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There are important lessons learned from SA's mistakes. Future WC hosts should learn how to
improve international image, spend cautiously, use stadium development to improve the city, and invite
public participation.
5.1.1 I Improve International Image
Despite criticisms of SA's 2010 planning, the elusive benefits of identity formation and national
pride are the greatest benefits of hosting the 2010 WC. 2010 is provides SA with an opportunity to
rebrand globally. If the 2010 WC fails to provide positive economic returns, it will still be provide a
tremendous boost to the country's international image. People who have very little knowledge of SA will
learn a great deal about the country just from watching the television cameras broadcast the city skyline.
Such international recognition is even more important for a developing country which may not receive
much international media without the event. Such a positive legacy cannot be achieved without such an
international event.
The WC will demonstrate the attributes of cities previously ignored internationally. New branding
may bring new residents to cities that were previously overlooked. For example, most immigrants tend to
move to Johannesburg expecting that the largest city has the most likelihood of needing laborers, but with
the considerable availability of work in smaller cities such as Polokwane, immigrants may move
elsewhere. Internationally, people may chose Port Elizabeth over more popular and expensive vacation
destinations such as Cape Town after seeing the city's attributes during the WC.
International sporting events also offer the host country a chance to improve their sports
competitiveness. When the US was awarded the WC in 1994, it created a national football league.
Likewise, SA is also using the 2010 WC as a chance to increase the competitiveness of its football
league. This is one of the greatest legacies.
5.1.2 I Spend Cautiously
International sporting events like the FIFA WC are increasingly sought after commodities for their
capacity to expedite development goals. Instead of aiding developing countries, the rash
commercialization of these sporting events can leave enormous debt and disappointment in their wake.
Cities are fraught with actualizing these promises and developing the best possible outcomes by
building the infrastructure while managing expenditure commitments. Cities must manage misconceptions
and misrepresentations and develop the best possible outcome that does not damage the national image
or economy. During this process, capital is diverted to less productive uses such as stadium upgrades,
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without contributing to economic growth. Although stadium development can be linked to social and
economic development, such legacies are not common and can only be achieved through good design
and community collaboration. During the years preceding international sporting events, there is no
accountability for wasting funds. Corruption, greed, and corporatization can take control of city
development. Host countries must careful not to overspend on short-term sports projects.
South African WC organizers assumed that in order to impress international audiences they must
develop impressive sport-related infrastructure. But SA is more innovative and could have been the first
host country not to succumb to worldwide demands for impressive stadiums, instead using the influx of
funding to advance national development goals. By cutting costs on stadium development a few million,
SA could have provided adequate housing to all citizens. That would have been an impressive legacy that
would have earned world recognition and improved the national image.
5.1.3 1 Use Stadium Development to Improve the City
South African cities are facing immense problems emanating from the legacy of apartheid which
places the country in an unusual position as both a developed and a developing country. The South
African city has been shaped by fear, poverty, inequality, violence, and remains divided according to race
and class. Increased violence and subsequent fear has hijacked the socialist promises and turned the
post-apartheid city into the fragmented city. In spite of increased opportunities, economic investment
meant to eviscerate past injustices has led to increased poverty and inequality. There is an overall lack of
effective government management and accountability limiting the efficacy of local initiatives.
Poor design is a key failure in 2010 planning. Good design can help host cities utilize the
construction of a new sports venue to transform the city. The way the stadium is situated on the site, the
aesthetic features of the buildings, and the surrounding public spaces, contribute to the success of a new
stadium. Designers should consider these design features in order jumpstart nearby investment and
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Image 5.2 I Cycle of Fragmentation4
Image 5.2 depicts the Cycle of Fragmentation. First, SA develops new initiatives to address equity and integration in
preparation for the 2010 WC. Next, the government focuses on urban upgrading and infill development that
contribute solely to an infrastructure legacy but ignore the other aspects of the legacy such as social integration.
2010 infrastructure investments reduce spending in previously advantage communities which in turn causes the
wealthier areas to privatize which also removes funding for the upgrades from city coffers. As a result,
infrastructure upgrades are not completed as planned and conditions in poor areas worsen, thus exacerbating the
urban fragmentation. In order to avoid this cycle, SA must develop a comprehensive approach to solving the
inequality and fragmentation in the city.
5.1.4 I Invite Public Participation
What is most amazing about the SA WC is the universal excitement in anticipation of 2010. South
Africans are concerned with WC development and want to ensure that the world is impressed with SA in
2010. South Africans are huge football fans and as 2010 approaches, commonality is increasing.
Generally, camaraderie can be sustained by national support in anticipation of 2010. This social cohesion
can make it easier to plan pleasing projects, but it can also be overly dominant and restrict distinctions.
Planners must balance these obstacles and use them to change the status quo, not force unnatural
changes. WC conflict can be avoided if planners work with the local community and invite public
participation; the city's development prospects are enhanced by active citizen participation. If people can
work together in anticipation for 2010 then this may change the natural inertia to avoid community input.
Strict deadlines conflict with urban development needs; decisions must be made quickly and there is not
4 Image designed and developed by author.
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time to gather public input. In this manner, 2010 is a paradox. The 2010 WC is supposed to be a chance
for SA to flaunt a decade of democracy but by hastening construction projects to impress the world, SA is
challenging the nature of democracy at home. Despite failures in the planning process, there is no public
outcry not to host the WC, just requests to have greater legacy on South African cities.
5.2 I LESSONS FOR FIFA
Planners and developers are not entirely to blame for the missed opportunities; FIFA should
require planning studies, economic impact studies, and public input, and ensure that FIFA requirements
mirror the country's development demands. In this instance, FIFA requirements failed to recognize the
possibilities for the 2010 WC. Strict FIFA regulations insisting that the 2010 WC be like previous WCs
hosted by wealthier countries, limited the efficacy of 2010 development goals. SA is unlike any previous
WC host country and should therefore have different hosting requirements. Hosting the WC in nine cities
makes it difficult to leave a lasting legacy in any city. If FIFA permitted SA to host the WC in fewer than
the required nine cities, planners could have used funds more constructively to make a more significant
impact on fewer cities. FIFA should have required SA do more than just generate income during 2010,
but consider the lasting legacy on the built environment. Although FIFA is not responsible for the wasted
opportunities, it should have adjusted hosting requirements to suit the needs of South African
development.
FIFA requirements should also include a clause necessitating public participation in WC designs.
WC hosting opportunities should also be awarded earlier to help countries facilitate this obligation.
Considerable conflict has erupted in the absence of public opinion in WC activities. South African
democracy is challenged by the blatant absence of public input in the development process. In fact, the
public should have its own representation (separate from other politicians) on the WC committee to
ensure adequate voice.
In future WCs, FIFA should invite local planners to help develop the WC. The LOC is not the
appropriate entity to be overseeing national planning efforts. The LOC is the agency responsible for
organizing the 2010 WC. It is composed of representatives of the sports, government, and business
sectors; they are not planners and are therefore not demanding that 2010 projects improve urban futures.
Physically, the LOC is based in Johannesburg and is not capable of managing projects nationwide. The
LOC does not know the best means for jumpstarting the local economy in Polokwane or how to improve
access to the waterfront in Port Elizabeth. Instead of hiring staff that could plan such complicated
projects, the LOC is focused on the ephemeral success of the event in 2010. Although officially, all
development projects are part of an Integrated Development Plan (IDP), the IDP does not necessarily
reflect the most pressing local demands. Therefore, development projects are scattered without a holistic
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or integrated approach to improve the city. The mission of the LOC is to develop a successful WC event,
not to improve urban futures. The agency is not accountable to the public for insufficient planning.
Speaking about preparing for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA official Michael Palmer said, "When
organizing an event, people need to identify their city's priorities. City priorities differ; what Joburg wants
to achieve will not be the same as Cape Town," he said.5 2010 should not be a success for city
redevelopment, but a reexamination of the people's priorities as a means of evaluating the success of
democracy. This will ensure a lasting legacy.
5.3 I LESSONS FOR FUTURE WORLD CUP HOSTS
Megaevents like the WC offer extraordinary promise for economic investment, image
enhancement, and city improvement. Although SA has not maximized the potential of the 2010 WC, it is
still a great opportunity that will continue to provide positive returns years after the event. Even the more
intangible benefits such as international recognition provide sufficient returns on the investment. Despite
SA's failings, developing countries should still compete for international hosting opportunities like the WC.
Potential 2010 disappointments provide valuable lessons for future WC planners and particularly for
organizers from developing countries. The achievements and mistakes of the 2010 SA WC are of
particular importance to organizers for the 2014 Brazil WC who should also use the WC to advance city
development goals.
Megaevents should generate economic investment. Too often, WC investment goes primarily to
the wealthy investors and corporations. Too often, WC-related investment increases wealth for the rich
and exacerbates the financial inequalities in the host country. Brazilian planners should improve on South
African economic initiatives to ensure that WC investment filters through to all Brazilians, by creating
additional opportunities for local, independent merchandizing. Although WCs typically create thousands of
jobs, the majority of these jobs are short-term jobs in the construction and tourism industry, and few of
these jobs will remain after the WC concludes. Brazil should be mindful to ensure that WC investment
creates permanent jobs.
Perhaps the most important lesson for Brazil and future WC host countries is to use the hosting
opportunity to hasten development goals. Infrastructure design is a key challenge for future WC host
countries. SA did not employ city planners and a result, urban design is absent from WC infrastructure.
Simple features like stadium orientation, stadium materials, surrounding public spaces, parking lot layout,
and highway connections can enhance the future viability of the stadiums. Brazil should hire urban
5 Sindane, Lucky. (September 7, 2006). 2010's Impact on the City Investigated: Speakers from Various Sectors Took
Part in a Colloquium to Address Ways of Ensuring Johannesburg Gets Maximum, Sustained Mileage Out of 2010
World Cup. Retrieved March 3, 2008, from Joburg News: www.joburgnews.co.za/2006/sep/sep7_colloquium.stm.
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designers to improve stadium designs to maximize the potential for stadiums to generate long-term
positive impacts on the city.
Brazil should learn lessons from 2010. In particular, Brazil should pay attention to the public
outcry over 2010 development decisions and ensure that it listens to the needs of the people for 2014.
Likewise, FIFA should change the hosting requirements for Brazil allowing it to host in fewer cities so as
to ensure a greater impact. FIFA can facilitate a renewed focus on urban planning and help Brazil to use
WC-related infrastructure to improve the public realm. Like SA, Brazil will benefit significantly from an
improved international image. Even if the megaevent does not provide Brazil with anticipated financial
gains or city improvements, it will help the world remember the country.
Megaevents like the 2010 WC offer extraordinary promise and possibility. Both developed and
developing countries should compete for international hosting opportunities like the WC. In particular,
developing countries should use international sporting events as a chance to advance local development
goals, but must remain mindful that WC hosting responsibilities mirror local development goals and that
WC investment leaves a lasting and meaningful legacy.
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THE STADIUMS
Five of South Africa's football stadiums will undergo major renovations for 2010 to be
completed by December 2008:
" Soccer City in Johannesburg
* Ellis Park in Johannesburg
* Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria
* Royal Bafokeng Stadium in (Mafikeng) Rustenberg in North West province
* Vodacom Park in (Mangaung) Bloemfontein in the Free State
All new stadiums must be completed by October 2009. New stadiums will be built in:
* Green Point Stadium in Cape Town
* Mbombela in Nelspruit, Mpumalanga
* Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth
* Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane in Limpopo
* Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban
Kings Park and Green Point stadium will become completely new multi-sport facilities,




SOCCER CITY IN JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG
Seating Capacity: 95,000
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
Soccer City in Johannesburg (formerly known as the FNB Stadium) is earmarked to
host the opening and final matches in 2010. Originally built in 1987, Soccer City has
hosted some of the most memorable football matches in South Africa's history. The
Stadium will be enlarged by the addition of an additional tier for seating. An encircling
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ELLIS PARK IN JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG
Seating Capacity: 70,000
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
Ellis Park Stadium is a major football venue in South Africa. The Stadium will undergo
major renovations adding new upper tiers to increase seating capacity by 10,000. The
Ellis Park district is expected to spend R2 billion upgrade over the next five years.
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LOFTUS VERSFELD IN PRETORIA, GAUTENG
Seating Capacity: 45,000
Expected Completion Date: December 2008
Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria (Tshwane) is situated just five kilometers from the city center
and is home ground to the Sundowns Football Club, one of South Africa's premier
professional clubs. The stadium, originally built in 1977 has undergone considerable
renovations and its four major stands have been completely rebuilt. To qualify for
selection as a first and second round venue, the floodlights, sound system, and
scoreboard will be upgraded. Designated areas will be constructed in the lower level of
the west stand. Loftus which will only need minor upgrades to meet requirements.
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ROYAL BAKOFENG SPORTS PALACE IN RUSTENBERG, GUATENG
Seating Capacity: 40,000
Expected Completion Date: December 2008
The Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace only requires minor renovations for 2010. The
Stadium, which opened in 1999, was completely funded by the Royal Bafokeng
community (an administrative entity presiding over the world richest platinum mines).
Capacity will be increased in the stadium by construction two additional rows of seating
around the second level. New electronic scoreboards, floodlights, and a new






FREE STATE STADIUM IN BLOEMFONTEIN, FREE STATE
Seating Capacity: 40,000
Expected Completion Date: December 2008
The Free State Stadium is located just minutes from the proposed team hotels in
Bloemfontein. Complete with ample parking surround the stadium and superb executive
hospitality, the stadium will undergo minor upgrades, increasing its capacity and
installing floodlights, turnstiles, a new sound system and electronic scoreboards. This
stadium has been selected for first and second round matches.
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GREEN POINT STADIUM IN CAPE TOWN, WESTERN CAPE
Seating Capacity: 68,000
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
The Green Point Stadium in Cape Town will be transformed into a new 70,000 seat, all-
weather, multi-purpose, environmentally sustainable, modern stadium with the
picturesque Table Mountain in the backdrop. Green Point is just northwest of the central
business district and the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront. The popular Green Point market
in the area around the stadium will no longer be permitted. The stadium has been




MBOMBELA STADIUM IN NELSPRUIT, MPUMALANGA
Seating Capacity: 40,000
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
The Mbombela Stadium in Nelspruit be built on open land just seven kilometers north of
Nelspruit and is slated for completion in June 2009. The Mbombela Stadium's adaptable
design will ensure a prosperous future use as multi-sport, entertainment, and exhibition
venue. Mbombela Stadium has been proposed as a venue for both the first and second
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NELSON MANDELA STADIUM IN PORT ELIZABETH, EASTERN CAPE
Seating Capacity: 49,500
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
The Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth will be a high-tech, modern venue. It will
host the first and second matches of 2010. The stadium is centrally-located just two




PETER MOKABA STADIUM IN POLOKWANE, KWAZULU-NATAL
Seating Capacity: 40,000
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
The Peter Mokaba Stadium is located in Polokwane (formerly known as Pietersburg),
the capital of Limpopo. The stadium's main stand and grass banks will be upgraded.
The roof over the existing west stand will be replaced with a roof that covers the entire
stadium. Twenty additional rows will be built around the entire stadium increasing the
capacity significantly. The stadium will also install an electronic scoreboard, new
floodlights, sound system, and fire detection system.
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KING'S PARK STADIUM IN DURBAN, KWAZULU-NATAL
Seating Capacity: 60,000
Expected Completion Date: October 2009
The King's Park Stadium, located in Durban will be the site of the semi-final rounds of
the World Cup. A new roofs will be added to the north and south ends of the ground and





APPENDIX B I THE 2010 SAFETY AND SECURITY PLAN
The Government's Response to the Crime Problem
Despite these seemingly obvious statistics, President Thabo Mbeki claims that crime rates have
fallen ten percent since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Although widely condemned for his government's
failure to reduce violent crime, Mbeki often points to the legacy of Apartheid which left institutional
disparities that take years to defragment. In March 2007, Mbeki accused critics of his administration of
racism claiming that the criticism stems from a "significant proportion of whites" who continue to live in
fear of blacks because of racial prejudices. "For this section of our population, every reported incident of
crime communicates the frightening and expected message that the kaffirs are coming!"' Mbeki is
completely out of touch with reality. He says that police are capable of dealing with the crime and this has
caused crime to decrease. The proof is he says is the immediate arrests and subsequent conviction of
criminals. But according to the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends, SA has the second highest
murder rate in the world and has the highest occurrence of rape of any country.2
The Ministry of Safety and Security has condemned those who complain about crime. Charles
Nquakula who has been SA's Minister of Safety and Security since 2002, is planning the security plan for
2010. But he may not be the ideal planner considering his blatant disregard for the South African fears. In
June 2006, Nqakula remarked that those South Africans who are unhappy with the crime situation in SA
should leave the country.
They can continue to whine until they're blue in the face, they can
continue to be as negative as they want to, or they can simply leave this
country so that all of the peace-loving South Africans, good South
African people who want to make this a successful country, continue with
their work...Apartheid so insulated them, they did not see crime at
all...So they think therefore that our country is tottering under such a
wave of crime that they refer to it as a tsunami...They are the ones who
are hurting our people. They should be the ones to leave the country.
This remark demonstrates his sheer lack of understanding of the causes and effects of the increasing
crime problem.3 As Minster of Safety and Security, Nqakula is charged with the responsibility of lowering
crime and as a planner of 2010, he must develop means to protect all the spectators. How can Nqakula
who clearly does not understand the crime situation successfully create a safety plan? Nqakula clearly
Kaffir is a racist term used to describe black Africans during the Apartheid years.
Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).
2 Mbeki, T. (February 15, 2005). State of the Nation Address. Johannesburg, South Africa.
3 SA Minister Defends Crime Remark. (June 21,2006). BBC News.
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failed to realize the consequences of his statement as many people from around the world are planning
their possible travel arrangements to the WC.
Nqakula has also been criticized locally for promoting peace and democracy abroad during a
spate of violent crime in Gauteng. While in Burundi, there was a killing spree in Gauteng in which an
alarming number of SAPS officers were killed while performing their duties. Between January and July
2006, 54 police officers were killed in Gauteng while working. To quell fears, Nqakula announced that he
would decrease crime by December 31, 2006. Despite his planning efforts, crime has continued to rise
leading critics to assume that Nqakula is inept and therefore should not be responsible for planning the
2010 safety procedures.
The SA government has cited the success of the 2003 Cricket WC as an example of their ability
to protect visitors. The report concluded,
Foreigners were generally very satisfied with the event and South Africa.
Crime reports were at insignificant levels. 3% of visitors experienced an
incident of crime whilst here. However, 99% of visitors (94% of those
affected) said they would return again. Overall, safety and security,
which was foreigners' number one concern before they arrive here,
showed the biggest improvement in rating from before to after the event.
Overall 99 percent of visitors to the WC said that despite original concerns regarding crime, that they
would recommend SA to other visitors.4 There is no comparison between attendance and scale of the
2003 event to the enormity of the 2010 WC. Based solely on its television audience, the football WC is
larger than the Olympics. SA is expecting hundreds of thousands of visitors, compared to a few thousand
who came in 2003. Likewise, political, social, economic, and political variables have changed in SA which
may contribute to increasing instability in the country during the event. Therefore, SA's proud admission is
virtually meaningless as it relates to the 2010 WC.
In response to SA's lack of concern regarding 2010, FIFA has announced that it too is not
concerned about crime at 2010. FIFA made the following announcement on its last visit to SA in 2006.
General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security,
but the Inspection Group was not aware of any such claims during the
visit, although it was possible to read press reports on some violence in
marginal areas during our visit... We therefore came to the conclusion
4 Crime in South Africa. (2007). Available at www.southafrica-2010-accomodation.com.
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that as long as people attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FIFA family
and spectators) keep within certain boundaries, they should not
encounter any trouble.
FIFA continued by recommitting to SA for 2010 and complimenting the "comprehensive work schedule",
saying that the new stadiums, media centers, and hospitality will undoubtedly "satisfy every requirement
for the event."5 Despite these apparent comforts, rumors constantly circulate claiming that FIFA is
threatening to take the event away from SA and give it to other more developed, safer countries.
The 2010 Safety and Security Plan
The South African government has given endless excuses for reasons why the visitors to 2010
will not be affected by escalating crime. They claim that their safety plan will protect visitors. In any case,
SAPS claims that crime is mostly concentrated in areas away from the stadiums and other areas where
visitors will be located and therefore will not affect them. FIFA's strong support of SA's ability to protect
visitors has been the greatest compliment of SA's safety plan.
The likelihood for a significant number of crimes at the 2010 WC is high. During the 2006 WC,
police registered 7,000 criminal incidents during the month-long event with as many as 9,000 people
detained mostly for assault and theft or property damage crimes. Eighty percent of those arrested were
Germans and the majority of the other foreigners spoke English.6 Germany generally has a relatively low
crime rate but during the WC, crime escalated. Revelers are careless targets and as a result the
possibility for violent incidents is dramatically higher than the already extremely high number of SA
crimes.
Andre Prius, the Deputy Commissioner of SAPS is in charge of safety and security at 2010. His
experience organizing the security plans for the Rugby and Cricket WCs makes him a reliable choice for
2010. He often reminds the public that the police cannot prevent crime or change the causes of crime,
they can only act as a deterrent. His safety plan for 2010 therefore only addresses ways to increase the
strength of the police force as a deterrent rather than addressing any of the endemic causes of crime.
WC organizers, like most government officials claim that crime is not a problem in SA and visitors
should not be concerned by inflated statistics. Organizers cite more than a decade of successful and safe
hosting opportunities of high-level events such as the 1995 Rugby WC, the 1999 All Africa Games, the
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the 2003 Cricket WC. In 2002, SA pioneered a
safety model for the 37,000 World Summit attendees. This plan was so successful that it has been
5 Crime in South Africa. (2007). Available at www.southafrica-2010-accomodation.com.
6 Kruys 2007 pg. 7-8
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adopted by the United Nations as a model for its future mega events. SA's success as host has led other
host countries to ask for assistance including 2007 Cricket World Cup's Caribbean hosts.7
The South African Government and the LOC have assured FIFA that SA will be able to manage
the necessary institutional and infrastructure needed to protect the millions of attendees at the WC. SA's
Comprehensive Plan for 2010 details plans for providing safety and security measures at the WC and the
2007 Budget Plan allocated R6.8 billion for crime prevention during the event. FIFA has endorsed the
safety plans. After a recent visit to SA, Sepp Blatter, president of FIFA announced, "authorities have the
know-how and resources to manage security during 2010" adding that SA police have provided an
"excellent, comprehensive work schedule" that will "satisfy every requirement for the event."8 According to
a 2006 report to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, SA Police Services (SAPS) guaranteed the safety
and security of those associated with the WC, stating the following,
The Government guarantees to undertake all security measures
necessary to guarantee general safety and personal protection
especially at airports, inside and outside hotels, stadiums, training
grounds, the international broadcasting center, media centers, any
official areas and other areas where accredited persons and/or
spectators are present.9
According to SA's commitment to FIFA, the SA government is responsible for 80 percent of the
security outside of the stadiums and 20 percent of security inside the stadiums; the LOC Safety and
Security Department is responsible for the converse, 20 percent of safety outside of the stadiums, namely
for the players and FIFA officials and 80 percent of security inside the stadiums. Agencies are responsible
for paying the high costs of security measures accordingly.10
To protect and secure attendees, the LOC has proposed a plan that will be practiced
implemented before 2010 in order to ensure its efficiency.
* The plan calls for greater border security at land, sea, and air ports of entry to ensure that only those
legally permitted to enter the country pass through.
* Police will patrol routes commonly taken by attendees such as the route from the Johannesburg
airport to the stadiums and from the stadium to local hotels. Increased police patrols will focus on
7 Appel, M. (November 21, 2007). 2010 Security Plan in Place. BuaNews (Cape Town).
8 Ibid.
9 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010 FIFA World Cup: Submissions by Department of Home Affairs, Mangaung
Municipality and South African Police Service to the Sport and Recreation Portfolio Committee, Education and
Recreation Select Committee, July 12, 2006. Available at www.pmg.org.za/viewminute/php?id=8010
10 Kruys 2007 pg. 13
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sections of the city where FIFA events are taking place including FIFA headquarters, hotels,
stadiums, fan parks, restaurants, and other tourist venues.
* Dedicated teams will work closely with businessmen using mobile communications before and during
the event.
* In addition to command vehicles, a fleet of 40 helicopters will patrol the tournament areas with
cameras providing live feed to operation headquarters in Pretoria. This will act as a force multiplier
with senior police officers monitoring the cameras and communicating to ground patrol if they notice
something is amiss.1
* Since 2005, SAPS has been actively recruiting resulting in a total police force of 192,000 by 2010,
with 31,000 police dedicated exclusively to monitoring WC activities.
* Special courts will be available 24-hours a day throughout the tournament so that criminals can be
processed quickly and efficiently. 12
Adding extra police and general force multipliers are the overall objectives of the safety and
security plan. Such capacity building actions are essential. Eric Bost, US Ambassador to SA said in the
November 26, 2006's Sunday Times, "In the three and a half months I have been here I have never, ever
seen a local police officer just drive through [my neighborhood] in a car." Between July 2002 and July
2007, SAPS has grown from 109,000 to 164,000 and the force is expected to increase to 192,000 by
2010. Between April 2006 and March 2007, 35,000 new recruits joined the reserve units and SAPS hopes
to supplement permanent police units with an additional 100,000 reservists by 2009.13 With 31,000
officers dedicated specifically to the WC, event organizers are not concerned about crime. But some
evidence suggests that extra policing does not necessary result in a simultaneous or proportionate
reduction in crime. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's success in reducing crime in New York City is largely
attributed to improving the neighborhood by focusing police activities on specific target areas such as
drug abuse and petty crime consequently leading to a decline in other criminal activities (a practice often
known as the Broken Window Syndrome). Such actions may yield better results than simply increasing
the numbers of police officers.14
What is perhaps most important to note in the plan is the absence of many permanent
institutional changes in the way in which SA manages its crime problem. The 2007 national budget
allocated R6.8 billion specifically for crime prevention and justice services and promised an additional
R88.2 billion by 2010. R666 million will be spent just on short term safety and security measures such as
helicopters, national and local command and control centers, radio communication technology and CCTV
cameras. Funding for long term safety measures such as the recruitment and training of additional police
1 Appel 2007
12 Ibid.
13 The Changing Face of SA's Police. (July 9, 2007). Available at
http://www.southafrica.info/what happening/news/police-090707.htm14 The Crime Statistics: Are We Our Own Worse Enemy? (July 16, 2007). Markinor News (Johannesburg).
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services has yet to be allocated. WC specifics such as police salaries, temporary police accommodations,
and daily allowances for the 31,000 dedicated WC police officers have yet to be assigned.,s
Other permanent improvements to SAPS include an improved communication system. By 2010,
SAPS will institute a computerized performance management system to assess and evaluate police
performance. In October 2007, Gauteng launched a new radio communications network featuring an
automated vehicle tracking system that will indicate in real time the number and location of police
vehicles. Improved tracking systems will help call center operators send the nearest available police
vehicles via the fastest routes to the emergency. Likewise, the system will ensure that police officers are
patrolling in their designated areas at all times. The Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal are expected to
develop similar systems by 2010.16
Elaborate crime prevention command and control units and helicopters may meet the needs of
the WC but are not practical for everyday crime fighting. Hiring additional police is the only long-lasting
element of this plan. However, hiring additional police is insufficient if the additional police do not have
reliable vehicles to get to crime areas quickly. Most importantly, the plan does not call for a national
realignment to reduce the causes of crime as well as ways to improve reduction policies.
Organized crime and large-scale crime is also a major concern. Corruption at ticket sales has
been a feature at previous WCs. During the Los Angeles Olympic Games, more crimes were perpetrated
by convicted felons who were hired or volunteered to help during the games committed more crimes than
any other group during the event.17 Government and private agencies are collaborating to reduce such
crime. Nine government agencies have teamed up to combat crime for 2010, forming the National
Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC), to "create a channel for the disposition of information
across government." The Ministry of Safety and Security has been working with the South African
Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) to prevent cash-in-transit heists and other organized crimes.
SABRIC has been supplying the Ministry with "information that relates to intelligence regarding people
who might want to mount armed robberies against financial institutions in the country." Business Against
Crime has also been collaborating offering CCTV systems for use during the event. Musanda Satellite
Campus in Pretoria is offering additional training courses for intelligence officers to help train the many
new recruits. Also the Electronic Communications Security Company is expected to open its new security
operations center at the beginning of 2008, which will protect critical information and communication
infrastructure from unauthorized access and attack. As for international terrorism, Barry Gilder, the
15 The Changing Face of SA's Police 2007
16 The Changing Face of SA's Police 2007
17 South Africa: Crime May be Own Goal That Bedevils SA's World Cup. (January 31, 2007). AIIAfrica.com
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chairman of NICOC, said that South Africa would be facing similar challenges with respect to terrorism
and other international crime elements as previous FIFA hosts.18
World Cup Causes Crime to Increase
Concerns that this mammoth event will lead to increases in national crime rates before, during,
and after the event are mounting. The HSRC's annual survey concludes crime-weary South Africans list
crime as the greatest disadvantage to hosting the WC. Between 2005 and 2006, concerns about crime as
the major disadvantage rose between 8 and 25 percent, depending on demographic, race, class, and
location.19 Despite the differences between respondents, concerns over crime are the one uniting force in
SA. Regardless of race, Udesh Pillay, leader of the HSRC said, "People see this [World Cup] as a feeding
ground that will enhance crime because there is so much up for grabs."20 The survey also concludes that
most South Africans are not as concerned about safety during the month-long event so much as general
crime increases in SA.
During major international events such as the FIFA WC, criminals are able to sneak into the
country via laxer immigration practices and engage in criminal activities such as drug smuggling. Barry
Gilder, the chairman of NICOC calls this one of the major challenges of reducing crime in SA in
anticipation for 2010. Although SA has composed a plan to protect its borders, some criminals will surely
sneak through.21
With so much police attention on the stadiums and the WC, criminals in other cities and other
areas of event cities will be able to act freely. Nqakula and SAPS has admitted that much of the crime is
occurring on the fringe areas. As a result SAPS should focus more of its attention on these areas with
increased crime. But with so many visitors coming to SA and so much international attention on the WC
venues, SAPS must instead concentrate on protecting the international visitors. As a result, crime will
surely increase with decreased police presence. So while SA may be able to control crime temporarily
while in the public limelight, these actions will not lead to decreased crime permanently.22
The murder rate in SA rose most dramatically until 2001 and since then it has remained similar
high levels. The SA government's insignificant response to this escalating crime problem has for the most
part ignored the issue. For the most part, President Mbeki and Charles Nqakula, Minster of Safety and
18Benton, S. (August 30, 2007). SA Intelligence Services Gear Up to Thwart Criminality During World Cup." BuaNews
Online (Cape Town).
19 The HSRC survey concluded that fears about crime increased from 19.1 percent to 28.3 percent in women, from
18.8 percent to 20.6 percent in men, from 15.2 percent to 28.2 percent for rural dwellers, from 18.9 percent to 25.3
percent in tribal settings, from 21.2 percent to 30.8 percent in urbanites, and from 15.5 percent to 25.3 percent in the
informal settlements.20 Mannak, Miriam. (February 7, 2007). Crime, South Africa and the 2010 World Cup. World Press (Cape Town).21 The Changing Face of SA's Police 2007
22 Alexander, Adam. Can Football Save South Africa from its Biggest Threat? (August 22, 2006). The Raw Story.
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Security have pretended that there is no crime problem, claiming that racism is causing people to doubt
the possibilities of the new black government. On the off chance that the politicians admit the problem,
they use the old politician's trick of appearing to be doing something when in reality, they are not doing
anything. According to the US State Department, "2010 will be more factor that will make the government
here want to protect its citizens and visitors." Crime expert, Johan Burger, a researched linked to the
Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria believes that the inequalities in wealth are the major contributor to
the rising crime rates across the country. He says, "But I think the government lacks a proper
understanding of what we are confronted with...The idea that you can combat crime deeply rooted in
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